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Practical Implications of Game Theory and Consumer Rights

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  • KS.DhanyaShankar

    (St.Mary's College)

Abstract

Game theory is the formal study of conflict and cooperation. Game theoretic concepts apply whenever the actions of several agents are interdependent. These agents may be individuals, groups, firms, or any combination of these. The concepts of game theory provide a language to formulate structure, analyse, and understand strategic scenarios. Supermarkets are one such industry which is characterized by narrow profit margin and cut throat competition which had necessitated the need for the formulation and implementation of strategic decision. This interplay of decision making is similar to that of a game. This game of strategy can be used to test the real world theoretical implications of game theory. Thus from this context there arises the need of a study to test the game theory against the experimental evidences of real world economy and the analysis of the implications of game theory in experimental economics.

Suggested Citation

  • KS.DhanyaShankar, 2019. "Practical Implications of Game Theory and Consumer Rights," Shanlax International Journal of Economics, Shanlax Journals, vol. 7(2), pages 11-19, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:acg:journl:v:7:y:2019:i:2:p:11-19
    DOI: 10.34293/economics.v7i2.307
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Dixit, Avinash, 1982. "Recent Developments in Oligopoly Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(2), pages 12-17, May.
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