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Insurance Pricing and Anti-Discrimination Legislation

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  • Alan E. Woodfield

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  • Alan E. Woodfield, 1994. "Insurance Pricing and Anti-Discrimination Legislation," Agenda - A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics, vol. 1(2), pages 197-204.
    • Handle: RePEc:acb:agenda:v:1:y:1994:i:2:p:197-204
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    2. Riley, John G, 1979. "Informational Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 331-359, March.
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