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Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring

In: A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Bernard, Benjamin & Frei, Christoph, 2016. "The folk theorem with imperfect public information in continuous time," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), May.
  2. Staudigl, Mathias & Steg, Jan-Henrik, 2014. "On Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring: From Discrete to Continuous Time," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 525, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
  3. , & ,, 2015. "A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
  4. Fudenberg, Drew & Olszewski, Wojciech, 2011. "Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 86-99, May.
  5. Osório, António (António Miguel), 2015. "Brownian Signals: Information Quality, Quantity and Timing in Repeated Games," Working Papers 2072/260962, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  6. Pierre Yared, 2008. "The Use of Concessions in Forestalling War," 2008 Meeting Papers 32, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  7. Pierre Cardaliaguet & Catherine Rainer & Dinah Rosenberg & Nicolas Vieille, 2016. "Markov Games with Frequent Actions and Incomplete Information—The Limit Case," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 41(1), pages 49-71, February.
  8. Takuo Sugaya & Alexander Wolitzky, 2023. "Monitoring versus Discounting in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(5), pages 1727-1761, September.
  9. Ryota Iijima & Akitada Kasahara, 2016. "Gradual Adjustment and Equilibrium Uniqueness under Noisy Monitoring," ISER Discussion Paper 0965, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  10. Osório, António (António Miguel), 2015. "Some Notes and Comments on the Efficient use of Information in Repeated Games with Poisson Signals," Working Papers 2072/249233, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  11. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2013. "Tail Probabilities for Triangular Arrays," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000685, David K. Levine.
  12. Susan Athey & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2017. "Yuliy Sannikov: Winner of the 2016 Clark Medal," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 31(2), pages 237-256, Spring.
  13. Keller, Godfrey & Rady, Sven, 2015. "Breakdowns," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
  14. Yared, Pierre, 2010. "A dynamic theory of war and peace," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 1921-1950, September.
  15. Osório-Costa, António M., 2009. "Frequent Monitoring in Repeated Games under Brownian Uncertainty," MPRA Paper 13104, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  16. Osório António M., 2012. "A Folk Theorem for Games when Frequent Monitoring Decreases Noise," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-27, April.
  17. Osório Costa, Antonio Miguel, 2012. "The Limits of Discrete Time Repeated Games:Some Notes and Comments," Working Papers 2072/203171, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  18. Aislinn Bohren, 2016. "Using Persistence to Generate Incentives in a Dynamic Moral Hazard Problem," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 15 Oct 2016.
  19. Osório-Costa, António M., 2009. "Efficiency Gains in Repeated Games at Random Moments in Time," MPRA Paper 13105, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  20. David Rahman, 2014. "The Power of Communication," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(11), pages 3737-3751, November.
  21. Fudenberg, Drew & Ishii, Yuhta & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2014. "Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 487-514.
  22. Daehyun Kim & Ichiro Obara, 2023. "Asymptotic Value of Monitoring Structures in Stochastic Games," Papers 2308.09211, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.
  23. António Osório, 2018. "Brownian Signals: Information Quality, Quantity and Timing in Repeated Games," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 52(2), pages 387-404, August.
  24. Roman, Mihai Daniel, 2010. "A game theoretic approach of war with financial influences," MPRA Paper 38389, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  25. Eduardo Faingold, 2020. "Reputation and the Flow of Information in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(4), pages 1697-1723, July.
  26. Osório, António (António Miguel), 2017. "Brownian Signals: Information Quality, Quantity and Timing in Repeated Games," Working Papers 2072/290761, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  27. Osório Costa, Antonio Miguel, 2011. "Public Monitoring with Uncertainty in the Time Repetitions," Working Papers 2072/179668, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  28. Bohren, J. Aislinn, 2024. "Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(1), January.
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