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Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Kwiek, Maksymilian, 2017. "Efficient voting with penalties," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 468-485.
  2. Gersbach, Hans & Tejada, Oriol, 2020. "Semi-flexible Majority Rules for Public Good Provision," CEPR Discussion Papers 15099, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Gary-Bobo, Robert J. & Jaaidane, Touria, 2000. "Polling mechanisms and the demand revelation problem," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 203-238, May.
  4. Martin Besfamille & Jean-Marie Lozachmeur, 2010. "NIMBY and mechanism design under different constitutional constraints," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 17(2), pages 114-132, April.
  5. Chen, Roy & Chen, Yan & Liu, Yang & Mei, Qiaozhu, 2017. "Does team competition increase pro-social lending? Evidence from online microfinance," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 311-333.
  6. Chakravarty, Surajeet & Kaplan, Todd R. & Myles, Gareth, 2018. "When costly voting is beneficial," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 33-42.
  7. Jin Yeub Kim, 2020. "Efficient and Neutral Mechanisms in Almost Ex Ante Bargaining Problems," Working papers 2020rwp-174, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
  8. Søberg, Morten & Tangerås, Thomas P., 2003. "Voter Turnout in Direct Democracy: Theory and Evidence," Working Paper Series 596, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  9. Jin Yeub Kim, 2022. "Neutral public good mechanisms," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 17(4), pages 1-16, April.
  10. Helmut Bester & Karl Wärneryd, 2006. "Conflict and the Social Contract," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(2), pages 231-249, July.
  11. Kopányi-Peuker, Anita & Offerman, Theo & Sloof, Randolph, 2017. "Fostering cooperation through the enhancement of own vulnerability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 273-290.
  12. Lagunoff, Roger, 1997. "On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provision of public projects," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 21(10), pages 1699-1725, August.
  13. Daniel McFadden, 2009. "The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(1), pages 77-100, April.
  14. Ledyard, John O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2002. "The approximation of efficient public good mechanisms by simple voting schemes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 153-171, February.
  15. Jin Yeub Kim, 2019. "Neutral Public Good Mechanisms," Working papers 2019rwp-159, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
  16. Michela Chessa & Patrick Loiseau, 2017. "Enhancing Voluntary Contribution in a Public Goods Economy via a Minimum Individual Contribution Level," GREDEG Working Papers 2017-24, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France, revised Feb 2023.
  17. Ledyard, John O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2007. "A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 441-466, March.
  18. Giebe, Thomas & Schweinzer, Paul, 2014. "Consuming your way to efficiency: Public goods provision through non-distortionary tax lotteries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 1-12.
  19. Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2015. "A Dynamic Non-direct Implementation Mechanism for Interdependent Value Problems, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 15-023, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Jun 2015.
  20. Jin Yeub Kim, 2021. "A Unique and Robust Social Contract: An Application to Negotiations with Probabilistic Conflicts," Working papers 2021rwp-187, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
  21. Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2015. "Informational size and two-stage mechanisms," PIER Working Paper Archive 15-011, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  22. Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Chris Forman, 1999. "Reciprocity and the Costs of Authority Relationships," Discussion Papers 1281, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  23. Pérez-Nievas, Mikel, 2000. "Interim efficient allocation mechanisms," UC3M Working papers. Economics 7220, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  24. Giovanni Maggi & Massimo Morelli, 2006. "Self-Enforcing Voting in International Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1137-1158, September.
  25. Peter Norman, 2004. "Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 71(4), pages 1163-1188.
  26. Lien, Jaimie W. & Zheng, Jie & Zhong, Xiaohan, 2017. "Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 98-120.
  27. Gradstein, Mark, 1998. "Provision of public goods in a large economy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 229-234, November.
  28. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele, 2020. "Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 108-116.
  29. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1996. "Balanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 59, David K. Levine.
  30. McLean, Richard P. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2017. "A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 34-48.
  31. Didier Laussel & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2003. "Efficient Equilibria in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism with Private Information," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(3), pages 449-478, July.
  32. Martin F. Hellwig, 2003. "Public-Good Provision with Many Participants," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(3), pages 589-614.
  33. E. Glen Weyl, 2017. "The robustness of quadratic voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 172(1), pages 75-107, July.
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