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Mechanism Design With Aftermarkets: Cutoff Mechanisms

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Dirk Bergemann & Marco Ottaviani, 2021. "Information Markets and Nonmarkets," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2296, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  2. Samuel Antill & Darrell Duffie, 2021. "Augmenting Markets with Mechanisms [Optimal Execution of Portfolio Transactions]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(4), pages 1665-1719.
  3. Alexander Teytelboym & Shengwu Li & Scott Duke Kominers & Mohammad Akbarpour & Piotr Dworczak, 2021. "Discovering Auctions: Contributions of Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(3), pages 709-750, July.
  4. Shota Ichihashi, 2020. "Online Privacy and Information Disclosure by Consumers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(2), pages 569-595, February.
  5. Miltiadis Makris & Ludovic Renou, 2018. "Information design in multi-stage games," Working Papers 861, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  6. Wang, Dazhong & Xu, Xinyi & Zeng, Xianjie, 2023. "Comparisons of standard royalty auctions with seller post-auction effort," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
  7. Kolotilin, Anton & Li, Hongyi, 2021. "Relational communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(4), November.
  8. Alex Smolin, 2023. "Disclosure and pricing of attributes," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 54(4), pages 570-597, December.
  9. Rivera Mora, Ernesto, 2024. "Mechanism design with belief-dependent preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
  10. Nishimura, Takeshi, 2022. "Informed principal problems in bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
  11. Escudé, Matteo & Sinander, Ludvig, 2023. "Slow persuasion," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(1), January.
    • Matteo Escud'e & Ludvig Sinander, 2019. "Slow persuasion," Papers 1903.09055, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.
  12. Daniel Krähmer & Roland Strausz, 2023. "Optimal Nonlinear Pricing with Data-Sensitive Consumers," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 80-108, May.
  13. Ran Canetti & Amos Fiat & Yannai A. Gonczarowski, 2023. "Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms," Papers 2302.05590, arXiv.org.
  14. Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts, 2021. "Auctions with signaling concerns," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(2), pages 420-448, May.
  15. Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2022. "Information design in sequential procurement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 79-85.
  16. Andreas A. Haupt & Nicole Immorlica & Brendan Lucier, 2023. "Certification Design for a Competitive Market," Papers 2301.13449, arXiv.org.
  17. Hendricks, Ken & Wiseman, Thomas, 2022. "How to sell in a sequential auction market," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(4), November.
  18. Andreas Haupt & Zoe Hitzig, 2023. "Opaque Contracts," Papers 2301.13404, arXiv.org.
  19. Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2019. "Sequential procurement with limited commitment," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-030, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  20. Miguel A. Fonseca & Francesco Giovannoni & Miltiadis Makris, 2020. "Auctions with external incentives: experimental evidence," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(4), pages 1003-1043, December.
  21. Oliver Bos & Martin Pollrich, 2020. "Optimal Auctions With Signaling Bidders," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2020_158, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  22. Kenneth Hendricks & Thomas Wiseman, 2021. "How To Sell (or Procure) in a Sequential Auction," Papers 2110.13121, arXiv.org.
  23. Martino Banchio & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2022. "Artificial Intelligence and Auction Design," Papers 2202.05947, arXiv.org.
  24. Cho, Myeonghwan & Song, Joon, 2022. "Auctioning business licenses to engage in Cournot competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
  25. Mohammad Akbarpour & Shengwu Li, 2020. "Credible Auctions: A Trilemma," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(2), pages 425-467, March.
  26. Skreta, Vasiliki & Doval, Laura, 2021. "Purchase history and product personalization," CEPR Discussion Papers 15969, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  27. Moshe Babaioff & Nicole Immorlica & Yingkai Li & Brendan Lucier, 2021. "Making Auctions Robust to Aftermarkets," Papers 2107.05853, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2022.
  28. Martino Banchio & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2022. "Artificial Intelligence and Auction Design," NBER Chapters, in: Economics of Artificial Intelligence, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  29. Roberto Sarkisian & Takuro Yamashita, 2024. "Optimal student allocation with peer effects," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 28(3), pages 551-571, September.
  30. Yoav Kolumbus & Joe Halpern & 'Eva Tardos, 2024. "Paying to Do Better: Games with Payments between Learning Agents," Papers 2405.20880, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2025.
  31. Rasouli, Mohammad & Somaini, Paulo, 2024. "Contracts with aftermarket substitution: The case of PG&E and electricity batteries," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 374(C).
  32. Chen, Yanlin & Hu, Audrey & Zhang, Jun, 2024. "Optimal auction design with aftermarket Cournot competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 54-65.
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