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Robust Mechanisms Under Common Valuation

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Stefan Seifert & Silke Hüttel, 2023. "Is there a risk of a winner’s curse in farmland auctions?," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 50(3), pages 1140-1177.
  2. Seifert, Stefan & Hüttel, Silke, 2020. "Common values and unobserved heterogeneity in farmland auctions in Germany," FORLand Working Papers 21 (2020), Humboldt University Berlin, DFG Research Unit 2569 FORLand "Agricultural Land Markets – Efficiency and Regulation".
  3. Mark Armstrong & Jidong Zhou, 2022. "Consumer Information and the Limits to Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(2), pages 534-577, February.
  4. Wei He & Jiangtao Li & Weijie Zhong, 2024. "Rank-Guaranteed Auctions," Papers 2408.12001, arXiv.org.
  5. Yeon-Koo Che & Weijie Zhong, 2021. "Robustly Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods," Papers 2105.02828, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.
  6. Roesler, Anne-Katrin & Deb, Rahul, 2021. "Multi-Dimensional Screening: Buyer-Optimal Learning and Informational Robustness," CEPR Discussion Papers 16206, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Bergemann, Dirk & Brooks, Benjamin & Morris, Stephen, 2020. "Countering the winner's curse: optimal auction design in a common value model," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(4), November.
  8. Takuro Yamashita & Shuguang Zhu, 2022. "On the Foundations of Ex Post Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 494-514, November.
  9. NAKADA, Satoshi & NITZAN, Shmuel & UI, Takashi & 宇井, 貴志, 2017. "Robust Voting under Uncertainty," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-60, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
  10. Eduardo Perez‐Richet & Vasiliki Skreta, 2022. "Test Design Under Falsification," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(3), pages 1109-1142, May.
  11. Yi-Chun Chen & Xiangqian Yang, 2020. "Information Design in Optimal Auctions," Papers 2010.08990, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
  12. Chen, Yi-Chun & Yang, Xiangqian, 2023. "Information design in optimal auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
  13. Toomas Hinnosaar & Keiichi Kawai, 2020. "Robust pricing with refunds," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(4), pages 1014-1036, December.
  14. Navin Kartik & Weijie Zhong, 2023. "Lemonade from Lemons: Information Design and Adverse Selection," Papers 2305.02994, arXiv.org.
  15. Alex Suzdaltsev, 2020. "Distributionally Robust Pricing in Independent Private Value Auctions," Papers 2008.01618, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2020.
  16. Alex Suzdaltsev, 2020. "An Optimal Distributionally Robust Auction," Papers 2006.05192, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2020.
  17. Rosenthal, Maxwell, 2023. "Robust incentives for risk," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
  18. Kim, Kyungmin & Koh, Youngwoo, 2022. "Auctions with flexible information acquisition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 256-281.
  19. Carl Heese & Stephan Lauermann, 2021. "Persuasion and Information Aggregation in Elections," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 112, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
  20. Wanchang Zhang, 2021. "Correlation-Robust Optimal Auctions," Papers 2105.04697, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
  21. Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2024. "Information Requirements for Mechanism Design," PIER Working Paper Archive 24-035, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  22. Suzdaltsev, Alex, 2022. "Distributionally robust pricing in independent private value auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
  23. Ju Hu & Xi Weng, 2021. "Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 909-953, October.
  24. Zihao Li & Jonathan Libgober & Xiaosheng Mu, 2022. "Sequentially Optimal Pricing under Informational Robustness," Papers 2202.04616, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2024.
  25. Tang, Rui & Zhang, Mu, 2021. "Maxmin implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
  26. Wanchang Zhang, 2021. "Random Double Auction: A Robust Bilateral Trading Mechanism," Papers 2105.05427, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
  27. Julio Backhoff-Veraguas & Patrick Beissner & Ulrich Horst, 2022. "Robust contracting in general contract spaces," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(4), pages 917-945, June.
  28. Tommaso Denti & Doron Ravid, 2023. "Robust Predictions in Games with Rational Inattention," Papers 2306.09964, arXiv.org.
  29. Shixin Wang, 2024. "Semi-Separable Mechanisms in Multi-Item Robust Screening," Papers 2408.13580, arXiv.org.
  30. Jin Xi & Haitian Xie, 2021. "Strength in Numbers: Robust Mechanisms for Public Goods with Many Agents," Papers 2101.02423, arXiv.org, revised May 2023.
  31. He, Wei & Li, Jiangtao, 2022. "Correlation-robust auction design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
  32. S. Nageeb Ali & Nima Haghpanah & Xiao Lin & Ron Siegel, 2020. "How to Sell Hard Information," Papers 2010.08037, arXiv.org.
  33. Wanchang Zhang, 2022. "Robust Private Supply of a Public Good," Papers 2201.00923, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
  34. In-Koo Cho & Jonathan Libgober, 2022. "Learning Underspecified Models," Papers 2207.10140, arXiv.org.
  35. Longjian Li, 2022. "Ambiguous Cheap Talk," Papers 2209.08494, arXiv.org.
  36. Ethan Che, 2019. "Distributionally Robust Optimal Auction Design under Mean Constraints," Papers 1911.07103, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2022.
  37. Wanchang Zhang, 2022. "Auctioning Multiple Goods without Priors," Papers 2204.13726, arXiv.org.
  38. Jin Xi & Haitian Xie, 2023. "Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(3), pages 649-683, October.
  39. Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2018. "A Very Robust Auction Mechanism," PIER Working Paper Archive 18-001, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 16 Jan 2018.
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