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Stable Matching With Incomplete Information

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Li, Mengling, 2020. "Ties matter: Improving efficiency in course allocation by allowing ties," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 354-384.
  2. George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson, 2017. "Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(604), pages 2041-2065, September.
  3. Hoyer, B. & Stroh-Maraun, N., 2020. "Matching strategies of heterogeneous agents under incomplete information in a university clearinghouse," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 453-481.
  4. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2017. "Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 744-759.
  5. Artemov, Georgy, 2021. "Assignment mechanisms: Common preferences and information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
  6. Matthew Ellman & Tomás Rodríguez Barraquer, 2016. "Strategic grouping and search for quality journalism, online versus offline," Working Papers 16-21, NET Institute.
  7. Pomatto, Luciano, 2022. "Stable matching under forward-induction reasoning," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(4), November.
  8. Seungjin Han, 2019. "Pre-Match Investment Competition with Bounded Transfers," Department of Economics Working Papers 2019-01, McMaster University.
  9. Shi, Fanqi, 2021. "Stability in sequential matching with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 492-502.
  10. Farzad Pourbabaee, 2024. "Reputation, learning and project choice in frictional economies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 78(4), pages 1075-1115, December.
  11. Laurens Cherchye & Thomas Demuynck & Bram De Rock & Frederic Vermeulen, 2017. "Household Consumption When the Marriage Is Stable," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(6), pages 1507-1534, June.
  12. Kamishiro, Yusuke & Vohra, Rajiv & Serrano, Roberto, 2023. "Signaling, screening, and core stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
  13. Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano & Myrna Wooders, 2021. "Monopolists of scarce information and small group effectiveness in large quasilinear economies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(4), pages 801-827, December.
  14. repec:ris:msuecw:2019_008 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Britta Hoyer & Nadja Stroh-Maraun, 2017. "Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse," Working Papers CIE 110, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
  16. Alston, Max, 2020. "On the non-existence of stable matches with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 336-344.
  17. Marcelo Ariel Fernandez & Kirill Rudov & Leeat Yariv, 2022. "Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 18-33, March.
  18. Peralta, Esteban, 2024. "Not all is lost: Sorting and self-stabilizing sets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 51-58.
  19. Benoit Decerf & Guillaume Haeringer & Martin Van der Linden, 2024. "Incontestable Assignments," Papers 2401.03598, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
  20. Dasgupta, Sulagna, 2024. "Designing information to improve welfare in matching markets," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 5-16.
  21. Anton M Unakafov & Thomas Schultze & Alexander Gail & Sebastian Moeller & Igor Kagan & Stephan Eule & Fred Wolf, 2020. "Emergence and suppression of cooperation by action visibility in transparent games," PLOS Computational Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 16(1), pages 1-32, January.
  22. Jin Yeub Kim, 2022. "Neutral public good mechanisms," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 17(4), pages 1-16, April.
  23. Timm Opitz & Christoph Schwaiger, 2023. "Reciprocal Preferences in Matching Markets," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 388, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  24. Cook, Jonathan & Kowaleski, Zachary T. & Minnis, Michael & Sutherland, Andrew & Zehms, Karla M., 2020. "Auditors are known by the companies they keep," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1).
  25. Tatiana Daddario & Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2024. "An assignment problem with interdependent valuations and externalities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 78(2), pages 567-592, September.
  26. Gregory Z. Gutin & Philip R. Neary & Anders Yeo, 2021. "Unique Stable Matchings," Papers 2106.12977, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
  27. Kloosterman, Andrew & Troyan, Peter, 2020. "School choice with asymmetric information: priority design and the curse of acceptance," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
  28. Li Chen & Juan Sebastian Pereyra Barreiro, 2015. "Self-Selection in School Choice," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2015-52, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  29. Dizdar, Deniz & Moldovanu, Benny, 2016. "On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 106-123.
  30. Terence R. Johnson, 2019. "Synchronized matching with incomplete information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 67(3), pages 589-616, April.
  31. L. Elisa Celis & Amit Kumar & Nisheeth K. Vishnoi & Andrew Xu, 2024. "Centralized Selection with Preferences in the Presence of Biases," Papers 2409.04897, arXiv.org.
  32. Bikhchandani, Sushil, 2017. "Stability with one-sided incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 372-399.
  33. Tat Chan & Yijun Chen & Chunhua Wu, 2023. "Collaborate to Compete: An Empirical Matching Game Under Incomplete Information in Rank-Order Tournaments," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 42(5), pages 1004-1026, September.
  34. Chen Shengqun & Wang Yingming & Shi Hailiu & Lin Yang & Li Meijuan, 2016. "Two-Sided Matching Decision-Making with Uncertain Information Under Multiple States," Journal of Systems Science and Information, De Gruyter, vol. 4(2), pages 186-194, April.
  35. Maxey, Tyler, 2024. "School choice with costly information acquisition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 248-268.
  36. Doval, Laura, 2022. "Dynamically stable matching," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.
  37. Scotchmer, Suzanne & Shannon, Chris, 2019. "Verifiability and group formation in markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 417-477.
  38. Emiliya Lazarova & Dinko Dimitrov, 2017. "Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(1), pages 29-49, March.
  39. Kenny Peng & Nikhil Garg, 2024. "Wisdom and Foolishness of Noisy Matching Markets," Papers 2402.16771, arXiv.org.
  40. Koch, Caleb M., 2019. "Index-wise comparative statics," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 35-41.
  41. Chen, Yi-Chun & Hu, Gaoji, 2024. "Bayesian stable states," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 102-116.
  42. Chen, Li & Sebastián Pereyra, Juan, 2019. "Self-selection in school choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 59-81.
  43. Kawaguchi, Riho & Yanagisawa, Daichi & Nishinari, Katsuhiro, 2019. "Decision-making with reference information," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 519(C), pages 109-118.
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