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Stable Matching With Incomplete Information

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2017. "Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 744-759.
  2. George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson, 2017. "Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(604), pages 2041-2065, September.
  3. Artemov, Georgy, 2021. "Assignment mechanisms: Common preferences and information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
  4. Matthew Ellman & Tomás Rodríguez Barraquer, 2016. "Strategic grouping and search for quality journalism, online versus offline," Working Papers 16-21, NET Institute.
  5. Pomatto, Luciano, 2022. "Stable matching under forward-induction reasoning," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(4), November.
  6. Farzad Pourbabaee, 2024. "Reputation, learning and project choice in frictional economies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 78(4), pages 1075-1115, December.
  7. Laurens Cherchye & Thomas Demuynck & Bram De Rock & Frederic Vermeulen, 2017. "Household Consumption When the Marriage Is Stable," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(6), pages 1507-1534, June.
  8. Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano & Myrna Wooders, 2021. "Monopolists of scarce information and small group effectiveness in large quasilinear economies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(4), pages 801-827, December.
  9. Marcelo Ariel Fernandez & Kirill Rudov & Leeat Yariv, 2022. "Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 18-33, March.
  10. Dasgupta, Sulagna, 2024. "Designing information to improve welfare in matching markets," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 5-16.
  11. Anton M Unakafov & Thomas Schultze & Alexander Gail & Sebastian Moeller & Igor Kagan & Stephan Eule & Fred Wolf, 2020. "Emergence and suppression of cooperation by action visibility in transparent games," PLOS Computational Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 16(1), pages 1-32, January.
  12. Jin Yeub Kim, 2022. "Neutral public good mechanisms," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 17(4), pages 1-16, April.
  13. Kamishiro, Yusuke & Vohra, Rajiv & Serrano, Roberto, 2023. "Signaling, screening, and core stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
  14. Gregory Z. Gutin & Philip R. Neary & Anders Yeo, 2021. "Unique Stable Matchings," Papers 2106.12977, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
  15. Li Chen & Juan Sebastian Pereyra Barreiro, 2015. "Self-Selection in School Choice," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2015-52, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  16. L. Elisa Celis & Amit Kumar & Nisheeth K. Vishnoi & Andrew Xu, 2024. "Centralized Selection with Preferences in the Presence of Biases," Papers 2409.04897, arXiv.org.
  17. Tat Chan & Yijun Chen & Chunhua Wu, 2023. "Collaborate to Compete: An Empirical Matching Game Under Incomplete Information in Rank-Order Tournaments," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 42(5), pages 1004-1026, September.
  18. Chen Shengqun & Wang Yingming & Shi Hailiu & Lin Yang & Li Meijuan, 2016. "Two-Sided Matching Decision-Making with Uncertain Information Under Multiple States," Journal of Systems Science and Information, De Gruyter, vol. 4(2), pages 186-194, April.
  19. Doval, Laura, 2022. "Dynamically stable matching," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.
  20. Emiliya Lazarova & Dinko Dimitrov, 2017. "Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(1), pages 29-49, March.
  21. Chen, Yi-Chun & Hu, Gaoji, 2024. "Bayesian stable states," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 102-116.
  22. Kawaguchi, Riho & Yanagisawa, Daichi & Nishinari, Katsuhiro, 2019. "Decision-making with reference information," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 519(C), pages 109-118.
  23. Li, Mengling, 2020. "Ties matter: Improving efficiency in course allocation by allowing ties," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 354-384.
  24. Hoyer, B. & Stroh-Maraun, N., 2020. "Matching strategies of heterogeneous agents under incomplete information in a university clearinghouse," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 453-481.
  25. Seungjin Han, 2019. "Pre-Match Investment Competition with Bounded Transfers," Department of Economics Working Papers 2019-01, McMaster University.
  26. Shi, Fanqi, 2021. "Stability in sequential matching with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 492-502.
  27. repec:ris:msuecw:2019_008 is not listed on IDEAS
  28. Britta Hoyer & Nadja Stroh-Maraun, 2017. "Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse," Working Papers CIE 110, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
  29. Alston, Max, 2020. "On the non-existence of stable matches with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 336-344.
  30. Peralta, Esteban, 2024. "Not all is lost: Sorting and self-stabilizing sets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 51-58.
  31. Benoit Decerf & Guillaume Haeringer & Martin Van der Linden, 2024. "Incontestable Assignments," Papers 2401.03598, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
  32. Timm Opitz & Christoph Schwaiger, 2023. "Reciprocal Preferences in Matching Markets," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 388, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  33. Cook, Jonathan & Kowaleski, Zachary T. & Minnis, Michael & Sutherland, Andrew & Zehms, Karla M., 2020. "Auditors are known by the companies they keep," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1).
  34. Tatiana Daddario & Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2024. "An assignment problem with interdependent valuations and externalities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 78(2), pages 567-592, September.
  35. Kloosterman, Andrew & Troyan, Peter, 2020. "School choice with asymmetric information: priority design and the curse of acceptance," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
  36. Dizdar, Deniz & Moldovanu, Benny, 2016. "On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 106-123.
  37. Terence R. Johnson, 2019. "Synchronized matching with incomplete information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 67(3), pages 589-616, April.
  38. Bikhchandani, Sushil, 2017. "Stability with one-sided incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 372-399.
  39. Maxey, Tyler, 2024. "School choice with costly information acquisition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 248-268.
  40. Scotchmer, Suzanne & Shannon, Chris, 2019. "Verifiability and group formation in markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 417-477.
  41. Kenny Peng & Nikhil Garg, 2024. "Wisdom and Foolishness of Noisy Matching Markets," Papers 2402.16771, arXiv.org.
  42. Koch, Caleb M., 2019. "Index-wise comparative statics," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 35-41.
  43. Chen, Li & Sebastián Pereyra, Juan, 2019. "Self-selection in school choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 59-81.
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