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Adverse Selection in Reverse Auctions for Ecosystem Services

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Cited by:

  1. Frans P. Vries & Nick Hanley, 2016. "Incentive-Based Policy Design for Pollution Control and Biodiversity Conservation: A Review," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(4), pages 687-702, April.
  2. Claron, Charles & Mikou, Mehdi & Levrel, Harold & Tardieu, Léa, 2022. "Mapping urban ecosystem services to design cost-effective purchase of development rights programs: The case of the Greater Paris metropolis," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
  3. Banerjee, Simanti & Conte, Marc N., 2017. "Balancing Complexity and Rent-Seeking in Multi-Attribute Conservation Procurement Auctions: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment," 2018 Allied Social Sciences Association (ASSA) Annual Meeting, January 5-7, 2018, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 266293, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
  4. Swallow, Stephen K., 2013. "Demand-side Value for Ecosystem Services and Implications for Innovative Markets: Experimental Perspectives on the Possibility of Private Markets for Public Goods," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(1), pages 33-56, April.
  5. Whitten, Stuart M., 2017. "Designing and implementing conservation tender metrics: Twelve core considerations," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 561-571.
  6. Paul J. Burke, 2016. "Undermined by Adverse Selection: Australia's Direct Action Abatement Subsidies," Economic Papers, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 35(3), pages 216-229, September.
  7. Samuel D. Bell & Nadia A. Streletskaya, 2019. "The Random Quantity Mechanism: Laboratory and Field Tests of a Novel Cost-Revealing Procurement Mechanism," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 73(3), pages 899-921, July.
  8. Lundberg, Liv & Persson, U. Martin & Alpizar, Francisco & Lindgren, Kristian, 2018. "Context Matters: Exploring the Cost-effectiveness of Fixed Payments and Procurement Auctions for PES," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 347-358.
  9. Vogt, Nora & Bizer, Kilian, 2013. "Lock-in effects in competitive bidding schemes for payments for ecosystem services: Revisiting the fundamental transformation," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 158, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
  10. Marc N. Conte & Robert Griffin, 2019. "Private Benefits of Conservation and Procurement Auction Performance," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 73(3), pages 759-790, July.
  11. Susan Stratton Sayre, 2019. "Pay for the Option to Pay? The Impact of Improved Scientific Information on Payments for Ecosystem Services," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 73(2), pages 591-625, June.
  12. Leah H. Palm-Forster & Paul J. Ferraro & Nicholas Janusch & Christian A. Vossler & Kent D. Messer, 2019. "Behavioral and Experimental Agri-Environmental Research: Methodological Challenges, Literature Gaps, and Recommendations," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 73(3), pages 719-742, July.
  13. Bruno Wichmann & Peter Boxall & Scott Wilson & Orsolya Pergery, 2017. "Auctioning Risky Conservation Contracts," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 68(4), pages 1111-1144, December.
  14. Hellerstein, Daniel M., 2017. "The US Conservation Reserve Program: The evolution of an enrollment mechanism," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 601-610.
  15. Nora Vogt, 2015. "Environmental Risk Negatively Impacts Trust and Reciprocity in Conservation Contracts: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(3), pages 417-431, November.
  16. Wallander, Steven & Paul, Laura A. & Ferraro, Paul J. & Messer, Kent D. & Iovanna, Richard, 2023. "Informational nudges in conservation auctions: A field experiment with U.S. farmers," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).
  17. Howard, Gregory E. & Zhang, Wendong & Valcu-Lisman, Adriana M., 2021. "Evaluating the Efficiency-Participation Tradeoff in Agricultural Conservation Programs: The Effect of Reverse Auctions, Spatial Targeting, and Higher Offered Payments," 2021 Annual Meeting, August 1-3, Austin, Texas 313926, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
  18. Jacob R. Fooks & Kent D. Messer & Joshua M. Duke, 2015. "Dynamic Entry, Reverse Auctions, and the Purchase of Environmental Services," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 91(1), pages 57-75.
  19. Stephanie Rosch & Sharon Raszap Skorbiansky & Collin Weigel & Kent D. Messer & Daniel Hellerstein, 2021. "Barriers to Using Economic Experiments in Evidence‐Based Agricultural Policymaking," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 43(2), pages 531-555, June.
  20. Pengfei Liu, 2021. "Balancing Cost Effectiveness and Incentive Properties in Conservation Auctions: Experimental Evidence from Three Multi-award Reverse Auction Mechanisms," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 78(3), pages 417-451, March.
  21. Simanti Banerjee & Anthony Kwasnica & James Shortle, 2015. "Information and Auction Performance: A Laboratory Study of Conservation Auctions for Spatially Contiguous Land Management," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 61(3), pages 409-431, July.
  22. Leah H. Palm-Forster & Scott M. Swinton & Frank Lupi & Robert S. Shupp, 2016. "Too Burdensome to Bid: Transaction Costs and Pay-for-Performance Conservation," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 98(5), pages 1314-1333.
  23. Harriet Toto Olita & Md. Sayed Iftekhar & Steven G. M. Schilizzi, 2023. "Optimizing contract allocation for risky conservation tenders," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 25(1), pages 63-85, January.
  24. Jacob R. Fooks & Kent D. Messer & Maik Kecinski, 2018. "A Cautionary Note on the Use of Benefit Metrics for Cost-Effective Conservation," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 71(4), pages 985-999, December.
  25. Gregory Howard & Wendong Zhang & Adriana Valcu‐Lisman & Philip W. Gassman, 2024. "Evaluating the tradeoff between cost effectiveness and participation in agricultural conservation programs," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 106(2), pages 712-738, March.
  26. Lewis, David J. & Polasky, Stephen, 2018. "An auction mechanism for the optimal provision of ecosystem services under climate change," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 20-34.
  27. Janusch, Nicholas R. & Messer, Kent D. & Ferraro, Paul J. & Allen, William, 2017. "Farmer participation in nutrient management practices in Delaware: A field experiment," 2017 Annual Meeting, July 30-August 1, Chicago, Illinois 258456, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
  28. Marc N. Conte & Robert M. Griffin, 2017. "Quality Information and Procurement Auction Outcomes: Evidence from a Payment for Ecosystem Services Laboratory Experiment," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 99(3), pages 571-591, April.
  29. Messer, Kent D. & Duke, Joshua M. & Lynch, Lori & Li, Tongzhe, 2017. "When Does Public Information Undermine the Efficiency of Reverse Auctions for the Purchase of Ecosystem Services?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 212-226.
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