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Moving the Goalposts

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2019. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(1), pages 44-95, March.
  2. Zhao, Wei & Mezzetti, Claudio & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2024. "Contracting over persistent information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(2), May.
  3. Benjamin H'ebert & Weijie Zhong, 2022. "Engagement Maximization," Papers 2207.00685, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.
  4. Gleb Romanyuk & Alex Smolin, 2019. "Cream Skimming and Information Design in Matching Markets," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 250-276, May.
  5. Jacopo Bizzotto & Adrien Vigier, 2021. "Can a better informed listener be easier to persuade?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 705-721, October.
  6. Pietro Ortoleva & Evgenii Safonov & Leeat Yariv, 2021. "Who Cares More? Allocation with Diverse Preference Intensities," Working Papers 2021-10, Princeton University. Economics Department..
  7. Kolotilin, Anton & Li, Hongyi, 2021. "Relational communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(4), November.
  8. Raphael Boleslavsky, 2023. "Waiting for Fake News," Papers 2304.04053, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
  9. Wu, Wenhao, 2023. "Sequential Bayesian persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
  10. Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit & Hernández, Penélope & Neeman, Zvika & Solan, Eilon, 2023. "Markovian persuasion with two states," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 292-314.
  11. Andrew Koh & Sivakorn Sanguanmoo, 2022. "Attention Capture," Papers 2209.05570, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.
  12. Jan Knoepfle, 2024. "Dynamic Competition for Attention," Papers 2409.18595, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
  13. Oleg Muratov, 2023. "Entrepreneur–Investor Information Design," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 64(4), pages 1431-1467, November.
  14. Ian Ball, 2023. "Dynamic Information Provision: Rewarding the Past and Guiding the Future," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(4), pages 1363-1391, July.
  15. Maxim Senkov, 2022. "Setting Interim Deadlines to Persuade," Papers 2210.08294, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.
  16. Shih-Tang Su & Vijay G. Subramanian & Grant Schoenebeck, 2021. "Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials," Papers 2110.09594, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2021.
  17. Modibo Camara & Jason Hartline & Aleck Johnsen, 2020. "Mechanisms for a No-Regret Agent: Beyond the Common Prior," Papers 2009.05518, arXiv.org.
  18. Patrick DeJarnette & David Dillenberger & Daniel Gottlieb & Pietro Ortoleva, 2020. "Time Lotteries and Stochastic Impatience," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(2), pages 619-656, March.
  19. Chang Liu, 2021. "Motivating Effort with Information about Future Rewards," Papers 2110.05643, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
  20. Gottardi, Piero & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2024. "Shuttle diplomacy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
  21. Alex Smolin, 2021. "Dynamic Evaluation Design," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 300-331, November.
  22. Kaya, Ayça, 2023. "Paying with information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), May.
  23. Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit & Hernández, Penélope & Neeman, Zvika & Solan, Eilon, 2023. "Markovian persuasion with two states," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119970, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  24. Tal Alon & Paul Dutting & Yingkai Li & Inbal Talgam-Cohen, 2022. "Bayesian Analysis of Linear Contracts," Papers 2211.06850, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
  25. Aleksandr Alekseev, 2022. "Give me a challenge or give me a raise," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(1), pages 170-202, February.
  26. Zeinab Aboutalebi & Ayush Pant, 2021. "Believe ... and you are there. On Self-Confidence and Feedback," Working Papers 64, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
  27. Teddy Mekonnen & Zeky Murra-Anton & Bobak Pakzad-Hurson, 2023. "Persuaded Search," Papers 2303.13409, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.
  28. Du, Ninghua & Shahriar, Quazi, 2024. "Information disclosure in mitigating moral hazard: An experimental investigation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 284-299.
  29. Marco Serena, 2021. "The value of information on deadlines; successful opaque management," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(2), pages 377-397, June.
  30. Nuta, Shunya, 2024. "Starting rough, Dynamic persuasion with partial information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 239(C).
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