Paying with information
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References listed on IDEAS
- Dmitry Orlov & Andrzej Skrzypacz & Pavel Zryumov, 2020. "Persuading the Principal to Wait," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(7), pages 2542-2578.
- Pak Hung Au, 2015. "Dynamic information disclosure," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(4), pages 791-823, October.
- Jacopo Bizzotto & Jesper Rüdiger & Adrien Vigier, 2021. "Dynamic Persuasion with Outside Information," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 179-194, February.
- Jeffrey C. Ely & Martin Szydlowski, 2020. "Moving the Goalposts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(2), pages 468-506.
- Li, Cheng, 2017. "A model of Bayesian persuasion with transfers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 93-95.
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Cited by:
- Ian Ball, 2023. "Dynamic Information Provision: Rewarding the Past and Guiding the Future," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(4), pages 1363-1391, July.
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More about this item
Keywords
Informational incentives; information control; agency costs;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
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