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A Folk Theorem for Competing Mechanisms

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Lester, Benjamin & Visschers, Ludo & Wolthoff, Ronald, 2015. "Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 1-15.
  2. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2018. "A Mechanism Design Approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(2), pages 735-760.
  3. James Albrecht & Pieter A. Gautier & Susan Vroman, 2014. "Efficient Entry in Competing Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(10), pages 3288-3296, October.
  4. Larionov, Daniil & Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2021. "First Best Implementation with Costly Information Acquisition," TSE Working Papers 21-1261, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Apr 2022.
  5. Lester, Benjamin & Visschers, Ludo & Wolthoff, Ronald, 2014. "Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets," 2007 Annual Meeting, July 29-August 1, 2007, Portland, Oregon TN 2015-36, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  6. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2019. "Private communication in competing mechanism games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 258-283.
  7. Seungjin Han & Andrew Leal, 2024. "Competing Mechanisms in Games Played Through Agents: Theory and Experiment," Papers 2403.03317, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.
  8. Cristian Troncoso-Valverde, 2013. "Competing Auctions with Heterogeneous Goods," Working Papers 46, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad Diego Portales.
  9. Koessler, Frédéric & Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane, 2013. "Committing to transparency to resist corruption," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 117-126.
  10. Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Thomas Mariotti & Alessandro Pavan, 2021. "Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms," CEIS Research Paper 519, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 21 Oct 2021.
  11. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Mariotti, Thomas & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2021. "Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: Two examples," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 79-93.
  12. Han, Seungjin, 2012. "On take it or leave it offers in common agency," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 777-781.
  13. Han, Seungjin, 2015. "Robust competitive auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 207-210.
  14. Seungjin Han, 2019. "General Competing Mechanisms with Frictions," Department of Economics Working Papers 2019-09, McMaster University.
  15. Michael Peters & Balázs Szentes, 2012. "Definable and Contractible Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(1), pages 363-411, January.
  16. repec:ubc:pmicro:michael_peters-2015-8 is not listed on IDEAS
  17. Seungjin Han, 2018. "Neutralized Competition," Department of Economics Working Papers 2018-11, McMaster University.
  18. Alessandro Pavan & Giacomo Calzolari, 2010. "Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 132-190, May.
  19. Gorkem Celik & Michael Peters, 2016. "Reciprocal relationships and mechanism design," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 49(1), pages 374-411, February.
  20. Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser & Uday Rajan, 2012. "Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 16(4), pages 283-296, December.
  21. Seungjin Han, 2015. "Competing Mechanisms: Theory and Applications in Directed Search Markets," Department of Economics Working Papers 2015-07, McMaster University, revised May 2016.
  22. Albrecht, James & Cai, Xiaoming & Gautier, Pieter & Vroman, Susan, 2020. "Multiple applications, competing mechanisms, and market power," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
  23. Han, Seungjin, 2014. "Implicit collusion in non-exclusive contracting under adverse selection," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 85-95.
  24. Peters, Michael, 2015. "Reciprocal contracting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 102-126.
  25. Peters, Michael, 2014. "Competing Mechanisms," Microeconomics.ca working papers michael_peters-2014-7, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 19 Feb 2014.
  26. Han Seungjin, 2016. "Sellers’ Implicit Collusion in Directed Search Markets," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 711-738, June.
  27. Peters, Michael, 2010. "On the Revelation Principle and Reciprocal Mechanisms in Competing Mechanism Games," Microeconomics.ca working papers michael_peters-2010-18, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 19 Feb 2014.
  28. Seungjin Han, 2020. "Quasi Ex-Post Equilibrium in Competing Mechanisms," Department of Economics Working Papers 2020-11, McMaster University.
  29. Michael Peters, 2014. "Competing mechanisms," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 47(2), pages 373-397, May.
  30. Zhu, Shuguang, 2023. "Private disclosure with multiple agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
  31. Peck, James, 2018. "Competing mechanisms with multi-unit consumer demand," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 126-161.
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