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Criminal constitutions

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Peter Leeson, 2014. "Pirates, prisoners, and preliterates: anarchic context and the private enforcement of law," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 365-379, June.
  2. Kurzfeld, Jonathan, 2024. "Strategic anarchy; a model of prison violence as a means to informal governance and rent extraction," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
  3. Ken Yahagi, 2019. "Law enforcement with criminal organizations and endogenous collaboration," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(3), pages 351-363, December.
  4. Darcy W E Allen, 2020. "When Entrepreneurs Meet:The Collective Governance of New Ideas," World Scientific Books, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., number q0269, September.
  5. David Skarbek & Peng Wang, 2015. "Criminal rituals," Global Crime, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(4), pages 288-305, October.
  6. Francesco Drago & Roberto Galbiati, 2012. "Indirect Effects of a Policy Altering Criminal Behavior: Evidence from the Italian Prison Experiment," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 199-218, April.
  7. Harris, Colin, 2018. "Institutional solutions to free-riding in peer-to-peer networks: a case study of online pirate communities," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(5), pages 901-924, October.
  8. Roberto Galbiati & Arnaud Philippe, 2014. "3. Enfermez-les tous ! Dissuasion et effets pervers des politiques répressives," Regards croisés sur l'économie, La Découverte, vol. 0(1), pages 44-57.
  9. Golz, Michael & D'Amico, Daniel J., 2018. "Market concentration in the international drug trade," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 28-42.
  10. Marciano, Alain & Ramello, Giovanni B., 2019. "Introduction to the symposium on the empirics of judicial institutions," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 73-80, February.
  11. Franklin G. Mixon, 2018. "Camaraderie, common pool congestion, and the optimal size of surf gangs," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 381-396, November.
  12. Daniel D’Amico, 2012. "Comparative political economy when anarchism is on the table," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 25(1), pages 63-75, March.
  13. Rustam Romaniuc & Katherine Farrow & Lisette Ibanez & Alain Marciano, 2016. "The perils of government enforcement," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 161-182, January.
  14. James Kostelnik & David Skarbek, 2013. "The governance institutions of a drug trafficking organization," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(1), pages 95-103, July.
  15. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/53r60a8s3kup1vc9l61c56pa6 is not listed on IDEAS
  16. Catino, Maurizio, 2015. "Mafia rules. The role of criminal codes in mafia organizations," Scandinavian Journal of Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 536-548.
  17. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/53r60a8s3kup1vc9l61c56pa6 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. Skarbek, David, 2012. "Prison gangs, norms, and organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 96-109.
  19. Freire, Danilo, 2017. "Prison Gangs," SocArXiv kuqqx, Center for Open Science.
  20. Escalante, Edwar E., 2020. "Night watchers and terrorists," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 116-131.
  21. Peter T. Leeson & David B. Skarbek, 2010. "Criminal constitutions," Global Crime, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(3), pages 279-297, August.
  22. Peter T. Leeson & Daniel J. Smith & Nicholas A. Snow, 2012. "Hooligans," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 122(2), pages 213-231.
  23. Daniel J. D'Amico, 2017. "The Social Provision of Punishment and Incarceration," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 76(5), pages 1107-1132, November.
  24. Lessing, Benjamin & Willis, Graham Denyer, 2019. "Legitimacy in Criminal Governance: Managing a Drug Empire from Behind Bars," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 113(2), pages 584-606, May.
  25. Ken Yahagi, 2018. "Welfare effects of forming a criminal organization," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 359-375, December.
  26. Nicholas A. Curott & Alexander Fink, 2012. "Bandit Heroes: Social, Mythical, or Rational?," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(2), pages 470-497, April.
  27. Stefano Dughera & Alain Marciano, 2020. "Altruism, predation and the Samaritan's dilemma," Working Papers hal-02550432, HAL.
  28. David Skarbek, 2024. "The political economy of criminal governance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 200(1), pages 1-24, July.
  29. Rustam Romaniuc & Katherine Farrow & Lisette Ibanez & Alain Marciano, 2016. "The perils of government enforcement," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 161-182, January.
  30. Skarbek, David, 2011. "Governance and Prison Gangs," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 105(4), pages 702-716, November.
  31. Leeson, Peter T., 2010. "Pirational choice: The economics of infamous pirate practices," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 497-510, December.
  32. Roth, M. Garrett & Skarbek, David, 2014. "Prison Gangs and the Community Responsibility System," Review of Behavioral Economics, now publishers, vol. 1(3), pages 223-243, May.
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