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How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections?
Citations
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Cited by:
- Marek M. Kaminski, 2015. "Empirical examples of voting paradoxes," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 20, pages 367-387, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- D. Marc Kilgour & Jean-Charles Grégoire & Angèle M. Foley, 2020. "The prevalence and consequences of ballot truncation in ranked-choice elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 184(1), pages 197-218, July.
- Gehrlein, William V. & Lepelley, Dominique & Moyouwou, Issofa, 2016.
"A note on Approval Voting and electing the Condorcet loser,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 115-122.
- William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley & Issofa Moyouwou, 2016. "A note on Approval Voting and electing the Condorcet loser," Post-Print hal-01452548, HAL.
- Conal Duddy, 2017. "Geometry of run-off elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(3), pages 267-288, December.
- Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2021. "Measuring Violations of Positive Involvement in Voting," Papers 2106.11502, arXiv.org.
- Eric Kamwa, 2019.
"Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser,"
Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 87(3), pages 299-320, October.
- Eric Kamwa, 2019. "The Condorcet Efficiency of the Preference Approval Voting and the Probability of Selecting the Condorcet Loser," Post-Print hal-01786121, HAL.
- Eric Kamwa, 2022.
"Scoring rules, ballot truncation, and the truncation paradox,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 192(1), pages 79-97, July.
- Eric Kamwa, 2022. "Scoring Rules, Ballot Truncation, and the Truncation Paradox," Post-Print hal-03632662, HAL.
- Moyouwou, Issofa & Tchantcho, Hugue, 2017. "Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 70-82.
- Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2020.
"On Some k -scoring Rules for Committee Elections: Agreement and Condorcet Principle,"
Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(5), pages 699-725.
- Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2020. "On some k-scoring rules for committee elections: agreement and Condorcet Principle," Post-Print hal-02147735, HAL.
- Antoine Rolland & Jean-Baptiste Aubin & Irène Gannaz & Samuela Leoni, 2024. "Probabilistic models of profiles for voting by evaluation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 63(2), pages 377-400, September.
- Aleksei Y. Kondratev & Alexander S. Nesterov, 2020. "Measuring majority power and veto power of voting rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(1), pages 187-210, April.
- Nicholas R. Miller, 2017. "Closeness matters: monotonicity failure in IRV elections with three candidates," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 91-108, October.
- William Gehrlein & Florenz Plassmann, 2014. "A comparison of theoretical and empirical evaluations of the Borda Compromise," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(3), pages 747-772, October.
- Dan S. Felsenthal & Hannu Nurmi, 2018. "Monotonicity Violations by Borda’s Elimination and Nanson’s Rules: A Comparison," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 637-664, August.
- Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2019. "On some k-scoring rules for committee elections: agreement and Condorcet Principle," Working Papers hal-02147735, HAL.
- Dougherty, Keith L. & Heckelman, Jac C., 2020. "The probability of violating Arrow’s conditions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
- Menezes, Mozart B.C. & da Silveira, Giovani J.C. & Drezner, Zvi, 2016. "Democratic elections and centralized decisions: Condorcet and Approval Voting compared with Median and Coverage locations," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 253(1), pages 195-203.
- Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2020. "Split Cycle: A New Condorcet Consistent Voting Method Independent of Clones and Immune to Spoilers," Papers 2004.02350, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
- Diss, Mostapha & Dougherty, Keith & Heckelman, Jac C., 2023.
"When ties are possible: Weak Condorcet winners and Arrovian rationality,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 128-136.
- Mostapha Diss & Keith Dougherty & Jac Heckelman, 2023. "When ties are possible: Weak Condorcet winners and Arrovian rationality," Post-Print hal-04419865, HAL.
- Jac C. Heckelman, 2021. "Characterizing plurality using the majoritarian condition: a new proof and implications for other scoring rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 335-346, December.
- Eric Kamwa, 2021. "To what extent does the model of processing sincereincomplete rankings affect the likelihood of the truncation paradox?," Working Papers hal-02879390, HAL.
- Dominique Lepelley & Issofa Moyouwou & Hatem Smaoui, 2018.
"Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(1), pages 1-33, January.
- Dominique Lepelley & Issofa Moyouwou & Hatem Smaoui, 2018. "Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules," Post-Print hal-01697627, HAL.
- Eric Kamwa, 2022. "Scoring Rules, Ballot Truncation, and the Truncation Paradox," Working Papers hal-03632662, HAL.
- David McCune & Adam Graham-Squire, 2023. "Monotonicity Anomalies in Scottish Local Government Elections," Papers 2305.17741, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
- Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), 2015. "Handbook of Social Choice and Voting," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 15584.
- Felix Brandt & Chris Dong & Dominik Peters, 2024. "Condorcet-Consistent Choice Among Three Candidates," Papers 2411.19857, arXiv.org.