The prevalence and consequences of ballot truncation in ranked-choice elections
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00723-2
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Cited by:
- Anne T. Byrne & David R. Just & Christopher B. Barrett, 2023.
"But it came from a food pantry: Product stigma and quality perceptions of food pantry offerings,"
Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 54(2), pages 327-344, March.
- Byrne, Anne T. & Just, David R. & Barrett, Christopher B., 2021. "But it came from a food pantry: Product stigma and quality perceptions of food pantry offering," Working Papers 315740, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
- Eric Kamwa, 2022. "Scoring Rules, Ballot Truncation, and the Truncation Paradox," Working Papers hal-03632662, HAL.
- Eric Kamwa, 2022.
"Scoring rules, ballot truncation, and the truncation paradox,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 192(1), pages 79-97, July.
- Eric Kamwa, 2022. "Scoring Rules, Ballot Truncation, and the Truncation Paradox," Post-Print hal-03632662, HAL.
- Lonna Rae Atkeson & Eli McKown‐Dawson & Jack Santucci & Kyle L. Saunders, 2024. "The impact of voter confusion in ranked choice voting," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 105(4), pages 1029-1041, July.
- David McCune & Jennifer Wilson, 2023. "Ranked-choice voting and the spoiler effect," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(1), pages 19-50, July.
- Mallory Dickerson & Erin Martin & David McCune, 2023. "An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Ballot Truncation on Ranked-Choice Electoral Outcomes," Papers 2306.05966, arXiv.org.
- Jac C. Heckelman, 2021. "Characterizing plurality using the majoritarian condition: a new proof and implications for other scoring rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 335-346, December.
- Brian Duricy, 2023. "Preferences on Ranked-Choice Ballots," Papers 2301.02697, arXiv.org.
- David McCune & Adam Graham-Squire, 2023. "Monotonicity Anomalies in Scottish Local Government Elections," Papers 2305.17741, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
- Kiran Tomlinson & Johan Ugander & Jon Kleinberg, 2022. "Ballot Length in Instant Runoff Voting," Papers 2207.08958, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2022.
- Adam Graham-Squire & David McCune, 2023. "An Examination of Ranked Choice Voting in the United States, 2004-2022," Papers 2301.12075, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2023.
- David McCune & Adam Graham-Squire, 2024. "Monotonicity anomalies in Scottish local government elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 63(1), pages 69-101, August.
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More about this item
Keywords
Ranked-choice selection; Single-winner; Ballot truncation; Ballot exhaustion;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- K16 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Election Law
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