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A Partisanship Theory of Fiscal and Monetary Regimes

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1991. "Regional economic conditions and the FOMC votes of district presidents," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Mar, pages 3-16.
  2. Niklas Potrafke, 2018. "Government ideology and economic policy-making in the United States—a survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 174(1), pages 145-207, January.
  3. Cover, James P. & VanHoose, David D., 2000. "Political pressures and the choice of the optimal monetary policy instrument," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 52(4), pages 325-341.
  4. Carola Conces Binder, 2021. "Political Pressure on Central Banks," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(4), pages 715-744, June.
  5. Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1991. "Are district presidents more conservative than board governors?," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Sep, pages 3-12.
  6. Robert Hudson & Kevin Keasey & Mike Dempsey, 1998. "Share prices under Tory and Labour governments in the UK since 1945," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(4), pages 389-400.
  7. Dodge Cahan & Luisa Doerr & Niklas Potrafke, 2019. "Government ideology and monetary policy in OECD countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(3), pages 215-238, December.
  8. Kuper, Gerard & Veurink, Jan Hessel, 2014. "Central bank independence and political pressure in the Greenspan era," Research Report 14020-EEF, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
  9. Michael Berlemann & Gunther Markwardt, 2007. "Unemployment and Inflation Consequences of Unexpected Election Results," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(8), pages 1919-1945, December.
  10. Dodge Cahan & Niklas Potrafke, 2021. "The Democrat-Republican presidential growth gap and the partisan balance of the state governments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 577-601, December.
  11. Thomas Havrilesky, 1990. "Distributive Conflict And Monetary Policy," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 8(2), pages 50-61, April.
  12. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Schaling, E., 1993. "Central bank independence : Theory and evidence (Revised version)," Other publications TiSEM a26d2af2-01f7-4f0f-b2e9-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  13. Fredrik Carlsen, 1998. "Rational Partisan Theory: Empirical Evidence for the United States," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(1), pages 64-82, July.
  14. Chappell, Henry Jr. & Havrilesky, Thomas M. & McGregor, Rob Roy, 1995. "Policymakers, institutions, and central bank decisions," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 113-136, May.
  15. José I. García de Paso, 1993. "Central Bank Structure and monetary policy uncertainty," Documentos de Trabajo del ICAE 9314, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico.
  16. James E. Alt, 1991. "Leaning into the Wind or Ducking out of the Storm: U.S. Monetary Policy in the 1980s," NBER Chapters, in: Politics and Economics in the Eighties, pages 41-82, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. repec:dgr:rugsom:14020-eef is not listed on IDEAS
  18. Berlemann, Michael & Markwardt, Gunther, 2003. "Partisan cycles and pre-electoral uncertainty," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 01/03, Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
  19. Patrick Artus, 1995. "Effets internes et internationaux de l'indépendance des banques centrales," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 46(3), pages 857-867.
  20. Christopher J. Ellis & Mark A. Thoma, 1991. "Causality In Political Business Cycles," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 9(2), pages 39-49, April.
  21. Pantzalis, Christos & Stangeland, David A. & Turtle, Harry J., 2000. "Political elections and the resolution of uncertainty: The international evidence," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(10), pages 1575-1604, October.
  22. Garcia De Paso, Jose I., 2000. "Partisan Appointments to the Central Bank: Policy Uncertainty and the Democratic Deficit," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 471-489, July.
  23. Mohammad Abdul Munim Joarder & A. K. M. Nurul Hossain & Monir Uddin Ahmed, 2016. "Does the central bank contribute to the political monetary cycles in Bangladesh?," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 49(4), pages 365-394, November.
  24. Niklas Potrafke, 2017. "Government Ideology and Economic Policy-Making in the United States," CESifo Working Paper Series 6444, CESifo.
  25. Fredrik Carlsen, 1997. "Counterfiscal policies and partisan politics: evidence from industrialized countries," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(2), pages 145-151.
  26. Faust, Jon, 1996. "Whom can we trust to run the Fed? Theoretical support for the founders' views," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 267-283, April.
  27. José I. Garcia de Paso, 1996. "A partisan model of political monetary cycles," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 20(2), pages 243-262, May.
  28. Mixon, Franklin Jr. & Upadhyaya, Kamal P., 2004. "Examining legislative challenges to central bank autonomy: macroeconomic and agency costs models," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 56(5), pages 415-428.
  29. Jamshidi, A., 2000. "The Financial System and Monetary Policy in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Other publications TiSEM 743c8f2b-8a0d-4580-8cc7-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  30. Jon Faust, 1992. "Whom can we trust to run the Fed? Theoretical support for the founders' views," International Finance Discussion Papers 429, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  31. van Lelyveld, Iman, 1999. "Inflation or unemployment? Who cares?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 463-484, September.
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