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Informational limits to democratic public policy: The jury theorem, yardstick competition, and ignorance

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Anders Gustafsson, 2019. "Busy doing nothing: why politicians implement inefficient policies," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 282-299, September.
  2. David Stadelmann & Reiner Eichenberger & Marco Portmann, 2011. "Parliaments as Condorcet Juries: Quasi-Experimental Evidence on the Representation of Majority Preferences," CREMA Working Paper Series 2011-14, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
  3. Sebastian Blesse & Philipp Lergetporer & Justus Nover & Katharina Werner, 2023. "Transparency and Policy Competition: Experimental Evidence from German Citizens and Politicians," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 387, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  4. Bryan C. McCannon, 2018. "Arbitration in classical Athens," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 413-423, December.
  5. Batinti, Alberto & Congleton, Roger D., 2018. "On the codetermination of tax-financed medical R&D and healthcare expenditures: Models and evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 175-188.
  6. Roger Congleton, 2012. "On the political economy and limits of crisis insurance: the case of the 2008–11 bailouts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 399-423, March.
  7. Finken, Jan, 2009. "Yardstick competition in German municipalities," FiFo Discussion Papers - Finanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 09-3, University of Cologne, FiFo Institute for Public Economics.
  8. Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard & Urs Steiner Brandt, 2021. "The calculus of democratic deliberation," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 165-186, June.
  9. Bryan C. McCannon & Paul Walker, 2016. "Endogenous competence and a limit to the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(1), pages 1-18, October.
  10. Bryan C. McCannon & Joylynn Pruitt, 2018. "Taking on the boss: Informative contests in prosecutor elections," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 20(5), pages 657-671, October.
  11. Roger D. Congleton, 2016. "Gordon Tullock’s implicit analytical history of government," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 179-193, June.
  12. Roger D. Congleton, 2019. "Fiscal Bargaining and the Implicit Fiscal Constitutions of Liberal Democracies: A Public Choice Perspective," Public Policy Review, Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance Japan, vol. 15(2), pages 175-198, December.
  13. Congleton, R.D., 2007. "Democracy in America: Labor Mobility, Ideology, and Constitutional Reform," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0764, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  14. Roger D. Congleton, 2023. "Federalism and pandemic policies: variety as the spice of life," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 195(1), pages 73-100, April.
  15. Roland Kirstein, "undated". "The Condorcet Jury-Theorem with Two Independent Error-Probabilities," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2006-1-1154, Berkeley Electronic Press.
  16. Arye L. Hillman, 2021. "Harming a favored side: an anomaly with supreme values and good intentions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 186(3), pages 275-285, March.
  17. Roger D. Congleton & Alberto Batinti & Rinaldo Pietratonio, 2017. "The Electoral Politics and the Evolution of Complex Healthcare Systems," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(4), pages 483-510, November.
  18. Congleton, Roger D., 2011. "Coping with unpleasant surprises in a complex world: Is rational choice possible in a world with positive information costs?," CIW Discussion Papers 6/2011, University of Münster, Center for Interdisciplinary Economics (CIW).
  19. Roger D. Congleton, 2015. "On the Evolution of Organizational Governance: Divided Governance and Survival in the Long Run," Working Papers 15-25, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
  20. Roger Congleton & Yongjing Zhang, 2013. "Is it all about competence? The human capital of U.S. presidents and economic performance," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 108-124, June.
  21. Christopher J Ellis & John Fender, 2010. "Information Aggregation, Growth and Franchise Extension with Applications to Female Enfranchisement and Inequality," Discussion Papers 10-27, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
  22. Dashle Kelley, 2014. "The political economy of unfunded public pension liabilities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 21-38, January.
  23. Hans Gersbach, 2021. "Elections, the curse of competence and credence policies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 186(3), pages 491-511, March.
  24. Alexander Lundberg, 2020. "The importance of expertise in group decisions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(3), pages 495-521, October.
  25. Keith L. Dougherty & Robi Ragan, 2016. "An expected utility analysis of k-majority rules," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 332-353, September.
  26. Apolte, Thomas & Müller, Julia, 2022. "The persistence of political myths and ideologies," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
  27. Stadelmann, David & Portmann, Marco & Eichenberger, Reiner, 2014. "The law of large districts: How district magnitude affects the quality of political representation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 128-140.
  28. Soeren C. Schwuchow & George Tridimas, 2022. "The political economy of Solon’s law against neutrality in civil wars," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 192(3), pages 249-272, September.
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