Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem

Citations

Cited by:

1. Iossa, Elisabetta & Martimort, David, 2015. "Pessimistic information gathering," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 75-96.
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7. Manuel Willington, 2004. "Pre-Contractual Information Acquisition," ILADES-UAH Working Papers inv154, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business.
8. Deng, Kent & O'Brien, Patrick, 2021. "The Kuznetsian paradigm for the study of modern economic history and the Great Divergence with appendices of literature review and statistical data," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 108563, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
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10. Jan Starmans, 2023. "Technological Determinants of Financial Constraints," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(5), pages 3003-3024, May.
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13. Fujiwara, Ippei & Waki, Yuichiro, 2020. "Fiscal forward guidance: A case for selective transparency," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 236-248.
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14. Cremer, Jacques & Khalil, Fahad & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1998. "Strategic Information Gathering before a Contract Is Offered," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 163-200, July.
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15. Rodrigo Basco & Thomas Bassetti & Lorenzo Dal Maso & Nicola Lattanzi, 2023. "Why and when do family firms invest less in talent management? The suppressor effect of risk aversion," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 27(1), pages 101-130, March.
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18. Iossa, Elisabetta & Stroffolini, Francesca, 2002. "Price cap regulation and information acquisition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(7), pages 1013-1036, September.
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23. Deng, Kent & O'Brien, Patrick, 2021. "The Kuznetsian paradigm for the study of modern economic history and the Great Divergence with appendices of literature review and statistical data," Economic History Working Papers 108563, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
24. Jiří Šindelář & Petr Budinský, 2018. "Agent-zákazník problém v distribuci finančních produktů [Agent-Principal Problem in Financial Distribution]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2018(4), pages 491-507.
25. Silvers, Randy, 2012. "The value of information in a principal–agent model with moral hazard: The ex post contracting case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 352-365.
26. Ed Nosal, 2006. "Information Gathering By A Principal," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1093-1111, November.
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27. Conlin, Michael & Orsini, Joe & Tang, Meng-Chi, 2013. "The effect of an agent’s expertise on National Football League contract structure," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 275-281.
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    • Bergemann, Dirk & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2001. "Information Structures in Optimal Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 2991, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
29. Iossa, Elisabetta, 2001. "Third Party Monitoring and Golden Parachutes," CEPR Discussion Papers 2777, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
30. McLeod, Alex, 2021. "Discovery, disclosure, and confidence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
31. Martimort, David & Iossa, Elisabetta, 2013. "Hidden Action or Hidden Information? How Information Gathering Shapes Contract Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 9552, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.