IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/hal/journl/hal-02445381.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

Full Revelation of Information in Sender-Receiver Games of Persuasion

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Ispano, Alessandro, 2018. "Information acquisition and the value of bad news," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 165-173.
  2. Wen, Hui & Ho, Ken C. & Gao, Jijun & Yu, Li, 2022. "The fundamental effects of ESG disclosure quality in boosting the growth of ESG investing," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
  3. Emiel Awad, 2020. "Persuasive Lobbying with Allied Legislators," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(4), pages 938-951, October.
  4. Golosov, Mikhail & Skreta, Vasiliki & Tsyvinski, Aleh & Wilson, Andrea, 2014. "Dynamic strategic information transmission," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 304-341.
  5. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Perez-Richet, Eduardo, 2018. "Communication with evidence in the lab," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 139-165.
  6. Maximilian Kasy & Jann Spiess, 2022. "Rationalizing Pre-Analysis Plans:Statistical Decisions Subject to Implementability," Economics Series Working Papers 975, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  7. Ivan Balbuzanov, 2019. "Lies and consequences," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(4), pages 1203-1240, December.
  8. Thomas Lanzi & Jerome Mathis, 2011. "How to consult an expert? Opinion versus evidence," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 70(4), pages 447-474, April.
  9. Kasy, Maximilian & Spiess, Jann, 2024. "Optimal Pre-analysis Plans: Statistical Decisions Subject to Implementability," IZA Discussion Papers 17187, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  10. Jianan Wang, 2021. "Evidence and fully revealing deliberation with non-consequentialist jurors," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 515-531, December.
  11. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2016. "Full disclosure in decentralized organizations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 5-7.
  12. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/4kpa2fek478tla1o86g6n9jb6v is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Matthew Gentzkow & Emir Kamenica, 2017. "Disclosure of endogenous information," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(1), pages 47-56, April.
  14. Maximilian Kasy & Jann Spiess, 2022. "Optimal Pre-Analysis Plans: Statistical Decisions Subject to Implementability," Papers 2208.09638, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.
  15. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/4kpa2fek478tla1o86g6n9jb6v is not listed on IDEAS
  16. Harbaugh, Richmond & To, Theodore, 2020. "False modesty: When disclosing good news looks bad," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 43-55.
  17. Phillip C. Stocken, 2022. "Disclosure regulation and incentive uncertainty," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(2), pages 2267-2281, June.
  18. Jianan Wang, 2022. "Partially verifiable deliberation in voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(3), pages 457-481, March.
  19. Feddersen, Timothy & Gradwohl, Ronen, 2020. "Decentralized advice," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
  20. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez‐Richet, 2014. "Certifiable Pre‐Play Communication: Full Disclosure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(3), pages 1093-1131, May.
  21. Ertac, Seda & Koçkesen, Levent & Ozdemir, Duygu, 2016. "The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: Theory and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 24-45.
  22. Matthias Lang, 2020. "Mechanism Design with Narratives," CESifo Working Paper Series 8502, CESifo.
  23. Ertac, Seda & Gümren, Mert & Koçkesen, Levent, 2019. "Strategic feedback in teams: Theory and experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 1-23.
  24. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-01053478 is not listed on IDEAS
  25. Maximilian Kasy & Jann Spiess, 2024. "Optimal Pre-Analysis Plans: Statistical Decisions Subject to Implementability," CESifo Working Paper Series 11258, CESifo.
  26. Eso, Peter & Wallace, Chris, 2016. "Persuasion and Pricing : Dynamic Trading with Hard Evidence," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 24, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.