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Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Oliver Hart, 2013. "Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points," Games, MDPI, vol. 4(3), pages 1-20, August.
  2. Ortner, Juan, 2015. "Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 1-16.
  3. n/a, 2012. "Commentaries and Reply to "Can Brand Extension Signal Product Quality?" by Sridhar Moorthy," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 31(5), pages 771-778, September.
  4. , & ,, 2012. "Implementation with evidence," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(2), May.
  5. Hayashi, Takashi & Lombardi, Michele, 2019. "One-step-ahead implementation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 110-126.
  6. Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Investments as signals of outside options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 683-708.
  7. Chen, Yi-Chun & Mueller-Frank, Manuel & Pai, Mallesh M., 2022. "Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
  8. Takahashi, Satoru & Tercieux, Olivier, 2020. "Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
  9. Lang, Matthias, 2019. "Communicating subjective evaluations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 163-199.
  10. Joshua S. Gans, 2019. "The Fine Print in Smart Contracts," NBER Working Papers 25443, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Yeon-Koo Che & Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Rey, 2021. "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation [Subgame Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(5), pages 2149-2178.
  12. Jain, Ritesh & Lombardi, Michele, 2022. "Continuous virtual implementation: Complete information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
  13. Ernst Fehr & Michael Powell & Tom Wilkening, 2014. "Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation," CESifo Working Paper Series 4948, CESifo.
  14. Kim, Minseong, 2019. "Firms as problem solvers: economics meets computer science," MPRA Paper 97332, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2012. "Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1947-1968.
  16. Committee, Nobel Prize, 2016. "Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström: Contract Theory," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2016-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
  17. Eccles, Peter & Wegner, Nora, 2016. "Robustness of subgame perfect implementation," Bank of England working papers 601, Bank of England.
  18. Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick, 2009. "Signaling an Outside Option," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 281, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  19. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Saran, Rene & Serrano, Roberto, 2023. "Continuous level-k mechanism design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 481-501.
  20. Kartik, Navin & Tercieux, Olivier & Holden, Richard, 2014. "Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 284-290.
  21. Eduard Marinov, 2016. "The 2016 Nobel Prize in Economics," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 6, pages 97-149.
  22. Donaldson, Jason Roderick & Gromb, Denis & Piacentino, Giorgia, 2020. "The paradox of pledgeability," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(3), pages 591-605.
  23. Ernst Fehr & Michael Powell & Tom Wilkening, 2021. "Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(4), pages 1055-1091, April.
  24. Mariann Ollár & Antonio Penta, 2019. "Implementation via transfers with identical but unknown distributions," Economics Working Papers 1676, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  25. Tomoeda, Kentaro, 2019. "Efficient investments in the implementation problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 247-278.
  26. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018. "Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 544-564.
  27. Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei & Xiong, Siyang, 2022. "Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(4), November.
  28. Carroll, Gabriel & Meng, Delong, 2016. "Locally robust contracts for moral hazard," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 36-51.
  29. Banerjee, Soumen & Chen, Yi-Chun & Sun, Yifei, 2024. "Direct implementation with evidence," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(2), May.
  30. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-00754592 is not listed on IDEAS
  31. Kyungmin Kim & Antonio Penta, 2012. "A Robustly Efficient Auction," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 248, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  32. Marin, Dalia & Doerr, Sebastian & Suverato, Davide & Verdier, Thierry, 2020. "Mis-allocation Within Firms: Internal Finance and International Trade," CEPR Discussion Papers 14478, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  33. Xianyi Wang & Xiaofang Wang & Hui He, 2021. "Contracts to Coordinate Healthcare Providers in the Telemedicine Referral System," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(18), pages 1-25, September.
  34. Harry Pei & Bruno Strulovici, 2021. "Robust Implementation with Costly Information," Papers 2112.06032, arXiv.org.
  35. Berde, Éva, 2013. "A fundamentális transzformáció és a referenciapont szerepe a hiányos szerződések elméletében [The role of basic transformation and reference point in the theory of incomplete contracts]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 865-885.
  36. Yi-Chun Chen & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Yifei Sun & Tom Wilkening, 2023. "Getting Dynamic Implementation to Work," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(2), pages 285-387.
  37. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2015. "Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Contract Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers 11002, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  38. Schmidt, Klaus, 2017. "The 2016 Nobel Memorial Prize in Contract Theory," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 19, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  39. Philippe Aghion & Richard Holden, 2011. "Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm: What Have We Learned over the Past 25 Years?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 181-197, Spring.
  40. Thomas F. Hellmann & Veikko Thiele, 2012. "A Theory of the Firm based on Partner Displacement," NBER Working Papers 18495, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  41. Chen, Yi-Chun & Takahashi, Satoru & Xiong, Siyang, 2022. "Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 485-504.
  42. Guembel, Alexander & White, Lucy, 2014. "Good cop, bad cop: Complementarities between debt and equity in disciplining management," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 541-569.
  43. Chen, Yi-Chun & Sun, Yifei, 2015. "Full implementation in backward induction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 71-76.
  44. Kunimoto, Takashi, 2020. "Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 62-73.
  45. Geoffroy de Clippel & Rene Saran & Roberto Serrano, 2014. "Mechanism Design with Bounded Depth of Reasoning and Small Modeling Mistakes," Working Papers 2014-7, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  46. Mezzetti, Claudio & Renou, Ludovic, 2017. "Repeated Nash implementation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.
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