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Approval Voting and Scoring Rules with Common Values

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Sébastien Courtin & Matias Nunez, 2013. "A Map of Approval Voting Equilibria Outcomes," THEMA Working Papers 2013-31, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  2. Dirk Helbing & Farzam Fanitabasi & Fosca Giannotti & Regula Hänggli & Carina I. Hausladen & Jeroen van den Hoven & Sachit Mahajan & Dino Pedreschi & Evangelos Pournaras, 2021. "Ethics of Smart Cities: Towards Value-Sensitive Design and Co-Evolving City Life," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(20), pages 1-25, October.
  3. Bouton, Laurent & Castanheira, Micael & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, 2016. "Divided majority and information aggregation: Theory and experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 114-128.
  4. Durand, François & Macé, Antonin & Núñez, Matías, 2024. "Voter coordination in elections: A case for approval voting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 1-34.
  5. Laurent Bouton & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Antonin Macé & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2021. "Voting Rights, Agenda Control and Information Aggregation," NBER Working Papers 29005, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Giles, Adam & Postl, Peter, 2014. "Equilibrium and effectiveness of two-parameter scoring rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 31-52.
  7. Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni & Carlos Pimienta, 2014. "Counterexamples on the Superiority of Approval versus Plurality," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(5), pages 824-834, October.
  8. Eyal Baharad & Leif Danziger, 2018. "Voting in Hiring Committees: Which “Almost” Rule is Optimal?," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 129-151, February.
  9. Núñez, Matías & Laslier, Jean-François, 2015. "Bargaining through Approval," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 63-73.
  10. Sébastien Courtin & Matías Núñez, 2017. "Dominance solvable approval voting games," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 19(6), pages 1047-1068, December.
  11. Dhillon, Amrita & Kotsialou, Grammateia & Xefteris, Dimitris, 2021. "Information Aggregation with Delegation of Votes," SocArXiv ubk7p, Center for Open Science.
  12. Herrera, Helios & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & McMurray, Joseph C., 2019. "Information aggregation and turnout in proportional representation: A laboratory experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).
  13. Bouton, Laurent & Castanheira, Micael & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, 2016. "Divided majority and information aggregation: Theory and experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 114-128.
  14. Haradhan Kumar Mohajan, 2011. "Approval Voting: A Multi-outcome Election," KASBIT Business Journals (KBJ), Khadim Ali Shah Bukhari Institute of Technology (KASBIT), vol. 4, pages 77-88, December.
  15. GOERTZ, Johanna & MANIQUET, François, 2013. "Large elections with multiple alternatives: a Condorcet Jury Theorem and inefficient equilibria," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2013023, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  16. Matías Núñez, 2014. "The strategic sincerity of Approval voting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(1), pages 157-189, May.
  17. Tsakas, Nikolas & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2021. "Information aggregation with runoff voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
  18. Paulo Barelli & Sourav Bhattacharya & Lucas Siga, 2022. "Full Information Equivalence in Large Elections," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(5), pages 2161-2185, September.
  19. Tsakas, Nikolas & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2021. "Stress-testing the runoff rule in the laboratory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 18-38.
  20. François Durand & Antonin Macé & Matias Nunez, 2019. "Analysis of Approval Voting in Poisson Games," Working Papers halshs-02049865, HAL.
  21. Eyal Baharad & Leif Danziger, 2018. "Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule is Optimal?," CESifo Working Paper Series 6851, CESifo.
  22. Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira, 2012. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(1), pages 43-87, January.
  23. Baharad, Eyal & Danziger, Leif, 2018. "Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule Is Optimal?," IZA Discussion Papers 11287, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  24. Postl, Peter, 2017. "Évaluation et comparaison des règles de vote derrière le voile de l’ignorance : Tour d'horizon sélectif et analyse des règles de scores à deux paramètres," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 93(1-2), pages 249-290, Mars-Juin.
  25. Baharad, Eyal & Danziger, Leif, 2018. "Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule Is Optimal?," GLO Discussion Paper Series 185, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
  26. Chernomaz, K. & Goertz, J.M.M., 2023. "(A)symmetric equilibria and adaptive learning dynamics in small-committee voting," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).
  27. Svetlana Kosterina, 2023. "Information structures and information aggregation in threshold equilibria in elections," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(2), pages 493-522, February.
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