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Full Revelation of Information in Sender-Receiver Games of Persuasion

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Miura, Shintaro, 2014. "A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 55-68.
  2. Giovannoni, Francesco & Seidmann, Daniel J., 2007. "Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 296-315, May.
  3. Phillip C. Stocken, 2022. "Disclosure regulation and incentive uncertainty," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(2), pages 2267-2281, June.
  4. Jianan Wang, 2022. "Partially verifiable deliberation in voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(3), pages 457-481, March.
  5. Feddersen, Timothy & Gradwohl, Ronen, 2020. "Decentralized advice," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
  6. Ispano, Alessandro, 2018. "Information acquisition and the value of bad news," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 165-173.
  7. Wen, Hui & Ho, Ken C. & Gao, Jijun & Yu, Li, 2022. "The fundamental effects of ESG disclosure quality in boosting the growth of ESG investing," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
  8. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez‐Richet, 2014. "Certifiable Pre‐Play Communication: Full Disclosure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(3), pages 1093-1131, May.
  9. Eduardo Perez, 2012. "Competing with Equivocal Information," Working Papers hal-03583828, HAL.
  10. Thomas Lanzi & Jerome Mathis, 2008. "Consulting an Expert with Potentially Conflicting Preferences," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 65(3), pages 185-204, November.
  11. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Perez-Richet, Eduardo, 2018. "Communication with evidence in the lab," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 139-165.
  12. Emiel Awad, 2020. "Persuasive Lobbying with Allied Legislators," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(4), pages 938-951, October.
  13. Golosov, Mikhail & Skreta, Vasiliki & Tsyvinski, Aleh & Wilson, Andrea, 2014. "Dynamic strategic information transmission," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 304-341.
  14. Ertac, Seda & Koçkesen, Levent & Ozdemir, Duygu, 2016. "The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: Theory and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 24-45.
  15. Matthias Lang, 2020. "Mechanism Design with Narratives," CESifo Working Paper Series 8502, CESifo.
  16. Ertac, Seda & Gümren, Mert & Koçkesen, Levent, 2019. "Strategic feedback in teams: Theory and experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 1-23.
  17. Maximilian Kasy & Jann Spiess, 2022. "Rationalizing Pre-Analysis Plans:Statistical Decisions Subject to Implementability," Economics Series Working Papers 975, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  18. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-01053478 is not listed on IDEAS
  19. Harbaugh, Richmond & To, Theodore, 2020. "False modesty: When disclosing good news looks bad," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 43-55.
  20. Ivan Balbuzanov, 2019. "Lies and consequences," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(4), pages 1203-1240, December.
  21. Péter Eső & Ádám Galambos, 2013. "Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(1), pages 263-282, February.
  22. Thomas Lanzi & Jerome Mathis, 2011. "How to consult an expert? Opinion versus evidence," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 70(4), pages 447-474, April.
  23. Maximilian Kasy & Jann Spiess, 2022. "Optimal Pre-Analysis Plans: Statistical Decisions Subject to Implementability," Papers 2208.09638, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.
  24. Eso, Peter & Wallace, Chris, 2016. "Persuasion and Pricing : Dynamic Trading with Hard Evidence," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 24, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
  25. Bhattacharya, Sourav & Goltsman, Maria & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2018. "On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 345-363.
  26. Hitoshi Sadakane, 2017. "Multistage Information Transmission with Voluntary Monetary Transfer," ISER Discussion Paper 1006, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  27. Jianan Wang, 2021. "Evidence and fully revealing deliberation with non-consequentialist jurors," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 515-531, December.
  28. Hedlund, Jonas, 2015. "Persuasion with communication costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 28-40.
  29. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2016. "Full disclosure in decentralized organizations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 5-7.
  30. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/4kpa2fek478tla1o86g6n9jb6v is not listed on IDEAS
  31. Péter Eső & Chris Wallace, 2014. "Information and evidence in bargaining," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 2(1), pages 23-32, April.
  32. Hitoshi Sadakane, 2017. "Multistage Information Transmission with Voluntary Monetary Transfer," ISER Discussion Paper 1006r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jun 2018.
  33. Matthew Gentzkow & Emir Kamenica, 2017. "Disclosure of endogenous information," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(1), pages 47-56, April.
  34. Hitoshi Sadakane, 2017. "Multistage Information Transmission with Voluntary Monetary Transfer," ISER Discussion Paper 1006rr, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jan 2018.
  35. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/4kpa2fek478tla1o86g6n9jb6v is not listed on IDEAS
  36. Ryan, Matthew & Vaithianathan, Rhema, 2011. "Verifiability and neologism-proofness in a Sender-Receiver game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 256-262, August.
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