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Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Cyril Hariton & Gwenaël Piaser, 2007. "When Redistribution Leads to Regressive Taxation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(4), pages 589-606, August.
  2. Salvatore Piccolo & David Martimort, 2006. "The Strategic Value of Incomplete Contracting in a Competing Hierarchies Environment," CSEF Working Papers 160, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 08 Dec 2006.
  3. Sumit Agarwal & David Lucca & Amit Seru & Francesco Trebbi, 2014. "Inconsistent Regulators: Evidence from Banking," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 129(2), pages 889-938.
  4. Faure-Grimaud, Antoine & Martimort, David, 2001. "On some agency costs of intermediated contracting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 75-82, April.
  5. David Martimort & Philippe De Donder & Etienne Billette De Villemeur, 2005. "An Incomplete Contract Perspective on Public Good Provision," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(2), pages 149-180, April.
  6. Barolini, David, 2006. "Integrated versus Separated Regulation: An Application to the Water Industry," Economics Discussion Papers 8899, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  7. Laurent Franckx & Alessio D'Amato, 2003. "Environmental policy as a multi-task principal-agent problem," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0312, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
  8. Emmanuelle Auriol & Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2018. "Can Supranational Infrastructure Regulation Compensate for National Institutional Weaknesses?," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 69(6), pages 913-936.
  9. Graeme Guthrie, 2006. "Regulating Infrastructure: The Impact on Risk and Investment," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(4), pages 925-972, December.
  10. Schmidt, Robert & Pollrich, Martin & Stiel, Caroline, 2013. "An optimal incentive contract to avert firm relocation under unilateral environmental regulation," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79741, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  11. Calzolari, Giacomo & Pavan, Alessandro, 2006. "On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 168-204, September.
  12. Dongsoo Shin & Roland Strausz, 2014. "Delegation and dynamic incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(3), pages 495-520, September.
  13. Antonio Estache & L. Wren-Lewis, 2008. "Towards a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Laffont's Lead," Working Papers ECARES 2008_018, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  14. Haselmann, Rainer & Singla, Shikhar & Vig, Vikrant, 2022. "Supranational supervision," LawFin Working Paper Series 50, Goethe University, Center for Advanced Studies on the Foundations of Law and Finance (LawFin).
  15. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Pouyet, Jerome, 2004. "The subsidiarity bias in regulation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1-2), pages 255-283, January.
  16. Avignone, Giuseppe & Altunbas, Yener & Polizzi, Salvatore & Reghezza, Alessio, 2021. "Centralised or decentralised banking supervision? Evidence from European banks," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
  17. Gwenael Piaser, 2003. "Labor Mobility and Income Tax Competition," Public Economics 0302002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  18. Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2009. "Toward a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Jean-Jacques Laffont's Lead," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(3), pages 729-770, September.
  19. Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2012. "Supranational Infrastructure Regulation: Institutional Opportunities and Challenges," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2012-025, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  20. Haselmann, Rainer & Singla, Shikhar & Vig, Vikrant, 2022. "Supranational supervision," LawFin Working Paper Series 46, Goethe University, Center for Advanced Studies on the Foundations of Law and Finance (LawFin).
  21. repec:vuw:vuwscr:18946 is not listed on IDEAS
  22. Kartasheva, Anastasia V., 2012. "Design of investment promotion policies," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 127-136.
  23. Carrasco, Vinicius, 2010. "Common agency, organizational design and the hold-up problem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 264-268, September.
  24. Zheng, Shiyuan & Wang, Kun & Chan, Felix T.S. & Fu, Xiaowen & Li, Zhi-Chun, 2022. "Subsidy on transport adaptation investment-modeling decisions under incomplete information and ambiguity," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 103-129.
  25. Barros, Pedro & Nilssen, Tore & Hoernig, Steffen, 2008. "Keeping Both Eyes Wide Open: The Life of a Competition Authority Among Sectoral Regulators," CEPR Discussion Papers 6861, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  26. Mark Armstrong & David E.M. Sappington, 2006. "Regulation, Competition and Liberalization," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 325-366, June.
  27. Martin F. Grace, 2010. "The Insurance Industry and Systemic Risk: Evidence and Discussion," NFI Policy Briefs 2010-PB-02, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute.
  28. Guthrie, Graeme, 2006. "Regulating Infrastructure: The Impact on Risk and Investment," Working Paper Series 18946, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
  29. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Meleu, Mathieu, 2001. "Separation of powers and development," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 129-145, February.
  30. Zheng, Shiyuan & Negenborn, Rudy R., 2014. "Centralization or decentralization: A comparative analysis of port regulation modes," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 21-40.
  31. David Martimort & Salvatore Piccolo, 2010. "The Strategic Value of Quantity Forcing Contracts," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 204-229, February.
  32. Graham Mallard, 2014. "Static Common Agency And Political Influence: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 17-35, February.
  33. Jensen, Olivia & Wu, Xun, 2017. "The hybrid model for economic regulation of water utilities: Mission impossible?," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 122-131.
  34. David Bartolini, 2010. "Separation of Regulatory Powers When Contracts Are Incomplete," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(2), pages 225-247, April.
  35. Burnett, Johann Caro & Carrasco, Vinicius, 2011. "Coordination and the provision of incentives to a common regulated firm," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 606-627, September.
  36. Patricia Charléty & Said Souam, 2002. "Analyse économique des fusions horizontales," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 17(2), pages 37-68.
  37. Sean Gailmard, 2009. "Multiple Principals and Oversight of Bureaucratic Policy-Making," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 21(2), pages 161-186, April.
  38. Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1557-1700, Elsevier.
  39. Calcott, Paul & Hutton, Stephen, 2006. "The choice of a liability regime when there is a regulatory gatekeeper," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 153-164, March.
  40. Cécile Aubert & Jean-Jacques Laffont & Pablo Serra & Diego Bondorevsky & Diego Petrecolla & Alfredo García & Paulina Beato & David Wood & Richard Tomiak & Jaime Millán & Carmen Fuente & Salomé Cisnal , 2002. "Competition Policy in Regulated Industries: Approaches for Emerging Economies," IDB Publications (Books), Inter-American Development Bank, number 42038 edited by Paulina Beato & Jean-Jacques Laffont, February.
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