Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard

Citations

Cited by:

1. Bhattacharya, Vivek & Manuelli, Lucas & Straub, Ludwig, 2018. "Imperfect public monitoring with a fear of signal distortion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 1-37.
2. Giraud, Raphaël & Thomas, Lionel, 2017. "Ambiguity, optimism, and pessimism in adverse selection models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 64-100.
   • Raphaël Giraud & Lionel Thomas, 2015. "Ambiguity, Optimism, and Pessimism in Adverse Selection Models," Working Papers hal-01199139, HAL.
   • Raphaël Giraud & Lionel Thomas, 2017. "Ambiguity, Optimism, and Pessimism in Adverse Selection Models," Post-Print hal-02878106, HAL.
3. Swagata Bhattacharjee, 2019. "Dynamic Contracting for Innovation Under Ambiguity," Working Papers 1022, Ashoka University, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2019.
4. Byun, Seong, 2022. "The role of intrinsic incentives and corporate culture in motivating innovation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
5. Leonardo Pejsachowicz, 2016. "Stochastic Independence under Knightian Uncertainty," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01753323, HAL.
6. Beauchêne, Dorian & Li, Jian & Li, Ming, 2019. "Ambiguous persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 312-365.
   • Dorian BEAUCHÊNE & Jian LI & Ming LI, 2018. "Ambiguous Persuasion," Cahiers de recherche 25-2018, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
7. Dumav, Martin & Khan, Urmee, 2018. "Moral hazard with non-additive uncertainty: When are actions implementable?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 110-114.
   • Urmee Khan & Martin Dumav, 2018. "Moral Hazard with Non-Additive Uncertainty: When are Actions Implementable?," Working Papers 201808, University of California at Riverside, Department of Economics.
8. Carrasco, Vinicius & Farinha Luz, Vitor & Kos, Nenad & Messner, Matthias & Monteiro, Paulo & Moreira, Humberto, 2018. "Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 245-279.
9. Corbae, Dean & Marimon, Ramon, 2011. "Introduction to Incompleteness and Uncertainty in Economics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(3), pages 775-784, May.
10. Shiri Alon & Aviad Heifetz, 2014. "The logic of Knightian games," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 2(2), pages 161-182, October.
11. Marie-Louise Vierø, 2012. "Contracting in Vague Environments," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 104-130, May.
    • Marie-Louise Viero, 2006. "Contracting In Vague Environments," Working Paper 1106, Economics Department, Queen's University.
12. Garrett, Daniel F., 2014. "Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 631-641.
13. Ziegler, Gabriel & Zuazo-Garin, Peio, 2020. "Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 197-215.
    • Gabriel Ziegler & Peio Zuazo-Garin, 2019. "Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity," Economics Working Papers 1630, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
14. Bhattacharjee, Swagata, 2022. "Dynamic contracting for innovation under ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 534-552.
    • Swagata Bhattacharjee, 2019. "Dynamic Contracting for Innovation Under Ambiguity," Working Papers 15, Ashoka University, Department of Economics, revised 02 Aug 2019.
15. Leonardo Pejsachowicz, 2016. "Stochastic Independence under Knightian Uncertainty," Post-Print hal-01753323, HAL.
16. Eisei Ohtaki, 2023. "Optimality in an OLG model with nonsmooth preferences," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 19(3), pages 611-659, September.
    • Eisei Ohtaki, 2020. "Optimality in an OLG model with nonsmooth preferences," Working Papers e145, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
17. Burkett, Justin & Rosenthal, Maxwell, 2024. "Statistical uncertainty and coarse contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 220(C).
18. Gerasimou, Georgios, 2018. "On the indifference relation in Bewley preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 24-26.
19. Martin Dumav, 2021. "Moral Hazard, Dynamic Incentives, and Ambiguous Perceptions," Papers 2110.15229, arXiv.org.
20. Kellner, Christian, 2015. "Tournaments as a response to ambiguity aversion in incentive contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 627-655.
21. Carroll, Gabriel & Bolte, Lukas, 2023. "Robust contracting under double moral hazard," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(4), November.
22. Urmee Khan & Martin Dumav, 2018. "Moral Hazard, Uncertain Technologies, and Linear Contracts," Working Papers 201806, University of California at Riverside, Department of Economics.
23. Gerasimou, Georgios, 2018. "On the indifference relation in Bewley preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 24-26.
    • Georgios Gerasimou, 2016. "On the Indifference Relation in Bewley Preferences," Discussion Paper Series, School of Economics and Finance 201609, School of Economics and Finance, University of St Andrews, revised 11 Dec 2017.
24. Khan, Urmee & Rigotti, Luca, 2023. "Optimal contracts when the players think different," UC3M Working papers. Economics 38519, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
25. Rosenthal, Maxwell, 2023. "Robust incentives for risk," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
26. Eisei Ohtaki & Hiroyuki Ozaki, 2014. "Optimality in a Stochastic OLG Model with Ambiguity," Working Papers e069, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
27. Martin Dumav & Urmee Khan & Luca Rigotti, 2021. "Moral Hazard with Heterogeneous Beliefs," Papers 2110.04368, arXiv.org.
28. Christian Kellner, 2017. "The principal-agent problem with smooth ambiguity," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(2), pages 83-119, June.