Optimal contracts when the players think different
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More about this item
Keywords
Contracting;JEL classification:
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2023-10-23 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-HRM-2023-10-23 (Human Capital and Human Resource Management)
- NEP-MIC-2023-10-23 (Microeconomics)
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