IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/reecde/v21y2017i2d10.1007_s10058-017-0198-4.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The principal-agent problem with smooth ambiguity

Author

Listed:
  • Christian Kellner

    (University of Southampton)

Abstract

We study a principal-agent model in which the (effort-dependent) realisation of output levels is ambiguous, and the agent is ambiguity averse (while the principal is ambiguity neutral). We show that introducing ambiguity aversion will lower profits if the action that the principal wants to implement is the most ambiguous one, while they may increase otherwise. Regarding the design of the optimal contract, we show that under ambiguity aversion the optimal incentive scheme may not be monotone even if a natural generalization of the monotone likelihood ratio property is satisfied, and illustrate how this fact could affect the design of contracts in an applied economic context. We also find that the individual rationality constraint need not bind in the presence of ambiguity aversion unless preferences satisfy constant absolute ambiguity aversion.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian Kellner, 2017. "The principal-agent problem with smooth ambiguity," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(2), pages 83-119, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:21:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s10058-017-0198-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-017-0198-4
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10058-017-0198-4
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10058-017-0198-4?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Whitmore, G A, 1970. "Third-Degree Stochastic Dominance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 60(3), pages 457-459, June.
    2. Fabian Herweg & Daniel Muller & Philipp Weinschenk, 2010. "Binary Payment Schemes: Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2451-2477, December.
    3. Larry G. Epstein, 2010. "A Paradox for the “Smooth Ambiguity” Model of Preference," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(6), pages 2085-2099, November.
    4. Marie-Louise Vierø, 2012. "Contracting in Vague Environments," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 104-130, May.
    5. Kellner, Christian, 2015. "Tournaments as a response to ambiguity aversion in incentive contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 627-655.
    6. Alfredo Di Tillio & Nenad Kos & Matthias Messner, 2012. "The Design of Ambiguous Mechanisms," Working Papers 446, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    7. Christian Gollier, 2011. "Portfolio Choices and Asset Prices: The Comparative Statics of Ambiguity Aversion," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 78(4), pages 1329-1344.
    8. Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-153, April.
    9. Sujoy Mukerji & Jean-Marc Tallon & EUREQua & CNRS - Universite Paris I., 2003. "An overview of economic applications of David Schmeidler`s models of decision making under uncertainty," Economics Series Working Papers 165, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    10. Subir Bose & Ludovic Renou, 2014. "Mechanism Design With Ambiguous Communication Devices," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(5), pages 1853-1872, September.
    11. Daniel Ellsberg, 1961. "Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 75(4), pages 643-669.
    12. Peter Klibanoff & Massimo Marinacci & Sujoy Mukerji, 2005. "A Smooth Model of Decision Making under Ambiguity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(6), pages 1849-1892, November.
    13. Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci & Aldo Rustichini, 2006. "Ambiguity Aversion, Robustness, and the Variational Representation of Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(6), pages 1447-1498, November.
    14. repec:oup:restud:v:84:y::i:1:p:237-276. is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
    16. Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 571-587, May.
    17. Gabriel Carroll, 2015. "Robustness and Linear Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(2), pages 536-563, February.
    18. Lopomo, Giuseppe & Rigotti, Luca & Shannon, Chris, 2011. "Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(3), pages 1148-1172, May.
    19. Marciano Siniscalchi, 2009. "Vector Expected Utility and Attitudes Toward Variation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(3), pages 801-855, May.
    20. Mukerji, Sujoy, 1998. "Ambiguity Aversion and Incompleteness of Contractual Form," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1207-1231, December.
    21. Itzhak Gilboa, 2004. "Uncertainty in Economic Theory," Post-Print hal-00756317, HAL.
    22. Matthias Lang, 2017. "First-Order and Second-Order Ambiguity Aversion," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(4), pages 1254-1269, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Huber, Stefanie J. & Schmidt, Tobias, 2022. "Nevertheless, they persist: Cross-country differences in homeownership behavior," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C).
    2. Hayat Khan, 2019. "A Nontechnical Guide on Optimal Incentives for Islamic Insurance Operators," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 12(3), pages 1-14, July.
    3. Martina Sopta & Mihaela Mikić & Matej BotiÄ ki, 2017. "Impact of the agent theory on private and public companies based on the analysis of Croatian health care system," Notitia - journal for economic, business and social issues, Notitia Ltd., vol. 1(3), pages 103-124, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Evren, Özgür, 2019. "Recursive non-expected utility: Connecting ambiguity attitudes to risk preferences and the level of ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 285-307.
    2. Massimo Guidolin & Francesca Rinaldi, 2013. "Ambiguity in asset pricing and portfolio choice: a review of the literature," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(2), pages 183-217, February.
    3. Hill, Brian, 2023. "Beyond uncertainty aversion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 196-222.
    4. Lang, Matthias & Wambach, Achim, 2013. "The fog of fraud – Mitigating fraud by strategic ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 255-275.
    5. Beauchêne, Dorian & Li, Jian & Li, Ming, 2019. "Ambiguous persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 312-365.
    6. Eisei Ohtaki, 2023. "Optimality in an OLG model with nonsmooth preferences," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 19(3), pages 611-659, September.
    7. Jewitt, Ian & Mukerji, Sujoy, 2017. "Ordering ambiguous acts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 213-267.
    8. Berger, Loïc & Bleichrodt, Han & Eeckhoudt, Louis, 2013. "Treatment decisions under ambiguity," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 559-569.
    9. Eisei Ohtaki & Hiroyuki Ozaki, 2015. "Monetary equilibria and Knightian uncertainty," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(3), pages 435-459, August.
    10. Peter Klibanoff & Sujoy Mukerji & Kyoungwon Seo, 2014. "Perceived Ambiguity and Relevant Measures," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(5), pages 1945-1978, September.
    11. Matthias Lang, 2017. "First-Order and Second-Order Ambiguity Aversion," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(4), pages 1254-1269, April.
    12. Laurent Denant-Boemont & Olivier L’Haridon, 2013. "La rationalité à l'épreuve de l'économie comportementale," Revue française d'économie, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(2), pages 35-89.
    13. Andrew J. Keith & Darryl K. Ahner, 2021. "A survey of decision making and optimization under uncertainty," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 300(2), pages 319-353, May.
    14. André, Eric, 2014. "Optimal portfolio with vector expected utility," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 50-62.
    15. Huang, Yi-Chieh & Tzeng, Larry Y. & Zhao, Lin, 2015. "Comparative ambiguity aversion and downside ambiguity aversion," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 257-269.
    16. Brian Hill, 2023. "Beyond Uncertainty Aversion," Post-Print hal-02428398, HAL.
    17. Christoph Bühren & Fabian Meier & Marco Pleßner, 2023. "Ambiguity aversion: bibliometric analysis and literature review of the last 60 years," Management Review Quarterly, Springer, vol. 73(2), pages 495-525, June.
    18. Kellner, Christian, 2015. "Tournaments as a response to ambiguity aversion in incentive contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 627-655.
    19. Rosenberg, Dinah & Vieille, Nicolas, 2019. "Zero-sum games with ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 238-249.
    20. Karni, Edi & Maccheroni, Fabio & Marinacci, Massimo, 2015. "Ambiguity and Nonexpected Utility," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Moral hazard; Ambiguity aversion; Optimal contract;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:21:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s10058-017-0198-4. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.