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Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play

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Cited by:

  1. Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2016. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring:Experiments and Theory," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1004, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  2. Deb, Joyee & González-Díaz, Julio & Renault, Jérôme, 2016. "Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 1-23.
  3. Feinberg, Yossi & Kets, Willemien, 2014. "Ranking friends," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 107(PA), pages 1-9.
  4. Francesco Nava & Michele Piccione, 2011. "Efficiency in Repeated Two-Action Games with Local Monitoring," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 560, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  5. Artyom Jelnov & Yair Tauman & Chang Zhao, 2021. "Stag Hunt with unknown outside options," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(1), pages 303-335, July.
  6. Konrad Podczeck & Daniela Puzzello, 2012. "Independent random matching," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 50(1), pages 1-29, May.
  7. Gong, Binglin & Yang, Chun-Lei, 2019. "Cooperation through indirect reciprocity: The impact of higher-order history," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 316-341.
  8. Matsushima Hitoshi, 2020. "Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 1-11, January.
  9. Joyee Deb, 2008. "Cooperation and Community Responsibility: A Folk Theorem for Repeated Matching Games with Names," Working Papers 08-24, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  10. Gaudeul, Alexia & Keser, Claudia & Müller, Stephan, 2021. "The evolution of morals under indirect reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 251-277.
  11. Gomis-Porqueras Pedro & Sun Ching-Jen, 2020. "Fiat Money as a Public Signal, Medium of Exchange, and Punishment," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(2), pages 1-11, June.
  12. Kamei, Kenju & Kobayashi, Hajime & Tse, Tiffany Tsz Kwan, 2022. "Observability of partners’ past play and cooperation: Experimental evidence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
  13. Levine, David K. & Modica, Salvatore, 2016. "Peer discipline and incentives within groups," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 19-30.
  14. Subhasish Dey & Katsushi S. Imai, 2014. "Workfare as "Collateral": The Case of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) in India," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1412, Economics, The University of Manchester.
  15. Yuval Heller & Erik Mohlin, 2018. "Observations on Cooperation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 85(4), pages 2253-2282.
  16. Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky, 2015. "Sustaining Cooperation: Community Enforcement vs. Specialized Enforcement," NBER Working Papers 21457, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Thomas Wiseman, 2015. "A Note on the Essentiality of Money under Limited Memory," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 18(4), pages 881-893, October.
  18. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2014. "Interlinkage and Generous Tit-for-Tat Strategy," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 65(1), pages 116-121, March.
  19. Kayaba, Yutaka & Matsushima, Hitoshi & Toyama, Tomohisa, 2020. "Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: Experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 193-208.
  20. Takashi Kamihigashi, 2023. "The 2022 Japanese Economic Association Nakahara prize recipient: Professor Satoru Takahashi, National University of Singapore," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 355-356, July.
  21. Takako Fujiwara-Greve & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, 2013. "Diverse Behavior Patterns in a Symmetric Society with Voluntary Partnerships," Working Papers e062, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
  22. Heller, Yuval & Mohlin, Erik, 2018. "Social learning and the shadow of the past," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 426-460.
  23. Kenju Kamei & Artem Nesterov, 2020. "Endogenous Monitoring through Gossiping in an Infinitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game: Experimental Evidence," Department of Economics Working Papers 2020_02, Durham University, Department of Economics.
  24. Yu Awaya & Hiroki Fukai & Makoto Watanabe, 2017. "A Model of Collateral," CESifo Working Paper Series 6731, CESifo.
  25. Tom Potoms & Tom Truyts, 2020. "Unhappy is the land without symbols - Group symbols in infinitely repeated public good games," Working Paper Series 1720, Department of Economics, University of Sussex Business School.
  26. Tóbiás, Áron, 2023. "Rational Altruism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 207(C), pages 50-80.
  27. Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2017. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory (Revised version of F-381)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-414, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
  28. Berger, Ulrich, 2011. "Learning to cooperate via indirect reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 30-37, May.
  29. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2012. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-044, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  30. Heller, Yuval, 2017. "Instability of belief-free equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 261-286.
  31. , & ,, 2014. "Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
  32. Deb, Joyee & Gonzalez-Diaz, Julio, 2019. "Enforcing social norms: Trust-building and community enforcement," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4), November.
  33. Araujo, Luis & Camargo, Braz, 2015. "Limited monitoring and the essentiality of money," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 32-37.
  34. Luciana C Moscoso Boedo & Antonio Jimenez-Martinez, 2015. "Identifying defectors in a population with short-run players," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(2), pages 1392-1403.
  35. Darong Dai, 2013. "Independence and Uniqueness of the Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium in Social Networks," International Journal of Business and Economic Sciences Applied Research (IJBESAR), Democritus University of Thrace (DUTH), Kavala Campus, Greece, vol. 6(3), pages 79-96, December.
  36. Nava, Francesco & Piccione, Michele, 2011. "Efficiency in repeated two-action games with local monitoring," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58062, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  37. Filip Vesely & Chun-Lei Yang, 2013. "On Optimal Social Convention in Voluntary Continuation Prisoner's Dilemma Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 4553, CESifo.
  38. Luciana Cecilia Moscoso Boedo & Lucia Quesada & Marcela Tarazona, 2013. "Cooperation among Strangers in the Presence of Defectors: An Experimental Study," Working Papers DTE 567, CIDE, División de Economía.
  39. Heller, Yuval, 2015. "Instability of Equilibria with Imperfect Private Monitoring," MPRA Paper 64468, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  40. Awaya, Yu, 2014. "Community enforcement with observation costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 173-186.
  41. Berger, Ulrich & Grüne, Ansgar, 2016. "On the stability of cooperation under indirect reciprocity with first-order information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 19-33.
  42. repec:pra:mprapa:64485 is not listed on IDEAS
  43. Heller, Yuval & Mohlin, Erik, 2015. "Stable Observable Behavior," MPRA Paper 63013, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  44. Daniel Monte & Roberto Pinheiro, 2017. "Costly Information Intermediation: Quality vs. Spillovers," Working Papers 17-21R2, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, revised 05 Dec 2024.
  45. Awaya Yu & Fukai Hiroki, 2020. "Monitoring and coordination for essentiality of money," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 1-7, January.
  46. Takako Fujiwara‐Greve & Henrich R. Greve & Stefan Jonsson, 2016. "Asymmetry Of Customer Loss And Recovery Under Endogenous Partnerships: Theory And Evidence," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57(1), pages 3-30, February.
  47. Heller, Yuval & Mohlin, Erik, 2017. "When Is Social Learning Path-Dependent?," MPRA Paper 78962, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  48. Francesc Dilmé, 2012. "Cooperation in Large Societies," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-011, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  49. Dai, Darong, 2012. "On the Existence of Pareto Optimal Endogenous Matching," MPRA Paper 43125, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  50. Matthew J. Hashim & Karthik N. Kannan & Sandra Maximiano, 2017. "Information Feedback, Targeting, and Coordination: An Experimental Study," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 28(2), pages 289-308, June.
  51. Joyee Deb & Takuo Sugaya & Alexander Wolitzky, 2020. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games With Anonymous Random Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(3), pages 917-964, May.
  52. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy (Forthcoming in the B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-452, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
  53. Francesc Dilmé, 2016. "Helping Behavior In Large Societies," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57(4), pages 1261-1278, November.
  54. Wojciech Olszewski, 2007. "A Simple Exposition of Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(58), pages 1-16.
  55. Michael McBride & Ryan Kendall & Martin B. Short & Maria R. D'Orsogna, 2012. "Crime, Punishment, and Evolution in an Adversarial Game," Working Papers 121308, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  56. Yangbo Song & Mihaela Schaar, 2020. "Dynamic network formation with foresighted agents," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(2), pages 345-384, June.
  57. Kamei, Kenju, 2015. "Endogenous Reputation Formation: Cooperation and Identity under the Shadow of the Future," MPRA Paper 61657, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  58. Jindani, Sam, 2020. "Community enforcement using modal actions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
  59. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2013. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-038, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  60. Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2011. "Monitoring Accuracy and Retaliation in Infinitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Theory and Experiments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-795, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  61. Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2019. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments (Revised version of CARF-F-433)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-466, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
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