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Full revelation of information in Sender-Receiver games of persuasion
Citations
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Cited by:
- Miura, Shintaro, 2014. "A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 55-68.
- Ispano, Alessandro, 2018.
"Information acquisition and the value of bad news,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 165-173.
- Alessandro Ispano, 2013. "Information acquisition and the value of bad news," Working Papers 2013-36, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Wen, Hui & Ho, Ken C. & Gao, Jijun & Yu, Li, 2022. "The fundamental effects of ESG disclosure quality in boosting the growth of ESG investing," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
- Eduardo Perez, 2012.
"Competing with Equivocal Information,"
SciencePo Working papers Main
hal-03583828, HAL.
- Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2012. "Competing with Equivocal Information," Working Papers hal-00675126, HAL.
- Eduardo Perez, 2012. "Competing with Equivocal Information," Working Papers hal-03583828, HAL.
- Emiel Awad, 2020. "Persuasive Lobbying with Allied Legislators," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(4), pages 938-951, October.
- Golosov, Mikhail & Skreta, Vasiliki & Tsyvinski, Aleh & Wilson, Andrea, 2014.
"Dynamic strategic information transmission,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 304-341.
- Mikhail Golosov, 2009. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," 2009 Meeting Papers 181, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2011. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," Working Papers 11-17, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2011. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1802, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2011.
- Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2013. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," Working Papers 13-03, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2011. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," EIEF Working Papers Series 1110, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised May 2011.
- Hagenbach, Jeanne & Perez-Richet, Eduardo, 2018.
"Communication with evidence in the lab,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 139-165.
- Hagenbach, Jeanne & Perez-Richet, Eduardo, 2018. "Communication with Evidence in the Lab," CEPR Discussion Papers 12927, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Jeanne Hagenbach & Eduardo Perez, 2018. "Communication with evidence in the lab," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03391914, HAL.
- Jeanne Hagenbach & Eduardo Perez, 2018. "Communication with evidence in the lab," Post-Print hal-03391914, HAL.
- Maximilian Kasy & Jann Spiess, 2022. "Rationalizing Pre-Analysis Plans:Statistical Decisions Subject to Implementability," Economics Series Working Papers 975, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Ivan Balbuzanov, 2019. "Lies and consequences," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(4), pages 1203-1240, December.
- Péter Eső & Ádám Galambos, 2013. "Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(1), pages 263-282, February.
- Thomas Lanzi & Jerome Mathis, 2011. "How to consult an expert? Opinion versus evidence," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 70(4), pages 447-474, April.
- Kasy, Maximilian & Spiess, Jann, 2024. "Optimal Pre-analysis Plans: Statistical Decisions Subject to Implementability," IZA Discussion Papers 17187, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Hitoshi Sadakane, 2017. "Multistage Information Transmission with Voluntary Monetary Transfer," ISER Discussion Paper 1006, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Jianan Wang, 2021. "Evidence and fully revealing deliberation with non-consequentialist jurors," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 515-531, December.
- Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2016.
"Full disclosure in decentralized organizations,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 5-7.
- Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2011. "Full Disclosure in Decentralized Organizations," Working Papers halshs-00652279, HAL.
- Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2016. "Full disclosure in decentralized organizations," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01313702, HAL.
- Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2016. "Full disclosure in decentralized organizations," Post-Print halshs-01313702, HAL.
- Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2011. "Full Disclosure in Decentralized Organizations," PSE Working Papers halshs-00652279, HAL.
- repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/4kpa2fek478tla1o86g6n9jb6v is not listed on IDEAS
- Péter Eső & Chris Wallace, 2014. "Information and evidence in bargaining," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 2(1), pages 23-32, April.
- Hitoshi Sadakane, 2017. "Multistage Information Transmission with Voluntary Monetary Transfer," ISER Discussion Paper 1006r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jun 2018.
- Matthew Gentzkow & Emir Kamenica, 2017. "Disclosure of endogenous information," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(1), pages 47-56, April.
- Maximilian Kasy & Jann Spiess, 2022. "Optimal Pre-Analysis Plans: Statistical Decisions Subject to Implementability," Papers 2208.09638, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.
- Hitoshi Sadakane, 2017. "Multistage Information Transmission with Voluntary Monetary Transfer," ISER Discussion Paper 1006rr, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jan 2018.
- repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/4kpa2fek478tla1o86g6n9jb6v is not listed on IDEAS
- Harbaugh, Richmond & To, Theodore, 2020.
"False modesty: When disclosing good news looks bad,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 43-55.
- Rick Harbaugh & Theodore To, 2005. "False Modesty: When Disclosing Good News Looks Bad," Working Papers 2005-05, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
- Giovannoni, Francesco & Seidmann, Daniel J., 2007. "Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 296-315, May.
- Phillip C. Stocken, 2022. "Disclosure regulation and incentive uncertainty," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(2), pages 2267-2281, June.
- Jianan Wang, 2022. "Partially verifiable deliberation in voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(3), pages 457-481, March.
- Feddersen, Timothy & Gradwohl, Ronen, 2020. "Decentralized advice," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
- Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez‐Richet, 2014.
"Certifiable Pre‐Play Communication: Full Disclosure,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(3), pages 1093-1131, May.
- Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2012. "Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure," Working Papers hal-00753473, HAL.
- Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2014. "Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure," Post-Print halshs-01053478, HAL.
- Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2014. "Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01053478, HAL.
- Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2012. "Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure," PSE Working Papers hal-00753473, HAL.
- Thomas Lanzi & Jerome Mathis, 2008.
"Consulting an Expert with Potentially Conflicting Preferences,"
Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 65(3), pages 185-204, November.
- T. Lanzi & J. Mathis, 2005. "Consulting an expert with potentially conflicting preferences," THEMA Working Papers 2005-07, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Ertac, Seda & Koçkesen, Levent & Ozdemir, Duygu, 2016.
"The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: Theory and experimental evidence,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 24-45.
- Seda Ertac & Levent Kockesen & Duygu Ozdemir, 2015. "The Role of Verifiability and Privacy in the Strategic Provision of Performance Feedback: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1524, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
- Matthias Lang, 2020. "Mechanism Design with Narratives," CESifo Working Paper Series 8502, CESifo.
- Ertac, Seda & Gümren, Mert & Koçkesen, Levent, 2019.
"Strategic feedback in teams: Theory and experimental evidence,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 1-23.
- Seda Ertac & Mert Gumren & Levent Kockesen, 2017. "Strategic Feedback in Teams: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1714, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
- repec:hal:pseose:halshs-01053478 is not listed on IDEAS
- Maximilian Kasy & Jann Spiess, 2024. "Optimal Pre-Analysis Plans: Statistical Decisions Subject to Implementability," CESifo Working Paper Series 11258, CESifo.
- Eso, Peter & Wallace, Chris, 2016. "Persuasion and Pricing : Dynamic Trading with Hard Evidence," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 24, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
- Bhattacharya, Sourav & Goltsman, Maria & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2018. "On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 345-363.
- Hedlund, Jonas, 2015. "Persuasion with communication costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 28-40.
- Ryan, Matthew & Vaithianathan, Rhema, 2011. "Verifiability and neologism-proofness in a Sender-Receiver game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 256-262, August.