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When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Keiichi Hori & Hiroshi Osano, 2013. "Managerial Incentives and the Role of Advisors in the Continuous-Time Agency Model," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 26(10), pages 2620-2647.
  2. Ulf Axelson & Philip Bond, 2015. "Wall Street Occupations," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(5), pages 1949-1996, October.
  3. Giat, Yahel & Subramanian, Ajay, 2013. "Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 2833-2861.
  4. Antonio Mello & Erwan Quintin, 2021. "A Backup Quarterback View of Mezzanine Finance," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 49(S2), pages 526-556, September.
  5. Jacek Rothert, 2015. "Monitoring, moral hazard, and turnover," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(2), pages 355-374, February.
  6. Lefgren, Lars J. & Platt, Brennan & Price, Joseph & Higbee, Samuel, 2019. "Outcome based accountability: Theory and evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 121-137.
  7. Ronald Anderson & Cecilia Bustamante & Stéphane Guibaud & Mihail Zervos, 2018. "Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03391936, HAL.
  8. Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2019. "Dynamic Non-monetary Incentives," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 111-150, November.
  9. Wang, Cheng, 2011. "Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 74-110, January.
  10. Fabel, Oliver & Kolmar, Martin, 2012. "Do parachutes discipline managers? An analysis of takeover battles," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 224-232.
  11. Borys Grochulski & Yuzhe Zhang, 2016. "Optimal Contracts with Reflection," Working Paper 16-14, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  12. Smith, Anthony Jr. & Wang, Cheng, 2006. "Dynamic credit relationships in general equilibrium," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 847-877, May.
  13. Oliver Fabel & Martin Kolmar, 2007. "On 'Golden Parachutes' as Manager Discipline," TWI Research Paper Series 17, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
  14. Wang, Cheng, 1997. "Incentives, CEO Compensation, and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 72-105, September.
  15. Brad Graham & Jack Robles, 2019. "Attorney fees in repeated relationships," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 127(2), pages 99-124, July.
  16. Bushman, Robert & Dai, Zhonglan & Wang, Xue, 2010. "Risk and CEO turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(3), pages 381-398, June.
  17. Martinez Leonardo, 2009. "Reputation, Career Concerns, and Job Assignments," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-29, May.
  18. Borys Grochulski & Yuzhe Zhang, 2017. "Market‐Based Incentives," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(2), pages 331-382, May.
  19. Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas Cooley & Sonia Di Giannatale, 2010. "A Theory of Firm Decline," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 13(4), pages 861-885, October.
  20. Daniel F. Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2012. "Managerial Turnover in a Changing World," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(5), pages 879-925.
  21. Yunan Li & Cheng Wang, 2022. "Endogenous Labor Market Cycles," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(2), pages 849-881, May.
  22. Ronald Anderson & Cecilia Bustamante & Stéphane Guibaud, 2013. "Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover," Working Papers hal-03470530, HAL.
  23. Anderson, Ronald W. & Bustamante, Maria Cecilia & Guibaud, Stéphane, 2012. "Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 43144, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  24. Siegert, Caspar & Trepper, Piers, 2015. "Optimal tolerance for failure," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 41-55.
  25. Ales, Laurence & Maziero, Pricila & Yared, Pierre, 2014. "A theory of political and economic cycles," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 224-251.
  26. Keiichi Hori & Hiroshi Osano, 2017. "Agency Contracts, Noncommitment Timing Strategies and Real Options," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 68(4), pages 521-554, December.
  27. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/2iclr3ojhv9ko9ord4mpg9odaj is not listed on IDEAS
  28. Wang, Cheng, 2006. "Equilibrium Layoff As Termination of a Dynamic Contract," Staff General Research Papers Archive 12704, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  29. Martinez, Leonardo, 2009. "A theory of political cycles," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1166-1186, May.
  30. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/2iclr3ojhv9ko9ord4mpg9odaj is not listed on IDEAS
  31. Jonathan Créchet, 2023. "Risk Sharing in a Dual Labor Market," Working Papers 2307E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
  32. Szydlowski, Martin & Yoon, Ji Hee, 2022. "Ambiguity in dynamic contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 199(C).
  33. Panu Poutvaara & Tuomas Takalo & Andreas Wagener, 2017. "The Optimal Duration of Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 6808, CESifo.
  34. Wang, Cheng & Yang, Youzhi, 2019. "Optimal self-enforcement and termination," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 161-186.
  35. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/2gg54vdji291pb220pomk85ev8 is not listed on IDEAS
  36. Cheng Wang & Youzhi Yang, 2023. "On the Pure Theory of Wage Dispersion," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 47, pages 246-277, January.
  37. Wang, Cheng & Yang, Youzhi, 2015. "Equilibrium matching and termination," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 208-229.
  38. Axelson, Ulf & Bond, Philip, 2011. "Investment banking careers: an equilibrium theory of overpaid jobs," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119062, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  39. Axelson, Ulf & Bond, Philip, 2015. "Wall Street occupations," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 37448, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  40. Ulf Axelson & Philip Bond, 2011. "Investment banking careers: An equilibrium theory of overpaid jobs," FMG Discussion Papers dp690, Financial Markets Group.
  41. Wang, Cheng & Yang, Youzhi, 2015. "Outside opportunities and termination," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 207-228.
  42. Cheng Wang, 2012. "Optimal Self-enforcing and Termination," 2012 Meeting Papers 433, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  43. Antinolfi, Gaetano & Carli, Francesco, 2015. "Costly monitoring, dynamic incentives, and default," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 105-119.
  44. Jeremy Greenwood & Pengfei Han & Juan M. Sánchez, 2022. "Financing Ventures," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(3), pages 1021-1053, August.
  45. Grochulski, Borys & Zhang, Yuzhe, 2023. "Termination as an incentive device," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(1), January.
  46. Yang, Youzhi, 2009. "Essays on Repated Moral Hazard," ISU General Staff Papers 200901010800001746, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  47. Josepa Miquel-Florensa, 2013. "Dynamic contractual incentives in the face of a Samaritans’s dilemma," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(1), pages 151-166, January.
  48. Jin, Yu, 2010. "Credit Termination and the Technology Bubbles," MPRA Paper 29010, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  49. Anderson, Ronald W. & Bustamante, Maria Cecilia & Guibaud, Stéphane & Zervos, Mihail, 2018. "Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 68784, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  50. Brad Graham & Jack Robles, 2019. "Attorney fees in repeated relationships," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 127(2), pages 99-124, July.
  51. Anderson, Ronald W. & Bustamante, Maria Cecilia & Guibaud, Stéphane, 2012. "Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119042, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  52. Créchet, Jonathan, 2024. "A model of risk sharing in a dual labor market," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).
  53. Barbos, Andrei, 2019. "Dynamic contracts with random monitoring," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 1-16.
  54. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/2gg54vdji291pb220pomk85ev8 is not listed on IDEAS
  55. Catherine Casamatta & Alexander Guembel, 2010. "Managerial Legacies, Entrenchment, and Strategic Inertia," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(6), pages 2403-2436, December.
  56. Fu, Kangkang & Kwok, Wing Chun & Wong, George, 2020. "Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover: A Chinese study," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
  57. Susanne Ohlendorf & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2012. "Repeated Moral Hazard And Contracts With Memory: The Case Of Risk‐Neutrality," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(2), pages 433-452, May.
  58. Chade, Hector & Vera de Serio, Virginia N., 2014. "Wealth effects and agency costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 1-11.
  59. Maziarz Mariusz, 2019. "A disequilibrium mechanism: When managerial decisions cause macroeconomic instability," Economics and Business Review, Sciendo, vol. 5(1), pages 79-92, March.
  60. Hiroshi Osano & Keiichi Hori, 2015. "A Dynamic Agency Theory of Investment and Managerial Replacement," KIER Working Papers 921, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  61. Leonardo Martinez, 2006. "Reputation and Career Concerns," 2006 Meeting Papers 853, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  62. Martin Szydlowski, 2012. "Ambiguity in Dynamic Contracts," Discussion Papers 1543, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  63. Ronald Anderson & Cecilia Bustamante & Stéphane Guibaud & Mihail Zervos, 2018. "Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover," SciencePo Working papers hal-03391936, HAL.
  64. Wang, Cheng & Yang, Youzhi, 2022. "Optimal CEO turnover," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
  65. Luo, Jie & Wang, Cheng, 2018. "Optimal sovereign lending and default," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 190-213.
  66. Jin, Yu, 2012. "Essays on financial institutions and instability," ISU General Staff Papers 201201010800003361, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  67. Ronald Anderson & Cecilia Bustamante & Stéphane Guibaud & Mihail Zervos, 2018. "Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover," Post-Print hal-03391936, HAL.
  68. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Ohlendorf, Susanne, 2008. "Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation," CEPR Discussion Papers 6725, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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