Dynamic Nonmonetary Incentives
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- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2019. "Dynamic Non-monetary Incentives," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 111-150, November.
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2016. "Dynamic nonmonetary incentives," Economics Working Papers 1545, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
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Cited by:
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2019.
"Monotone contracts,"
Economics Working Papers
1647, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2019. "Monotone Contracts," Working Papers 1085, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Spear, Stephen E. & Wang, Cheng, 2005.
"When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 239-256, February.
- Stephen Spear & Cheng Wang, "undated". "When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts," GSIA Working Papers 2002-E5, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
- Spear, Stephen E. & Wang, Cheng, 2005. "When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts," Staff General Research Papers Archive 11443, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Matthew Mitchell, 2018. "Free (Ad)vice," 2018 Meeting Papers 1194, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Christoph Siemroth, 2024.
"Ending Wasteful Year‐End Spending: On Optimal Budget Rules In Organizations,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 65(3), pages 1163-1188, August.
- Siemroth, Christoph, 2022. "Ending Wasteful Year-End Spending: On Optimal Budget Rules in Organizations," Economics Discussion Papers 32231, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2021.
"Optimal Contracts with Randomly Arriving Tasks,"
The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(637), pages 1905-1918.
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2020. "Optimal Contracts with Randomly Arriving Tasks," Working Papers 1147, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2020. "Optimal contracts with randomly arriving tasks," Economics Working Papers 1690, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Rantakari, Heikki, 2023. "How to reward honesty?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 207(C), pages 129-145.
- Lipnowski, Elliot & Ramos, João, 2020.
"Repeated delegation,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
- Elliot Lipnowski & Joao Ramos, 2015. "Repeated Delegation," Working Papers 15-02, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Elliot Lipnowski & Joao Ramos, 2018. "Repeated Delegation," 2018 Meeting Papers 1292, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Chen, Yi, 2022. "Dynamic delegation with a persistent state," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(4), November.
- Forand, Jean Guillaume & Zapal, Jan, 2020. "Production priorities in dynamic relationships," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
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More about this item
Keywords
dynamic mechanism design; uncertain action availability;JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-REG-2016-11-06 (Regulation)
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