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Charter value, minimum bank capital requirement and deposit insurance pricing in equilibrium

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Koen Schoors & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "Passive Creditors," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(1), pages 57-86, March.
  2. Kleff Volker & Weber Martin, 2008. "How Do Banks Determine Capital? Evidence from Germany," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 9(3), pages 354-372, August.
  3. Elijah Brewer III & Thomas H. Mondschean & Philip Strahan, 1996. "The Role of Monitoring in Reducing the Moral Hazard Problem Associated with Government Guarantees: Evidence from the Life Insurance Industry," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 96-15, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
  4. Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira & Leonor Modesto, 2021. "Competition and the risk of bank failure: Breaking with the representative borrower assumption," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(4), pages 622-638, August.
  5. Michael Brei & Leonardo Gambacorta, 2014. "The leverage ratio over the cycle," BIS Working Papers 471, Bank for International Settlements.
  6. Chen, Andrew H. & Mazumdar, Sumon C., 1997. "A dynamic model of firewalls and non-traditional banking," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 393-416, March.
  7. S. CLAEYS & G. LANINE & K. SCHOORs, 2005. "Bank Supervision Russian Style: Rules vs Enforcement and Tacit Objectives," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 05/307, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
  8. Lin, Karen Lai Kai, 2020. "The Cyclical Patterns of Capital Buffers: Evidence from Japanese Banks," Hitotsubashi Journal of commerce and management, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 53(1), pages 49-68, February.
  9. Kane, Edward J., 2001. "Dynamic inconsistency of capital forbearance: Long-run vs. short-run effects of too-big-to-fail policymaking," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 281-299, August.
  10. Guo, Lin, 1999. "When and why did FSLIC resolve insolvent thrifts?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(6), pages 955-990, June.
  11. Daniel Perez & Vicente Salas-Fumas & Jesus Saurina, 2008. "Earnings and Capital Management in Alternative Loan Loss Provision Regulatory Regimes," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(3), pages 423-445.
  12. de-Ramon, Sebastián & Iscenko, Zanna & Osborne, Matthew & Straughan, Michael & Andrews, Peter, 2012. "Measuring the impact of prudential policy on the macroeconomy: A practical application to Basel III and other responses to the financial crisis," MPRA Paper 69423, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. Rebecca Demsetz & Marc R. Saidenberg & Philip E. Strahan, 1997. "Agency problems and risk taking at banks," Staff Reports 29, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  14. Ning Gong & Kenneth D. Jones, 2013. "Bailouts, Monitoring, and Penalties: An Integrated Framework of Government Policies to Manage the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 13(3), pages 299-325, September.
  15. Jokipii, Terhi & Milne, Alistair, 2011. "Bank capital buffer and risk adjustment decisions," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 165-178, August.
  16. Cordella, Tito & Yeyati, Eduardo Levy, 2003. "Bank bailouts: moral hazard vs. value effect," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 300-330, October.
  17. Leonardo Gambacorta & Sudipto Karmakar, 2018. "Leverage and Risk-Weighted Capital Requirements," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 14(5), pages 153-191, December.
  18. Sophie Claeys, & Gleb Lanine & Koen Schoors, 2005. "Bank Supervision Russian style: Rules versus Enforcement and Tacit Objectives," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp778, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  19. Jokipii, Terhi & Milne, Alistair, 2008. "The cyclical behaviour of European bank capital buffers," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(8), pages 1440-1451, August.
  20. Rebecca Demsetz & Marc R. Saidenberg & Philip E. Strahan, 1997. "Agency problems and risk taking at banks," Research Paper 9709, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  21. Ayuso, Juan & Perez, Daniel & Saurina, Jesus, 2004. "Are capital buffers pro-cyclical?: Evidence from Spanish panel data," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 249-264, April.
  22. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2000_010 is not listed on IDEAS
  23. E. Agliardi, 2007. "Bank Closure Policies and Capital Requirements: a Note," Working Papers 603, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  24. Shehzad, Choudhry Tanveer & De Haan, Jakob, 2015. "Supervisory powers and bank risk taking," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 15-24.
  25. Claeys, Sophie & Schoors, Koen, 2007. "Bank supervision Russian style: Evidence of conflicts between micro- and macro-prudential concerns," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 630-657, September.
  26. Jang, Karen Y., 2017. "The effect of TARP on the propagation of real estate shocks: Evidence from geographically diversified banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 173-192.
  27. Sophie Claeys, & Gleb Lanine & Koen Schoors, 2005. "Bank Supervision Russian style: Rules versus Enforcement and Tacit Objectives," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp778, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  28. Montagnoli, Alberto & Mouratidis, Konstantinos & Whyte, Kemar, 2021. "Assessing the cyclical behaviour of bank capital buffers in a finance-augmented macro-economy," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
  29. Weber, Martin & Kleff, Volker, 2003. "How Do Banks Determine Capital? Empirical Evidence for Germany," ZEW Discussion Papers 03-66, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  30. Ari Hyytinen & Tuomas Takalo, 2002. "Enhancing Bank Transparency: A Re-assessment," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 6(3), pages 429-445.
  31. Jiang, Chunxia & Liu, Hong & Molyneux, Philip, 2019. "Do different forms of government ownership matter for bank capital behavior? Evidence from China," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 38-49.
  32. Cicchiello, Antonella Francesca & Cotugno, Matteo & Perdichizzi, Salvatore & Torluccio, Giuseppe, 2022. "Do capital buffers matter? Evidence from the stocks and flows of nonperforming loans," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
  33. repec:bla:germec:v:9:y:2008:i::p:354-372 is not listed on IDEAS
  34. Lin, Karen Lai Kai & Konishi, Masaru, 2013. "Capital requirements, bank behavior and fair value accounting: Evidence from Japanese commercial banks," Working Paper Series G-1-6, Hitotsubashi University Center for Financial Research.
  35. Óscar Alfonso Carvallo-Valencia & Leslie A. Jiménez, 2018. "Bank Capital Buffers and Procyclicality in Latin America," Investigación Conjunta-Joint Research, in: Alberto Ortiz-Bolaños (ed.), Monetary Policy and Financial Stability in Latin America and the Caribbean, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 133-158, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, CEMLA.
  36. Linus Wilson & Yan Wu, 2010. "Common (stock) sense about risk-shifting and bank bailouts," Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, Springer;Swiss Society for Financial Market Research, vol. 24(1), pages 3-29, March.
  37. repec:zbw:bofitp:2005_010 is not listed on IDEAS
  38. Natalya A. Schenck & John H. Thornton, 2016. "Charter values, bailouts and moral hazard in banking," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 49(2), pages 172-202, April.
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