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Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: Towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Mezzetti, Claudio & Renou, Ludovic, 2012. "Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2357-2375.
  2. Oechssler, Joerg & Reischmann, Andreas & Sofianos, Andis, 2022. "The conditional contribution mechanism for repeated public goods – The general case," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
  3. Ortner, Juan, 2015. "Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 1-16.
  4. Jason Shachat & Zhenxuan Zhang, 2017. "The Hayek Hypothesis and Long‐run Competitive Equilibrium: An Experimental Investigation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(599), pages 199-228, February.
  5. Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2019. "Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(4), pages 1326-1344, November.
  6. Bierbrauer, Felix & Netzer, Nick, 2016. "Mechanism design and intentions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 557-603.
  7. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Saulle, Riccardo D., 2024. "Designing rotation programs: Limits and possibilities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 77-102.
  8. Jain, Ritesh, 2021. "Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 47-66.
  9. Xiong, Siyang, 2023. "Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: complete characterization," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(1), January.
  10. Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(4), pages 1843-1881.
  11. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2014. "Behavioral Implementation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(10), pages 2975-3002, October.
  12. Tumennasan, Norovsambuu, 2013. "To err is human: Implementation in quantal response equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 138-152.
  13. Ritesh Jain & Ville Korpela & Michele Lombardi, 2022. "Two-Player Rationalizable Implementation," CSEF Working Papers 660, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  14. Reischmann, Andreas, 2015. "The Conditional Contribution Mechanism for the Provision of Public Goods," Working Papers 0586, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
  15. Lee, Jihong & Sabourian, Hamid, 2015. "Complexity and repeated implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 259-292.
  16. Kartik, Navin & Tercieux, Olivier & Holden, Richard, 2014. "Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 284-290.
  17. T. Hayashi & R. Jain & V. Korpela & M. Lombardi, 2023. "Behavioral strong implementation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1257-1287, November.
  18. Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein, 2014. "Complex Questionnaires," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(4), pages 1529-1541, July.
  19. Xiaochuan Huang & Takehito Masuda & Yoshitaka Okano & Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2014. "Cooperation among behaviorally heterogeneous players in social dilemma with stay or leave decisions," Working Papers SDES-2014-7, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Feb 2015.
  20. Kimya, Mert, 2017. "Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 138-146.
  21. Rodrigo A. Velez & Alexander L. Brown, 2018. "Empirical Equilibrium," Papers 1804.07986, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2020.
  22. Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein, 2012. "A Model of Persuasion with Boundedly Rational Agents," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(6), pages 1057-1082.
  23. Meng, Dawen & Tian, Guoqiang, 2013. "Entry-Deterring Nonlinear Pricing with Bounded Rationality," MPRA Paper 57935, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised May 2014.
  24. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele, 2019. "Mechanism design with farsighted agents," MPRA Paper 94436, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  25. Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2016. "Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences," Working Papers 2016-4, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  26. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2012. "Natural Implementation with Partially Honest Agents," Discussion Paper Series 561, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  27. Ben Amiet & Andrea Collevecchio & Kais Hamza, 2020. "When "Better" is better than "Best"," Papers 2011.00239, arXiv.org.
  28. Saran, Rene, 2016. "Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 517-564.
  29. Koray, Semih & Yildiz, Kemal, 2018. "Implementation via rights structures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 479-502.
  30. Kneeland, Terri, 2017. "Mechanism design with level-k types: Theory and an application to bilateral trade," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2017-303, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
  31. zhao, guo & Chai, Yingming, 2024. "A Sufficient Condition for Weakly Acyclic games with Applications," MPRA Paper 120789, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  32. Daske, Thomas, 2017. "Externality Assessments, Welfare Judgments, and Mechanism Design," EconStor Preprints 172494, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
  33. Geoffroy de Clippel & Rene Saran & Roberto Serrano, 2014. "Mechanism Design with Bounded Depth of Reasoning and Small Modeling Mistakes," Working Papers 2014-7, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  34. Lombardi, M. & Yoshihara, N., 2012. "National implementation with partially honest agents," Research Memorandum 005, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  35. Barlo, Mehmet & Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün, 2023. "Behavioral implementation under incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
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