Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: complete characterization
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- Siyang Xiong, 2022. "Rationalizable Implementation of Social Choice Functions: Complete Characterization," Papers 2202.04885, arXiv.org.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Ritesh Jain & Ville Korpela & Michele Lombardi, 2022.
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- R Jain & V Korpela & M Lombardi, 2022. "Two-Player Rationalizable Implementation," Working Papers 202228, University of Liverpool, Department of Economics.
- R. Jain & V. Korpela & M. Lombardi, 2023. "Two-Player Rationalizable Implementation," Working Papers 202317, University of Liverpool, Department of Economics.
- Barlo, Mehmet & Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün, 2023. "Behavioral implementation under incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
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Implementation; rationalizability;JEL classification:
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