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A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Marco Faravelli & Randall Walsh, 2011. "Smooth Politicians And Paternalistic Voters: A Theory Of Large Elections," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000250, David K. Levine.
  2. Lo Prete, Anna & Revelli, Federico, 2014. "Voter Turnout and City Performance," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 201435, University of Turin.
  3. Matveenko, Andrei & Valei, Azamat & Vorobyev, Dmitriy, 2022. "Participation quorum when voting is costly," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
  4. R. Aytimur & Aristotelis Boukouras & Robert Schwager, 2014. "Voting as a signaling device," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(3), pages 753-777, April.
  5. Alastair Smith & Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & Tom LaGatta, 2017. "Group incentives and rational voting1," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(2), pages 299-326, April.
  6. Federico Revelli, 2013. "Tax limits and local democracy," Working Papers 2013/29, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  7. Christos Mavridis & Marco Serena, 2018. "Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 177(1), pages 53-66, October.
  8. Alberto Grillo, 2017. "Risk aversion and bandwagon effect in the pivotal voter model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 172(3), pages 465-482, September.
  9. Hans Gersbach & Akaki Mamageishvili & Oriol Tejada, 2017. "Assessment Voting in Large Electorates," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 17/284, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
  10. Marco Faravelli & Kenan Kalayci & Carlos Pimienta, 2020. "Costly voting: a large-scale real effort experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(2), pages 468-492, June.
  11. Mavridis, Christos & Serena, Marco, 2021. "Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size and asymmetric benefits," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
  12. Gersbach, Hans & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2019. "The Effect of Handicaps on Turnout for Large Electorates: An Application to Assessment Voting," CEPR Discussion Papers 13921, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 2011. "Overcoming Ideological Bias in Elections," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(2), pages 183-211.
  14. Hans Peter Grüner & Thomas Tröger, 2019. "Linear Voting Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(6), pages 2037-2077, November.
  15. Marco Faravelli & Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2015. "(Don’t) Make My Vote Count," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(4), pages 544-569, October.
  16. Melis Kartal, 2015. "Laboratory elections with endogenous turnout: proportional representation versus majoritarian rule," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(3), pages 366-384, September.
  17. Meya, Johannes & Poutvaara, Panu & Schwager, Robert, 2020. "Pocketbook voting, social preferences, and expressive motives in referenda," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 185-205.
  18. Dmitriy Vorobyev, 2022. "Information disclosure in elections with sequential costly participation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(3), pages 317-344, March.
  19. Van Wesep, Edward D., 2014. "The Idealized Electoral College voting mechanism and shareholder power," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 90-108.
  20. Dmitriy Vorobyev, 2016. "Participation in fraudulent elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(4), pages 863-892, April.
  21. David Dillenberger & Colin Raymond, 2016. "Group-Shift and the Consensus Effect, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-015, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 30 Sep 2016.
  22. Christos Mavridis & Marco Serena, 2019. "Complete Information Pivotal-Voter Model with Asymmetric Group Size and Asymmetric Beneï¬ ts," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2019-17_2, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
  23. Marco Faravelli & Priscilla Man, 2021. "Generalized majority rules: utilitarian welfare in large but finite populations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(1), pages 21-48, July.
  24. Casella, Alessandra & Guo, Jeffrey Da-Ren & Jiang, Michelle, 2023. "Minority turnout and representation under cumulative voting. An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 133-155.
  25. Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2023. "Large elections and interim turnout," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 175-210.
  26. Faravelli, Marco & Man, Priscilla & Walsh, Randall, 2015. "Mandate and paternalism: A theory of large elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 1-23.
  27. Gersbach, Hans & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2021. "The effect of handicaps on turnout for large electorates with an application to assessment voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
  28. Rohde, Linnéa Marie, 2024. "Can compulsory voting reduce information acquisition?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 305-337.
  29. Chan, Jimmy & Gupta, Seher & Li, Fei & Wang, Yun, 2019. "Pivotal persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 178-202.
    • Jimmy Chan & Seher Gupta & Fei Li & Yun Wang, 2018. "Pivotal Persuasion," Working Papers 2018-11-03, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.
  30. Federico Revelli & Tsung-Sheng Tsai & Cheng-Tai Wu, 2024. "Ties," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 62(1), pages 1-35, February.
  31. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 2015. "Majority Rule and Utilitarian Welfare," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 339-375, November.
  32. Arzumanyan, Mariam & Polborn, Mattias K., 2017. "Costly voting with multiple candidates under plurality rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 38-50.
  33. Lorens A. Imhof & Matthias Kräkel, 2023. "Team Diversity and Incentives," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(4), pages 2497-2516, April.
  34. Dmitriy Vorobyev & Azamat Valei & Andrei Matveenko, 2023. "Approval vs. Participation Quorums," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_438, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  35. Dillenberger, David & Raymond, Collin, 2019. "On the consensus effect," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 384-416.
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