Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-018-0585-6
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- Christos Mavridis & Marco Serena, 2018. "Complete Information Pivotal-Voter Model with Asymmetric Group Size," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2018-07, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Müller, Michael & Puppe, Clemens, 2020. "Strategy-proofness and responsiveness imply minimal participation," Working Paper Series in Economics 138, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
- Christos Mavridis & Marco Serena, 2019. "Complete Information Pivotal-Voter Model with Asymmetric Group Size and Asymmetric Beneï¬ ts," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2019-17_2, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
- Michael Müller & Clemens Puppe, 2023. "Strategy-proofness implies minimal participation under single-peakedness," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(1), pages 131-151, April.
- Mavridis, Christos & Serena, Marco, 2021. "Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size and asymmetric benefits," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
- Nöldeke, Georg & Peña, Jorge, 2020.
"Group size and collective action in a binary contribution game,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 42-51.
- Nöldeke, Georg & Peña, Jorge, 2020. "Group size and collective action in a binary contribution game," IAST Working Papers 18-86, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).
- Georg Nöldeke & Jorge Peña, 2020. "Group size and collective action in a binary contribution game," Post-Print hal-02923973, HAL.
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Keywords
Costly voting; Pivotal voter model; Complete information;All these keywords.
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