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Sharing a polluted river

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Wu, Hao & van den Brink, René & Estévez-Fernández, Arantza, 2024. "Highway toll allocation," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 180(C).
  2. René van den Brink & Simin He & Jia-Ping Huang, 2015. "Polluted River Problems and Games with a Permission Structure," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 15-108/II, Tinbergen Institute.
  3. Hougaard, Jens Leth & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Tvede, Mich & Østerdal, Lars Peter, 2017. "Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 98-110.
  4. René Brink & P. Herings & Gerard Laan & A. Talman, 2015. "The Average Tree permission value for games with a permission tree," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(1), pages 99-123, January.
  5. Juarez, Ruben & Ko, Chiu Yu & Xue, Jingyi, 2018. "Sharing sequential values in a network," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 734-779.
  6. Rodney Beard, 2011. "The river sharing problem : A review of the technical literature for policy economists," Post-Print hal-00827354, HAL.
  7. Rene van den Brink & Saish Nevrekar, 2020. "Peaceful Agreements to Share a River," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 20-016/II, Tinbergen Institute.
  8. Trudeau, Christian & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2020. "Clique games: A family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 8-14.
  9. René van den Brink, 2009. "Comparable Axiomatizations of the Myerson Value, the Restricted Banzhaf Value, Hierarchical Outcomes and the Average Tree Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Restricted Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 09-108/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  10. Ambec, Stefan & Ehlers, Lars, 2008. "Sharing a river among satiable agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 35-50, September.
  11. Drehmann, Mathias & Tarashev, Nikola, 2013. "Measuring the systemic importance of interconnected banks," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 586-607.
  12. Gudmundsson, Jens & Hougaard, Jens Leth & Ko, Chiu Yu, 2019. "Decentralized mechanisms for river sharing," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 67-81.
  13. Lowing, David, 2024. "Cost allocation in energy distribution networks," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
  14. van den Brink, René & He, Simin & Huang, Jia-Ping, 2018. "Polluted river problems and games with a permission structure," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 182-205.
  15. René van den Brink, 2017. "Games with a Permission Structure: a survey on generalizations and applications," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 17-016/II, Tinbergen Institute.
  16. Hou, Dongshuang & Sun, Panfei & Yang, Guangjing, 2020. "Sharing the costs of cleanup polluted river: Upstream compensation method," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
  17. He, Jie & Huang, Anping & Xu, Luodan, 2015. "Spatial heterogeneity and transboundary pollution: A contingent valuation (CV) study on the Xijiang River drainage basin in south China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 101-130.
  18. Acosta-Vega, Rick K. & Algaba, Encarnación & Sánchez-Soriano, Joaquín, 2023. "Design of water quality policies based on proportionality in multi-issue problems with crossed claims," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 311(2), pages 777-788.
  19. van den Brink, René & Katsev, Ilya & van der Laan, Gerard, 2010. "An algorithm for computing the nucleolus of disjunctive non-negative additive games with an acyclic permission structure," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 207(2), pages 817-826, December.
  20. Shivshanker Singh Patel & Parthasarathy Ramachandran, 2022. "A bargaining model for sharing water in a river with negative externality," OPSEARCH, Springer;Operational Research Society of India, vol. 59(2), pages 645-666, June.
  21. Bergantiños, Gustavo & Martínez, Ricardo, 2014. "Cost allocation in asymmetric trees," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 237(3), pages 975-987.
  22. Encarnacion Algaba & René van den Brink & Chris Dietz, 2015. "Power Measures and Solutions for Games under Precedence Constraints," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 15-007/II, Tinbergen Institute.
  23. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Gómez-Rúa, María & Molis, Elena, 2015. "Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the Upstream Responsibility rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 134-150.
  24. Encarnación Algaba & Rene van den Brink & Chris Dietz, 2013. "Cooperative Games on Accessible Union Stable Systems," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-207/II, Tinbergen Institute.
  25. Bergantiños, Gustavo & González-Díaz, Julio & González-Rueda, Ángel M. & P. Fernández de Córdoba, María, 2017. "Loss allocation in energy transmission networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 69-97.
  26. Yokote, Koji & Funaki, Yukihiko & Kamijo, Yoshio, 2017. "Coincidence of the Shapley value with other solutions satisfying covariance," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 1-9.
  27. Abraham, Anand & Ramachandran, Parthasarathy, 2020. "A solution for the flood cost sharing problem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
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