IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/ecm/emetrp/v70y2002i5p1893-1927.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

Computational Complexity and Communication: Coordination in Two-Player Games

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. R. Vijay Krishna, 2004. "Extended Conversations in Sender-Receiver Games," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 126, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  2. Halpern, Joseph Y. & Pass, Rafael & Seeman, Lior, 2019. "The truth behind the myth of the Folk theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 479-498.
  3. Vida, Péter & Āzacis, Helmuts, 2013. "A detail-free mediator," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 101-115.
  4. , & ,, 2013. "Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
  5. Urbano, A. & Vila, J. E., 2004. "Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 143-173, January.
  6. Heng Liu, 2017. "Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1037-1069, November.
  7. Lance Fortnow & Rahul Santhanam, 2009. "Bounding Rationality by Discounting Time," Discussion Papers 1481, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. F. Forges & B. von Stengel, 2002. "Computionally Efficient Coordination in Games Trees," THEMA Working Papers 2002-05, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  9. Gerardi, Dino & Myerson, Roger B., 2007. "Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 104-134, July.
  10. Heller, Yuval, 2010. "Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 394-400, July.
  11. Bernhard von Stengel & Françoise Forges, 2008. "Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium: Definition and Computational Complexity," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 33(4), pages 1002-1022, November.
  12. Kar, Anirban & Ray, Indrajit & Serrano, Roberto, 2010. "A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 189-193, May.
  13. Izmalkov, Sergei & Lepinski, Matt & Micali, Silvio, 2011. "Perfect implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 121-140, January.
  14. Heller, Yuval & Solan, Eilon & Tomala, Tristan, 2012. "Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 222-234.
  15. Gerardi, Dino, 2004. "Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 104-131, January.
  16. Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 2003. "Cheap talk in games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 45-71, January.
  17. Forges, Francoise & Koessler, Frederic, 2005. "Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 793-811, November.
  18. R. Vijay Krishna, 2004. "Communication in Games of Incomplete Information: The Two-player Case," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 125, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  19. Ferenc Forgó, 2011. "Generalized correlated equilibrium for two-person games in extensive form with perfect information," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 19(2), pages 201-213, June.
  20. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5279 is not listed on IDEAS
  21. Joseph Y. Halpern, 2007. "Computer Science and Game Theory: A Brief Survey," Papers cs/0703148, arXiv.org.
  22. Aumann, Robert J., 2003. "Presidential address," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 2-14, October.
  23. Yuval Heller, 2012. "Sequential Correlated Equilibria in Stopping Games," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 60(1), pages 209-224, February.
  24. Wagner, P.Achim, 2011. "Unmediated communication with partially verifiable types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 99-107, January.
  25. Peter Vida, 2005. "A Detail-free Mediator and the 3 Player Case," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 0511, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
  26. Kalai, Adam Tauman & Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud & Samet, Dov, 2010. "A commitment folk theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 127-137, May.
  27. Sergei Izmalkov & Matt Lepinski & Silvio Micali, 2010. "Perfect Implementation," Working Papers w0140, New Economic School (NES).
  28. Gregory Parkhurst & Jason Shogren, 2005. "Does complexity reduce coordination?," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(7), pages 447-452.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.