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Does complexity reduce coordination?

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  • Gregory Parkhurst
  • Jason Shogren

Abstract

Herein it is shown that increased complexity does not necessarily imply more coordination failure. Experienced people playing a 4-player spatial grid game with over 68 000 strategy choices and (68 000)4 potential outcomes were as likely to find the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium as in a corresponding normal form game.

Suggested Citation

  • Gregory Parkhurst & Jason Shogren, 2005. "Does complexity reduce coordination?," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(7), pages 447-452.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:12:y:2005:i:7:p:447-452
    DOI: 10.1080/13504850500092400
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Valle, Haydn & Capon, Timothy & Harris, Michael & Reeson, Andrew, 2012. "Coordination and Strategic Behaviour in Landscape Auctions," 2012 Conference (56th), February 7-10, 2012, Fremantle, Australia 124466, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    2. Samuel Ferey & Yannick Gabuthy & Nicolas Jacquemet, 2013. "L'apport de l'économie expérimentale dans l'élaboration des politiques publiques," Revue française d'économie, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(2), pages 155-194.
    3. Panchalingam, Thadchaigeni & Jones Ritten, Chian & Shogren, Jason F. & Ehmke, Mariah D. & Bastian, Christopher T. & Parkhurst, Gregory M., 2019. "Adding realism to the Agglomeration Bonus: How endogenous land returns affect habitat fragmentation," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 1-1.
    4. Parkhurst, Gregory M. & Shogren, Jason F., 2007. "Spatial incentives to coordinate contiguous habitat," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 344-355, December.
    5. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-00879205 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Nguyen, Chi & Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe & Hanley, Nick & Schilizzi, Steven & Iftekhar, Sayed, 2022. "Spatial Coordination Incentives for landscape-scale environmental management: A systematic review," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    7. Reeson, Andrew F. & Rodriguez, Luis C. & Whitten, Stuart M. & Williams, Kristen & Nolles, Karel & Windle, Jill & Rolfe, John, 2011. "Adapting auctions for the provision of ecosystem services at the landscape scale," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(9), pages 1621-1627, July.
    8. Justin Dijk & Erik Ansink, 2018. "Conservation auctions, collusion and the endowment effect," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 18-093/VIII, Tinbergen Institute.

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