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Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship

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Cited by:

  1. Dionne, G. & Doherty, N., 1991. "Adverse Selection In Insurance Markets: A Selective Survey," Cahiers de recherche 9105, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  2. Jennifer L. Wang, 2004. "Asymmetric Information Problems in Taiwan's Automobile Insurance Market: The Effect of Policy Design on Loss Characteristics," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 7(1), pages 53-71, March.
  3. Deb, Joyee & González-Díaz, Julio & Renault, Jérôme, 2016. "Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 1-23.
  4. H. Schneider, 1983. "Mitbestimmung, unvollständige Information und Leistungsanreize: Überlegungen zu einer funktionsfähigen Unternehmensverfassung," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 119(III), pages 337-355, September.
  5. Gerard A. Pfann & Daniel S. Hamermesh, 2000. "Two-Sided Learning, Labor Turnover, and Worker Displacement," Working Papers 0021, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago.
  6. Luis H. B. Braido, 2003. "Insurance and Incentives in Sharecropping," CESifo Working Paper Series 1098, CESifo.
  7. Mailath, George J. & Postlewaite, Andrew & Samuelson, Larry, 2005. "Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 126-140, October.
  8. Yingni Guo & Johannes Horner, 2015. "Dynamic Mechanisms without Money," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1985, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  9. Buskens, Vincent, 2003. "Trust in triads: effects of exit, control, and learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 235-252, February.
  10. Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2003. "The MaxMin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(1), pages 133-150, December.
  11. Bengt Holmström, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 169-182.
  12. D. J. Wu & Min Ding & Lorin M. Hitt, 2013. "IT Implementation Contract Design: Analytical and Experimental Investigation of IT Value, Learning, and Contract Structure," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 24(3), pages 787-801, September.
  13. Tianyu Ma & Zhuofu Wang & Jiyong Ding, 2018. "Governing the Moral Hazard in China’s Sponge City Projects: A Managerial Analysis of the Construction in the Non-Public Land," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(9), pages 1-15, August.
  14. Bagwell, Kyle & Wolinsky, Asher, 2002. "Game theory and industrial organization," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 49, pages 1851-1895, Elsevier.
  15. Chris Robinson & Bingyong Zheng, 2010. "Moral hazard, insurance claims, and repeated insurance contracts," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 43(3), pages 967-993, August.
  16. Dionne, Georges & Harrington, Scott, 2017. "Insurance and Insurance Markets," Working Papers 17-2, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
  17. Subir K. Chakrabarti & Jaesoo Kim, 2023. "Optimal equilibrium contracts in the infinite horizon with no commitment across periods," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 94(3), pages 379-404, April.
  18. Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2015. "Approximate implementation in Markovian environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 401-442.
  19. Bart S. Vanneste & Douglas H. Frank, 2014. "Forgiveness in Vertical Relationships: Incentive and Termination Effects," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(6), pages 1807-1822, December.
  20. Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1987. "Le risque moral dans la relation de mandat," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 38(1), pages 5-24.
  21. Chaigneau, Pierre, 2010. "The optimal timing of executive compensation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119081, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  22. Neil A. Doherty & Christian Laux & Alexander Muermann, 2015. "Insuring Nonverifiable Losses," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 19(1), pages 283-316.
  23. Garcia, René, 1986. "La théorie économique de l’information : exposé synthétique de la littérature," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 62(1), pages 88-109, mars.
  24. Regine Oexl, 2011. "Trilateral Contract and the Hold-up Problem," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0126, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
  25. Abreu, Dilip & Milgrom, Paul & Pearce, David, 1991. "Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(6), pages 1713-1733, November.
  26. Dionne, Georges & Fombaron, Nathalie & Mimra, Wanda, 2023. "Adverse selection in insurance," Working Papers 23-5, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
  27. Escobar, Juan F. & Llanes, Gastón, 2018. "Cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 408-443.
  28. Canzoneri, Matthew B, 1985. "Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1056-1070, December.
  29. Burghof, Hans-Peter & Henschel, Claudia, 1998. "Credit information in universal banking: A clinical study," CFS Working Paper Series 1998/13, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
  30. Cato, Susumu & Ebina, Takeshi, 2014. "Inequality aversion in long-term contracts," MPRA Paper 59893, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  31. Vincent P. Crawford, 1985. "Dynamic Games and Dynamic Contract Theory," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 29(2), pages 195-224, June.
  32. Gifford, Sharon, 1999. "Efficient moral hazard," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 427-442, December.
  33. Azariadis, Costas, 1987. "Human Capital And Self-Enforcing Contracts," Economic Research Papers 268330, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
  34. Luis H.B. Braido, 2005. "Risk and Insurance in Sharecropping," Risk and Insurance 0508002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  35. repec:eee:labchp:v:2:y:1986:i:c:p:789-848 is not listed on IDEAS
  36. Fosco, C. & Mengel, F., 2008. "Incentives and informal networks," Research Memorandum 022, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  37. Dionne, Georges & Maurice, Mathieu & Pinquet, Jean & Vanasse, Charles, 2001. "The Role of Memory in Long-Term Contracting with Moral Hazard: Empirical Evidence in Automobile Insurance," Working Papers 01-5, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
  38. Russell Cooper, 1984. "Insurance, Flexibility and Non-contingent Trades," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 691, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  39. G. Dionne & N. Doherty & N. Fombaron, 2000. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets," THEMA Working Papers 2000-21, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  40. Barbos, Andrei, 2019. "Dynamic contracts with random monitoring," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 1-16.
  41. Luis H. B. Braido, 2008. "Evidence on the Incentive Properties of Share Contracts," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(2), pages 327-349, May.
  42. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 14, pages 309-330, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  43. Parilina, Elena M. & Zaccour, Georges, 2024. "Payment schemes for sustaining cooperation in dynamic games played over event trees," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 313(3), pages 1200-1216.
  44. B. Caillaud & R. Guesnerie & P. Rey & J. Tirole, 1988. "Government Intervention in Production and Incentives Theory: A Review of Recent Contributions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
  45. Eric Maskin, 2001. "Roy Radner and Incentive Theory," Economics Working Papers 0004, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  46. ,, 2015. "Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
  47. Gerard A. Pfann & Daniel S. Hamermesh, 2001. "Two-Sided Learning, Labor Turnover and Displacement," NBER Working Papers 8273, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  48. Nahum D. Melumad, 1989. "Asymmetric information and the termination of contracts in agencies," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 5(2), pages 733-753, March.
  49. Katolnik, Svetlana & Schöndube, Jens Robert, 2015. "Don't Kill the Goose that Lays the Golden Eggs: Strategic Delay in Project Completion," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113046, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  50. Andrew Atkeson & Robert E. Lucas, Jr., 1993. "Effciency and Equality in a Simple Model of Unemployment Insurance," NBER Working Papers 4381, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  51. Katolnik, Svetlana & Schöndube, Jens Robert, 2014. "Don't Kill the Goose that Lays the Golden Eggs: Strategic Delay in Project Completion," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-533, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
  52. Rosen, Sherwin, 1988. "Transactions Costs and Internal Labor Markets," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 49-64, Spring.
  53. Holmstrom, Bengt R. & Tirole, Jean, 1989. "The theory of the firm," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 61-133, Elsevier.
  54. Guo, Yingni & Hörner, Johannes, 2020. "Dynamic Allocation without Money," TSE Working Papers 20-1133, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  55. Yingni Guo & Johannes Hörner, 2021. "Dynamic Allocation without Money," Working Papers hal-03187506, HAL.
  56. Sylvain Chassang, 2013. "Calibrated Incentive Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(5), pages 1935-1971, September.
  57. Biener, Christian & Eling, Martin & Landmann, Andreas & Pradhan, Shailee, 2018. "Can group incentives alleviate moral hazard? The role of pro-social preferences," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 230-249.
  58. Mounir, Angie & Perea, Andrés & Tsakas, Elias, 2018. "Common belief in approximate rationality," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 6-16.
  59. Michael D. Ryall & Rachelle C. Sampson, 2017. "Contract Structure for Joint Production: Risk and Ambiguity Under Compensatory Damages," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(4), pages 1232-1253, April.
  60. Henri Loubergé, 1998. "Risk and Insurance Economics 25 Years After," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 23(4), pages 540-567, October.
  61. Pfann Gerard A. & Hamermesh Daniel S., 2008. "Two-Sided Learning with Applications to Labor Turnover and Worker Displacement," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 228(5-6), pages 423-445, October.
  62. Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2010. "Persuasion by Cheap Talk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2361-2382, December.
    • Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2006. "Persuasion by Cheap Talk," Working Papers 2006-10, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, revised Oct 2009.
  63. David E. M. Sappington, 1991. "Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 45-66, Spring.
  64. Atakan, Alp Enver & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2014. "Reputation in Repeated Moral Hazard Games," MPRA Paper 54427, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  65. Chaigneau, Pierre, 2018. "The optimal timing of CEO compensation," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 90-94.
  66. Aaron Finkle, "undated". "Obstructive Monitoring," Working Papers 14-05, Davidson College, Department of Economics.
  67. Kornelius Kraft & Antonia Niederprüm, 1999. "Ist die Vergütung von Managern im Zeitablauf flexibler geworden?," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 51(9), pages 787-804, September.
  68. Morfi, Chrysa & Ollila, Petri & Nilsson, Jerker & Surry, Yves & Feng, Li & Karantininis, Konstantinos, 2014. "The switching behaviour of Finnish co-operative members in relation to their commitment and loyalty," 2014 International Congress, August 26-29, 2014, Ljubljana, Slovenia 182774, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
  69. Barbara E. Weißenberger, 1998. "Zur Bedeutung von Vertrauensstrategien für den Aufbau und Erhalt von Kundenbindung im Konsumgüterbereich," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 50(7), pages 614-640, July.
  70. Dionne, Georges & Fombaron, Nathalie & Doherty, Neil, 2012. "Adverse selection in insurance contracting," Working Papers 12-8, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
  71. Marco Celentani & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2008. "Maintaining A Reputation Against A Long-Lived Opponent," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 9, pages 163-176, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  72. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sundaram, Rangarajan K., 1998. "Optimal Retention in Agency Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 293-323, October.
  73. Hongbin Cai, 2009. "Costly participation and heterogeneous preferences in informational committees," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(1), pages 173-189, March.
  74. Menale Kassie & Stein Holden, 2007. "Sharecropping efficiency in Ethiopia: threats of eviction and kinship," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 37(2‐3), pages 179-188, September.
  75. Aaron Finkle & Dongsoo Shin, 2020. "Obstructive monitoring," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(4), pages 873-891, October.
  76. Paul K. Chaney, 1989. "Moral Hazard And Capital Budgeting," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 12(2), pages 113-128, June.
  77. Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1557-1700, Elsevier.
  78. Rafael Tenorio, 2000. "The Economics of Professional Boxing Contracts," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 1(4), pages 363-384, November.
  79. Johannes Hörner & Julian Jamison, 2007. "Collusion with (almost) no information," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(3), pages 804-822, September.
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