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On the Origin of Convention: Evidence from Coordination Games
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Cited by:
- Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Johannes Buckenmaier & Georg Kirchsteiger, 2020.
"Do Traders Learn to Select Efficient Market Institutions?,"
ECON - Working Papers
364, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
- Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Johannes Buckenmaier & Georg Kirchsteiger, 2020. "Do Traders Learn to Select Efficient Market Institutions ?," Working Papers ECARES 2020-40, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Cartwright, Edward & Wooders, Myrna, 2004.
"Correlated equilibrium and behavioral conformity,"
Economic Research Papers
269625, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Edward Cartwright & Myrna Wooders, 2005. "Correlated Equilibrium and Behavioral Conformity," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0526, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Cartwright, Edward & Wooders, Myrna, 2005. "Correlated equilibrium and behavioural conformity," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 732, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Blume, A. & DeJong, D.V. & Neumann, G.R. & Savin, N.E., 1998.
"Learning in Sender-Receiver Games,"
Working Papers
98-02, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
- DeJong, D.V. & Blume, A. & Neumann, G., 1998. "Learning in Sender-Receiver Games," Discussion Paper 1998-28, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Andreas Blume & Douglas V. DeJong & George R. Neumann & Nathan E. Savin, 1998. "Learning in Sender-Receiver Games," CIG Working Papers FS IV 98-13, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- DeJong, D.V. & Blume, A. & Neumann, G., 1998. "Learning in Sender-Receiver Games," Other publications TiSEM 4a8b4f46-f30b-4ad2-bb0c-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Subhasish Dugar & Quazi Shahriar, 2012. "Focal Points and Economic Efficiency: The Role of Relative Label Salience," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 78(3), pages 954-975, January.
- Tom Wilkening, 2009. "The Informational Properties of Institutions: An Experimental Study of Persistence in Markets with Certification," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1087, The University of Melbourne.
- Michele Bernasconi & Matteo Galizzi, 2010. "Network formation in repeated interactions: experimental evidence on dynamic behaviour," Mind & Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Springer;Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 9(2), pages 193-228, December.
- Verena Kurz & Andreas Orland & Kinga Posadzy, 2018.
"Fairness versus efficiency: how procedural fairness concerns affect coordination,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(3), pages 601-626, September.
- Kurz, Verena & Orland, Andreas & Posadzy, Kinga, 2016. "Fairness Versus Efficiency: How Procedural Fairness Concerns Affect Coordination," LiU Working Papers in Economics 3, Linköping University, Division of Economics, Department of Management and Engineering.
- Ed Hopkins, 2002.
"Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2141-2166, November.
- Ed Hopkins, 2000. "Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 51, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Ed Hopkins, 2001. "Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 625018000000000226, www.najecon.org.
- Ed Hopkins, 2001. "Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000226, David K. Levine.
- Masiliūnas, Aidas, 2019. "Overcoming inefficient lock-in in coordination games with sophisticated and myopic players," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 1-12.
- Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Johannes Buckenmaier & Georg Kirchsteiger, 2022.
"Do traders learn to select efficient market institutions?,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(1), pages 203-228, February.
- Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Johannes Buckenmaier & Georg Kirchsteiger, 2020. "Do Traders Learn to Select Efficient Market Institutions?," ECON - Working Papers 364, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
- Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Johannes Buckenmaier & Georg Kirchsteiger, 2021. "Do Traders Learn to Select Efficient Market Institutions ?," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/322288, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Bernardo A. Huberman & Tad Hogg HP Laboratories, 2003. "Quantum Solution of Coordination Problems," Game Theory and Information 0306005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Alm, James & McKee, Michael, 2004. "Tax compliance as a coordination game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 297-312, July.
- Landeo, Claudia M. & Spier, Kathryn E., 2015.
"Incentive contracts for teams: Experimental evidence,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 496-511.
- Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2015. "Incentive Contracts for Teams: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 53, Peruvian Economic Association.
- Landeo, Claudia & Spier, Kathryn, 2015. "Incentive Contracts for Teams: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 2015-9, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
- John Cadigan, 2005. "The Citizen Candidate Model: An Experimental Analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 197-216, April.
- Anders Poulsen & Axel Sonntag, 2019.
"Focality is Intuitive - Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Time Pressure in Coordination Games,"
Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS)
19-01, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Sonntag, Axel & Poulsen, Anders, 2019. "Focality is intuitive - Experimental evidence on the effects of time pressure in coordination games," MPRA Paper 92262, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A., 2005.
"An experimental study of costly coordination,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 349-364, May.
- Charles A. Holt & Jacob K. Goeree, "undated". "An Experimental Study of Costly Coordination," Virginia Economics Online Papers 326, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
- John Van Huyck & Frederick Rankin & Raymond Battalio, 1999. "What Does it Take to Eliminate the use of a Strategy Strictly Dominated by a Mixture?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 2(2), pages 129-150, December.
- Andreas Blume & Douglas V. DeJong & George R. Neumann & N. E. Savin, 2002. "Learning and communication in sender-receiver games: an econometric investigation," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(3), pages 225-247.
- David Bodoff, 2013. "When learning meets salience," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(2), pages 241-266, February.
- Lee Cronk & Athena Aktipis & Steven Gazzillo & Dave White & Amber Wutich & Barry Sopher, 2019. "Common knowledge promotes risk pooling in an experimental economic game," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 14(8), pages 1-15, August.
- Gary E. Bolton & Kalyan Chatterjee & Kathleen L. McGinn, 2013.
"How Communication Links Influence Coalition Bargaining: A Laboratory Investigation,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining, chapter 6, pages 113-128,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Gary E. Bolton & Kalyan Chatterjee & Kathleen L. McGinn, 2003. "How Communication Links Influence Coalition Bargaining: A Laboratory Investigation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 49(5), pages 583-598, May.
- Blume, A. & DeJong, D.V. & Neumann, G. & Savin, N.E., 2000.
"Learning and Communication in Sender-Reciever Games : An Economic Investigation,"
Other publications TiSEM
138dc36b-5269-421a-9e79-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Blume, A. & DeJong, D.V. & Neumann, G. & Savin, N.E., 2000. "Learning and Communication in Sender-Reciever Games : An Economic Investigation," Discussion Paper 2000-09, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Edward Cartwright & Myrna Wooders, 2008. "Behavioral Properties of Correlated Equilibrium; Social Group Structures with Conformity and Stereotyping," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0814, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Van Huyck, John & Battalio, Raymond, 2002. "Prudence, Justice, Benevolence, and Sex: Evidence from Similar Bargaining Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 227-246, May.
- Dimitri Dubois & Marc Willinger & Phu Nguyen Van, 2008.
"Optimization incentive and relative riskiness in experimental coordination games,"
Working Papers
08-19, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Nov 2008.
- Dimitri Dubois & Marc Willinger & Phu Nguyen-Van, 2009. "Optimization incentive and relative riskiness in experimental coordination games," Working Papers 02, Development and Policies Research Center (DEPOCEN), Vietnam.
- Pilwon Kim & Dongryul Lee, 2019. "Repeated minimum-effort coordination games," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 1343-1359, September.
- George R. Neumann & Nathan E. Savin, 2000. "Learning and Communication in Sender-Receiver Games: An Econometric Investigation," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1852, Econometric Society.
- Martin Sefton, 1999. "A Model of Behavior in Coordination Game Experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 2(2), pages 151-164, December.
- Rankin, Frederick W. & Van Huyck, John B. & Battalio, Raymond C., 2000. "Strategic Similarity and Emergent Conventions: Evidence from Similar Stag Hunt Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 315-337, August.