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What Does it Take to Eliminate the use of a Strategy Strictly Dominated by a Mixture?

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  • John Van Huyck
  • Frederick Rankin
  • Raymond Battalio

Abstract

This paper reports an experiment to determine whether subjects will learn to stop using a strictly dominated strategy that can be an above average reply. It is difficult to find an experimental design that eliminates the play of the strictly dominated strategy completely. The least effective treatment used money to motivate behavior directly. The most effective treatment used a binary-lottery with money prizes to induce preferences, but even this treatment required giving subjects plenty of experience. Doing so reduced the play of the strictly dominated strategy to around 10 percent by the end of a session. There is no evidence for the explosive cycling needed to make the strictly dominated strategy an above average reply. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999

Suggested Citation

  • John Van Huyck & Frederick Rankin & Raymond Battalio, 1999. "What Does it Take to Eliminate the use of a Strategy Strictly Dominated by a Mixture?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 2(2), pages 129-150, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:2:y:1999:i:2:p:129-150
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1009996122528
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    4. Juan D. Montoro-Pons, 2000. "Collective Action, Free Riding And Evolution," Computing in Economics and Finance 2000 279, Society for Computational Economics.
    5. Xu, Bin & Zhou, Hai-Jun & Wang, Zhijian, 2013. "Cycle frequency in standard Rock–Paper–Scissors games: Evidence from experimental economics," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 392(20), pages 4997-5005.
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