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Effort Maximization in Asymmetric Contest Games with Heterogeneous Contestants

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Cited by:

  1. Hadi Yektaş & Magnus Hoffmann & Friedhelm Hentschel & Roland Hodler, 2019. "Wars of Conquest and Independence," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 175(4), pages 617-640.
  2. Dahm, Matthias & Esteve-González, Patricia, 2018. "Affirmative action through extra prizes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 123-142.
  3. Yizhaq Minchuk & Aner Sela, 2021. "Subsidy and Taxation in All-Pay Auctions under Incomplete," Working Papers 2104, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
  4. Christian Ewerhart, 2015. "Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(1), pages 59-71, September.
  5. Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias, 2020. "Affirmative Action Through Endogenous Set-Asides," QM&ET Working Papers 20-1, University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory.
  6. Franke, Jörg & Kanzow, Christian & Leininger, Wolfgang & Schwartz, Alexandra, 2014. "Lottery versus all-pay auction contests: A revenue dominance theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 116-126.
  7. Wen‐Jhan Jane, 2024. "Interim performance information and risk taking in a tournament—Field evidence from professional basketball," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 71(2), pages 145-174, May.
  8. Dmitry Ryvkin, 2022. "To Fight or to Give Up? Dynamic Contests with a Deadline," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(11), pages 8144-8165, November.
  9. Gil Epstein & Yosef Mealem & Shmuel Nitzan, 2013. "The efficacy and efforts of interest groups in post elections policy formation," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 77-105, February.
  10. Franke, Jörg & Leininger, Wolfgang & Wasser, Cédric, 2018. "Optimal favoritism in all-pay auctions and lottery contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 22-37.
  11. Eric Avis & Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan & Carlos Varjão, "undated". "Money and Politics: The Effects of Campaign Spending Limits on Political Competition and Incumbency Advantage," Textos para discussão 656, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil).
  12. Ella Segev & Aner Sela, 2014. "Sequential all-pay auctions with head starts," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(4), pages 893-923, December.
  13. Noam Cohen & Guy Maor & Aner Sela, 2018. "Two-stage elimination contests with optimal head starts," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 22(3), pages 177-192, December.
  14. Ashwin Rode, 2021. "Rent Seeking over Tradable Emission Permits," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 78(2), pages 257-285, February.
  15. Einy, E & Haimanko, O & Moreno, D & Sela, A & Shitovitz, B, 2013. "Tullock Contests with Asymmetric Information," Discussion Papers 2013-11, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  16. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2017. "Biased contests for symmetric players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 116-144.
  17. Shanglyu Deng & Hanming Fang & Qiang Fu & Zenan Wu, 2023. "Information Favoritism and Scoring Bias in Contests," PIER Working Paper Archive 23-002, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  18. A. Aiche & E. Einy & O. Haimanko & D. Moreno & A. Sela & B. Shitovitz, 2019. "Information in Tullock contests," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 86(3), pages 303-323, May.
  19. Grandjean, G. & Tellone, D. & Vergote, W., 2016. "Cooperation, Competition and Entry in a Tullock Contest," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2016032, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  20. José Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, "undated". "Supplier Diversity before the Time of Cholera," Discussion Papers in Economics 20/07, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
  21. Ratul Lahkar & Rezina Sultana, 2020. "Affirmative Action in Large Population Contests," Working Papers 40, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
  22. Minchuk, Yizhaq & Sela, Aner, 2023. "Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 99-114.
  23. René Kirkegaard, 2020. "Microfounded Contest Design," Working Papers 2003, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
  24. Barbieri, Stefano & Serena, Marco, 2022. "Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 1-30.
  25. Ratul Lahkar & Rezina Sultana, 2024. "Affirmative action in large population tullock contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 201(1), pages 327-353, October.
  26. Cohen, Chen & Darioshi, Roy & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2022. "Optimal favoritism and maximal revenue: A generalized result," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
  27. Epstein, Gil S. & Mealem, Yosef, 2013. "Politicians, Governed vs. Non-Governed Interest Groups and Rent Dissipation," IZA Discussion Papers 7736, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  28. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve‐González & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2023. "Heterogeneity, leveling the playing field, and affirmative action in contests," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 89(3), pages 924-974, January.
  29. Franke, Jörg & Leininger, Wolfgang, 2014. "On the efficient provision of public goods by means of biased lotteries: The two player case," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(3), pages 436-439.
  30. Mikhail Drugov & Margaret Meyer & Marc M ller, 2022. "Selecting the Best when Selection is Hard," Diskussionsschriften dp2204, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
  31. Beviá, Carmen & Corchón, Luis C., 2015. "Centralized vs decentralized contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 32-35.
  32. Yosef Mealem & Shmuel Nitzan, 2012. "Differential Prize Taxation and Structural Discrimination in Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 3831, CESifo.
  33. Olivier Bos & Béatrice Roussillon & Paul Schweinzer, 2016. "Agreeing on Efficient Emissions Reduction," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 118(4), pages 785-815, October.
  34. Ratul Lahkar & Saptarshi Mukherjee, 2022. "Optimal Large Population Tullock Contests," Working Papers 82, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
  35. Timothy Mathews & Soiliou Daw Namoro & James W. Boudreau, 2023. "The Impact of Organizer Market Structure on Participant Entry Behavior in a Multi-Tournament Environment," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(1), pages 1-21, January.
  36. Kräkel, Matthias & Szech, Nora & von Bieberstein, Frauke, 2014. "Externalities in recruiting," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 107(PA), pages 123-135.
  37. Yosef Mealem & Shmuel Nitzan, 2014. "Equity and effectiveness of optimal taxation in contests under an all-pay auction," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(2), pages 437-464, February.
  38. Zhu, Feng, 2021. "On optimal favoritism in all-pay contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
  39. Gil S. Epstein & Yosef Mealem & Shmuel Nitzan, 2013. "Lotteries vs. All-Pay Auctions in Fair and Biased Contests," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(1), pages 48-60, March.
  40. Tomohiko Kawamori, 2020. "Extractive contest design," Papers 2006.01808, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2022.
  41. MEALEM, Yosef & NITZAN, Shmuel & UI, Takashi & 宇井, 貴志, 2016. "The Advantage of Dual Discrimination in Lottery Contest Games," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-34, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
  42. Lorens A. Imhof & Matthias Kräkel, 2023. "Team Diversity and Incentives," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(4), pages 2497-2516, April.
  43. Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias, 2024. "On the trade-off between supplier diversity and cost-effective procurement," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 217(C), pages 63-90.
  44. Kawamori, Tomohiko, 2023. "Complete-rent-dissipation contest design," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 232(C).
  45. Li, Bo & Wu, Zenan & Xing, Zeyu, 2023. "Optimally biased contests with draws," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
  46. Lu, Jingfeng & Wang, Zhewei & Zhou, Lixue, 2022. "Optimal favoritism in contests with identity-contingent prizes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 196(C), pages 40-50.
  47. Serhat Doğan & Emin Karagözoğlu & Kerim Keskin & Çağrı Sağlam, 2023. "Large Tullock contests," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 140(2), pages 169-179, October.
  48. Omri Haluta & Aner Sela, 2020. "Effort Maximization In Contests Under A Balance Constraint," Working Papers 2006, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
  49. Todd Kaplan & David Wettstein, 2015. "The optimal design of rewards in contests," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 19(4), pages 327-339, December.
  50. Jörg Franke & Wolfgang Leininger & Cédric Wasser, 2014. "Revenue Maximizing Head Starts in Contests," Ruhr Economic Papers 0524, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
  51. Deng, Shanglyu & Fu, Qiang & Wu, Zenan, 2021. "Optimally biased Tullock contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 10-21.
  52. repec:zbw:rwirep:0524 is not listed on IDEAS
  53. Andreas Goetsch & Christian Salzmann, 2019. "The Impact of Contest Dynamics on Ex Post Doping Audits," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 20(3), pages 411-427, April.
  54. Franke, Jörg & Leininger, Wolfgang, 2013. "On the Efficient Provision of Public Goods by Means of Lotteries," Ruhr Economic Papers 399, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
  55. Alexandre de Cornière & Greg Taylor, 2014. "Quality Provision in the Presence of a Biased Intermediary," Working Papers 14-06, NET Institute.
  56. Jean-François Mercier, 2018. "Selecting contestants for a rent-seeking contest," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(3), pages 927-947, September.
  57. Franke, Jörg & Leininger, Wolfgang & Wasser, Cédric, 2014. "Revenue Maximizing Head Starts in Contests," Ruhr Economic Papers 524, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
  58. Fu, Qiang & Wu, Zenan, 2020. "On the optimal design of biased contests," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(4), November.
  59. Clark, Derek J. & Kundu, Tapas, 2021. "Competitive balance: Information disclosure and discrimination in an asymmetric contest," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 178-198.
  60. Philipp Kastrau & Erika Deserranno & Gianmarco León-Ciliotta, 2021. "Promotions and Productivity: The Role of Meritocracy and Pay Progression in the Public Sector," Working Papers 1239, Barcelona School of Economics.
  61. Serena, Marco, 2017. "Quality contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 15-25.
  62. Grandjean, G. & Tellone, D. & Vergote, W., 2017. "Endogenous network formation in a Tullock contest," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 1-10.
  63. Osório António, 2018. "Conflict and Competition over Multi-Issues," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(2), pages 1-17, July.
  64. Feng, Xin & Jiao, Qian & Kuang, Zhonghong & Lu, Jingfeng, 2024. "Optimal prize design in team contests with pairwise battles," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 215(C).
  65. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Anastasia Danilov & Martin G. Kocher, 2023. "The Lifecycle of Affirmative Action Policies and Its Effect on Effort and Sabotage Behavior," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 401, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  66. Shanglyu Deng & Hanming Fang & Qiang Fu & Zenan Wu, 2020. "Confidence Management in Tournaments," NBER Working Papers 27186, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  67. Fu, Qiang & Lyu, Youji & Wu, Zenan & Zhang, Yuanjie, 2022. "Expectations-based loss aversion in contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 1-27.
  68. Derek J. Clark & Tore Nilssen & Jan Yngve Sand, 2020. "Gaining advantage by winning contests," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 24(1), pages 23-38, June.
  69. Shanglyu Deng & Hanming Fang & Qiang Fu & Zenan Wu, 2020. "Confidence Management in Tournaments," NBER Working Papers 27186, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  70. repec:elg:eechap:15325_8 is not listed on IDEAS
  71. Ratul Lahkar & Rezina Sultana, 2023. "Rent dissipation in large population Tullock contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 197(1), pages 253-282, October.
  72. Deserranno, Erika & Leon-Ciliotta, Gianmarco, 2022. "Promotions and Productivity: The Role of Meritocracy and Pay Progression in the Public Sector," CEPR Discussion Papers 15837, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  73. Yosef Mealem & Shmuel Nitzan, 2013. "Direct and Structural Discrimination in Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 4518, CESifo.
  74. Gil Epstein & Yosef Mealem, 2015. "Politicians, governed versus non-governed interest groups and rent dissipation," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 79(1), pages 133-149, July.
  75. Osório, António (António Miguel), 2018. "Conflict and Competition over Multi-Issues," Working Papers 2072/306550, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  76. Dongryul Lee & Joon Song, 2019. "Optimal Team Contests to Induce More Efforts," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 20(3), pages 448-476, April.
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