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Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members' Voting

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Benesch, Christine & Bütler, Monika & Hofer, Katharina E., 2018. "Transparency in parliamentary voting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 60-76.
  2. Sean Gailmard & Jeffery A. Jenkins, 2009. "Agency Problems, the 17th Amendment, and Representation in the Senate," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(2), pages 324-342, April.
  3. James M. Snyder & David Strömberg, 2010. "Press Coverage and Political Accountability," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(2), pages 355-408, April.
  4. Schelker, Mark, 2018. "Lame ducks and divided government: How voters control the unaccountable," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 131-144.
  5. Alan E. Wiseman, 2006. "A Theory of Partisan Support and Entry Deterrence in Electoral Competition," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 18(2), pages 123-158, April.
  6. Stephen Ansolabehere & Philip Edward Jones, 2010. "Constituents’ Responses to Congressional Roll‐Call Voting," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(3), pages 583-597, July.
  7. Walter J. Stone & Elizabeth N. Simas, 2010. "Candidate Valence and Ideological Positions in U.S. House Elections," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(2), pages 371-388, April.
  8. Tom S. Clark, 2009. "The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(4), pages 971-989, October.
  9. René Lindstädt & Ryan Wielen, 2011. "Timely shirking: time-dependent monitoring and its effects on legislative behavior in the U.S. Senate," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 119-148, July.
  10. Breitmoser, Yves & Valasek, Justin, 2017. "A rationale for unanimity in committees," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2017-308, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
  11. Cortney S. Rodet, 2014. "Voter Behavior, Term Limits, and Seniority Advantage in Pork-Barrel Politics," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 170(4), pages 646-683, December.
  12. Jamie L. Carson & Gregory Koger & Matthew J. Lebo & Everett Young, 2010. "The Electoral Costs of Party Loyalty in Congress," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(3), pages 598-616, July.
  13. McMurray, Joseph, 2022. "Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 150-161.
  14. Justin Buchler, 2011. "The proximity paradox: the legislative agenda and the electoral success of ideological extremists," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 1-19, July.
  15. David R. Jones, 2010. "Partisan Polarization and Congressional Accountability in House Elections," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(2), pages 323-337, April.
  16. Richard J. McAlexander & Johannes Urpelainen, 2020. "Elections and Policy Responsiveness: Evidence from Environmental Voting in the U.S. Congress," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 37(1), pages 39-63, January.
  17. Jeffrey Harden & Thomas Carsey, 2012. "Balancing constituency representation and party responsiveness in the US Senate: the conditioning effect of state ideological heterogeneity," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 137-154, January.
  18. Björn Kauder & Niklas Potrafke, 2022. "Rewarding conservative politicians? Evidence from voting on same-sex marriage," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(1), pages 161-172, April.
  19. Björn Kauder & Niklas Potrafke, 2017. "Do Bundestag MPs Who Fail to Toe the Party Line Get Told Off," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 70(12), pages 26-29, June.
  20. Ortner, Juan, 2017. "A theory of political gridlock," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
  21. John W. Patty, 2008. "Equilibrium Party Government," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 52(3), pages 636-655, July.
  22. Robert E. Hogan, 2008. "Policy Responsiveness and Incumbent Reelection in State Legislatures," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 52(4), pages 858-873, October.
  23. Ryan J. Vander Wielen, 2023. "Party leaders as welfare-maximizing coalition builders in the pursuit of party-related public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 194(1), pages 75-99, January.
  24. Daniel M. Butler & Jeffrey J. Harden, 2023. "Can Institutional Reform Protect Election Certification?," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, , vol. 708(1), pages 257-270, July.
  25. Milena Djourelova & Ruben Durante & Gregory J. Martin, 2021. "The Impact of Online Competition on Local Newspapers: Evidence from the Introduction of Craigslist," CESifo Working Paper Series 9090, CESifo.
  26. Joseph McGarrity, 2005. "Macroeconomic conditions and committee re-election rates," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 453-480, September.
  27. Michael J. Ensley & Michael W. Tofias & Scott De Marchi, 2009. "District Complexity as an Advantage in Congressional Elections," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(4), pages 990-1005, October.
  28. Mark D. Ramirez, 2021. "Understanding public blame attributions when private contractors are responsible for civilian casualties," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 54(1), pages 21-40, March.
  29. Christopher R. Berry & Barry C. Burden & William G. Howell, 2010. "After Enactment: The Lives and Deaths of Federal Programs," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(1), pages 1-17, January.
  30. Justin Buchler, 2007. "The social sub-optimality of competitive elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(3), pages 439-456, December.
  31. Dennis, Christopher & Medoff, Marshall H. & Magnera, Michael, 2008. "Constituents' economic interests and senator support for spending limitations," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 2443-2453, December.
  32. Royce Carroll & Hiroki Kubo, 2018. "Polarization and ideological congruence between parties and supporters in Europe," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 176(1), pages 247-265, July.
  33. Jacob M. Grumbach & Jamila Michener, 2022. "American Federalism, Political Inequality, and Democratic Erosion," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, , vol. 699(1), pages 143-155, January.
  34. Björn Kauder & Niklas Potrafke & Marina Riem, 2017. "Do Parties Punish MPs for Voting Against the Party Line?," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 63(3), pages 317-332.
  35. Brandon Marshall & Michael Peress, 2018. "Dynamic estimation of ideal points for the US Congress," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 176(1), pages 153-174, July.
  36. Matias Iaryczower & Gabriel Katz, 2016. "What does IT Take for Congress to Enact Good Policies? an Analysis of Roll Call Voting in the US Congress," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 79-104, March.
  37. Jamie L. Carson & Ryan D. Williamson, 2018. "Candidate ideology and electoral success in congressional elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 176(1), pages 175-192, July.
  38. Justin Fox, 2007. "Government transparency and policymaking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 23-44, April.
  39. Qian Liu & Yingying Wang & Ning Kang, 2023. "Analyzing the Influence of BRI Foreign Direct Investment on Governance: Perspective from Southeast Asian Countries," Global Journal of Emerging Market Economies, Emerging Markets Forum, vol. 15(2), pages 289-305, May.
  40. Juan Ortner, 2014. "Political Bargaining in a Changing World," 2014 Meeting Papers 445, Society for Economic Dynamics.
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