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The social sub-optimality of competitive elections

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  • Justin Buchler

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  • Justin Buchler, 2007. "The social sub-optimality of competitive elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(3), pages 439-456, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:133:y:2007:i:3:p:439-456
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-007-9207-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Canes-Wrone, Brandice & Brady, David W. & Cogan, John F., 2002. "Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members' Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 96(1), pages 127-140, March.
    2. Niemi, Richard G. & Deegan, John, 1978. "A Theory of Political Districting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(4), pages 1304-1323, December.
    3. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jan Klingelhöfer, 2019. "Competitive Elections, Incumbency Advantage,and Accountability," CFDS Discussion Paper Series 2019/8, Center for Financial Development and Stability at Henan University, Kaifeng, Henan, China.
    2. Gersbach, Hans, 2007. "Vote-share Contracts and Democracy," CEPR Discussion Papers 6497, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Jan Klingelhöfer, 2021. "Competitive elections, incumbency advantage, and accountability," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(4), pages 1397-1428, June.
    4. Hans Gersbach, 2020. "History-Bound Reelections," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 33-75, August.

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