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Busy Voters, Agenda Control, and the Power of Information

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph & van Winden, Frans, 1997. "Campaign expenditures, contributions and direct endorsements: The strategic use of information and money to influence voter behavior," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 1-31, February.
  2. Peter Selb, 2008. "Supersized votes: ballot length, uncertainty, and choice in direct legislation elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(3), pages 319-336, June.
  3. Jo Thori Lind & Dominic Rohner, 2017. "Knowledge is Power: A Theory of Information, Income and Welfare Spending," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 84(336), pages 611-646, October.
  4. Cukierman, Alex & Tommasi, Mariano, 1998. "When Does It Take a Nixon to Go to China?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 180-197, March.
  5. Valentino Larcinese, 2007. "Does political knowledge increase turnout? Evidence from the 1997 British general election," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(3), pages 387-411, June.
  6. Enriqueta Aragonès & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2017. "Imperfectly Informed Voters And Strategic Extremism," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(2), pages 439-471, May.
  7. Lohmann, Susanne & Hopenhayn, Hugo, 1998. "Delegation and the Regulation of Risk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 222-246, May.
  8. Cukierman, A. & Spiegel, Y., 1998. "When do Representative and Direct Democracies Lead to Similar Policy Choices?," Papers 21-98, Tel Aviv.
  9. Carsten Helm & Michael Neugart, 2013. "Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(3), pages 383-406, September.
  10. Wittman, Donald, 2007. "Candidate quality, pressure group endorsements and the nature of political advertising," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 360-378, June.
  11. Tsuyoshi Hatori & Kiyoshi Kobayashi, 2012. "Knowledge, Political Innovation and Referendum," Chapters, in: Charlie Karlsson & Börje Johansson & Roger R. Stough (ed.), The Regional Economics of Knowledge and Talent, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  12. Dimitrios Xefteris, 2011. "Referenda as a Catch-22," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(1), pages 121-138, June.
  13. Jerome S. Legge Jr. & Robert F. Durant, 2010. "Public Opinion, Risk Assessment, and Biotechnology: Lessons from Attitudes toward Genetically Modified Foods in the European Union," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 27(1), pages 59-76, January.
  14. Amy Pond, 2021. "Biased politicians and independent agencies," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 33(3), pages 279-299, July.
  15. Christine Benesch & Rino L. Heim & Mark Schelker & Lukas D. Schmid, 2021. "Do Voting Advice Applications Change Political Behavior?," CESifo Working Paper Series 8868, CESifo.
  16. Danny Hayes & Seth C. McKee, 2009. "The Participatory Effects of Redistricting," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(4), pages 1006-1023, October.
  17. Elhanan Helpman & Gene M. Grossman, 1999. "Competing for Endorsements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 501-524, June.
  18. Daniel Finke & Thomas König, 2009. "Why risk popular ratification failure? A comparative analysis of the choice of the ratification instrument in the 25 Member States of the EU," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 341-365, September.
  19. Denise L. Anthony & Douglas D. Heckathorn & Steven M. Maser, 1994. "Rational Rhetoric in Politics," Rationality and Society, , vol. 6(4), pages 489-518, October.
  20. Cheryl Boudreau & Mathew D. McCubbins, 2008. "Nothing But the Truth? Experiments on Adversarial Competition, Expert Testimony, and Decision Making," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 5(4), pages 751-789, December.
  21. repec:dar:wpaper:35489 is not listed on IDEAS
  22. Anke Kessler, 2005. "Representative versus direct democracy: The role of informational asymmetries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(1), pages 9-38, January.
  23. Bryan C. McCannon & Joylynn Pruitt, 2018. "Taking on the boss: Informative contests in prosecutor elections," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 20(5), pages 657-671, October.
  24. Alan S. Gerber & Gregory A. Huber & Ebonya Washington, 2009. "Party Affiliation, Partisanship, and Political Beliefs: A Field Experiment," NBER Working Papers 15365, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  25. Gabor Toka & Marina Popescu, 2009. "Public Television, Private Television and Citizens' Political Knowledge," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers 66, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
  26. Ronald Fischer & Pablo González & Pablo Serra, 2003. "The Privatization of Social Services in Chile: an Evaluation," Documentos de Trabajo 167, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  27. Fischer, Ronald & Gonzalez, Pablo & Serra, Pablo, 2006. "Does competition in privatized social services work? The Chilean Experience," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 647-664, April.
  28. Thomas König, 2007. "Discontinuity," European Union Politics, , vol. 8(3), pages 411-432, September.
  29. Shamir Noam & Shamir Julia, 2012. "The Role of Prosecutor's Incentives in Creating Congestion in Criminal Courts," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(3), pages 579-618, December.
  30. Matt Lamb & Steven Perry, 2020. "Knowing What You Don't Know: The Role of Information and Sophistication in Ballot Completion," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 101(3), pages 1132-1149, May.
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