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Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information

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  • Helm, Carsten
  • Neugart, Michael

Abstract

With ideological parties being better informed about the state of the world than voters, the true motivation of policy proposals is hard to judge for the electorate. However, if reform proposals have to be agreed upon by government members with heterogeneous policy preferences, it may become possible for the government to signal to the voters its private information about the necessity of reforms. This provides a rationale why coalition governments may find it easier to implement reforms than single-party governments, why oversized coalitions are formed, and why governments sometimes have cabinet members from opposing parties.

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  • Helm, Carsten & Neugart, Michael, 2024. "Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information," Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute for Business Studies (BWL) 149718, Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute for Business Studies (BWL).
    • Handle: RePEc:dar:wpaper:149718
    DOI: 10.1628/093245613X13620416111362
    Note: for complete metadata visit http://tubiblio.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/149718/
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