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'On Forward Induction

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Andrés Perea & Elias Tsakas, 2019. "Limited focus in dynamic games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(2), pages 571-607, June.
  2. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2005. "Justification of Stable Equilibria," Research Papers 1896, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  3. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2009. "On Forward Induction," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(1), pages 1-28, January.
  4. Garratt, Rodney J. & van Oordt, Maarten R.C., 2022. "Entrepreneurial incentives and the role of initial coin offerings," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
  5. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2012. "Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection for Generic Two‐Player Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(4), pages 1639-1699, July.
  6. Françoise Forges & József Sákovics, 2022. "Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(3), pages 589-605, November.
  7. Eguia, Jon X. & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Morton, Rebecca & Nicolò, Antonio, 2018. "Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 465-483.
  8. Evdokimov, Piotr & Rustichini, Aldo, 2016. "Forward induction: Thinking and behavior," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 195-208.
  9. Andreas Blume & Peter H. Kriss & Roberto A. Weber, 2017. "Pre-play communication with forgone costly messages: experimental evidence on forward induction," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(2), pages 368-395, June.
  10. Roman Inderst & Sebastian Pfeil, 2013. "Securitization and Compensation in Financial Institutions," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 17(4), pages 1323-1364.
  11. Joseph Abdou & Nikolaos Pnevmatikos & Marco Scarsini & Xavier Venel, 2022. "Decomposition of Games: Some Strategic Considerations," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 47(1), pages 176-208, February.
  12. Kriss, Peter H. & Blume, Andreas & Weber, Roberto A., 2016. "Coordination with decentralized costly communication," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 225-241.
  13. Oikonomou, V.K. & Jost, J, 2013. "Periodic strategies and rationalizability in perfect information 2-Player strategic form games," MPRA Paper 48117, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  14. Yuval Heller & Eyal Winter, 2016. "Rule Rationality," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57(3), pages 997-1026, August.
  15. Dufwenberg, Martin & Köhlin, Gunnar & Martinsson, Peter & Medhin, Haileselassie, 2016. "Thanks but no thanks: A new policy to reduce land conflict," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 31-50.
  16. Anton Miglo, 2022. "Choice between IEO and ICO: Speed vs. Liquidity vs. Risk," FinTech, MDPI, vol. 1(3), pages 1-18, September.
  17. Perea, Andrés, 2017. "Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 489-516.
  18. Jin, Ye & Zhou, Zhen & Brandenburger, Adam, 2023. "Coordination via delay: Theory and experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 23-49.
  19. Man, Priscilla T.Y., 2012. "Forward induction equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 265-276.
  20. Clark, Daniel & Fudenberg, Drew & He, Kevin, 2022. "Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
  21. Anton Miglo, 2021. "STO vs. ICO: A Theory of Token Issues under Moral Hazard and Demand Uncertainty," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(6), pages 1-35, May.
  22. Yildiz, Muhamet, 2015. "Invariance to representation of information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 142-156.
  23. Committee, Nobel Prize, 2020. "Improvements to auction theory and inventions of new auction formats," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2020-2, Nobel Prize Committee.
  24. Catonini, Emiliano, 2019. "Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 101-117.
  25. Guarino, Pierfrancesco, 2020. "An epistemic analysis of dynamic games with unawareness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 257-288.
  26. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2008. "Decision-Theoretic Forward Induction," Research Papers 1986, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  27. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2014. "Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words? Auditing, Disclosure, and Verification in Organizations," Working Papers gueconwpa~14-14-04, Georgetown University, Department of Economics, revised 13 Jun 2015.
  28. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2008. "Axiomatic Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Signalling Games with Generic Payoffs," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002381, David K. Levine.
  29. Anderlini, Luca & Gerardi, Dino & Lagunoff, Roger, 2016. "Auditing, disclosure, and verification in decentralized decision problems," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 131(PA), pages 393-408.
  30. Miglo, Anton, 2020. "ICO vs. Equity Financing Under Imperfect, Complex and Asymmetric Information," MPRA Paper 99598, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  31. Dekel, Eddie & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2015. "Epistemic Game Theory," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
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