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ICO vs. Equity Financing under Imperfect, Complex and Asymmetric Information

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  • Anton Miglo

    (Adam Smith Business School, College of Social Science, University of Glasgow, Glasgow G128QQ, UK)

Abstract

This paper offers a game-theoretic model of a firm that raises funds for financing an innovative business project and chooses between ICO (initial coin offering) and equity financing. The model is based on information problems associated with both ICO and equity financing well-documented in the literature. Several new features are introduced, for example, information complexity, which is analyzed along with a more traditional imperfect information and an asymmetric information approach. The model provides several implications that have not yet been tested. For example, we find that the message complexity can be beneficial for firms conducting ICOs. Also, high-quality projects can use ICO as a signal of quality. Thirdly, the average size of projects undertaking equity financing is larger than that of firms conducting ICO.

Suggested Citation

  • Anton Miglo, 2023. "ICO vs. Equity Financing under Imperfect, Complex and Asymmetric Information," FinTech, MDPI, vol. 3(1), pages 1-23, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jfinte:v:3:y:2023:i:1:p:2-39:d:1308540
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Anton Miglo, 2021. "STO vs. ICO: A Theory of Token Issues under Moral Hazard and Demand Uncertainty," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(6), pages 1-35, May.
    2. Anton Miglo, 2022. "Choice between IEO and ICO: Speed vs. Liquidity vs. Risk," FinTech, MDPI, vol. 1(3), pages 1-18, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    asymmetric information; complex information; initial coin offering (ICO); equity financing; signaling;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship
    • M13 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - New Firms; Startups
    • M15 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - IT Management
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D

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