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Optimal Favoritism in All-Pay Auctions and Lottery Contests

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias, 2020. "Affirmative Action Through Endogenous Set-Asides," QM&ET Working Papers 20-1, University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory.
  2. Franke, Jörg & Leininger, Wolfgang & Wasser, Cédric, 2018. "Optimal favoritism in all-pay auctions and lottery contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 22-37.
  3. Knyazev Dmitriy & Moser Caspar, 2024. "Offsetting Distortion Effects of Head Starts on Incentives in Tullock Contests," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 24(2), pages 467-485.
  4. Samuel Häfner & Georg Nöldeke, 2022. "Sorting in iterated incumbency contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(4), pages 1103-1140, November.
  5. Clark, Derek J. & Nilssen, Tore, 2018. "Beating the Matthew Effect: Head Starts and Catching Up in a Dynamic All-Pay Auction," Memorandum 2/2018, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  6. Letina, Igor & Liu, Shuo & Netzer, Nick, 2023. "Optimal contest design: Tuning the heat," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
  7. Matthias Dahm, 2017. "All-Pay Auctions with Extra Prize: A Partial Exclusion Principle," Discussion Papers 2017-01, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  8. Shanglyu Deng & Hanming Fang & Qiang Fu & Zenan Wu, 2023. "Information Favoritism and Scoring Bias in Contests," PIER Working Paper Archive 23-002, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  9. Hervas-Drane, Andres & Shelegia, Sandro, 2022. "Price competition with a stake in your rival," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
  10. José Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, "undated". "Supplier Diversity before the Time of Cholera," Discussion Papers in Economics 20/07, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
  11. René Kirkegaard, 2020. "Microfounded Contest Design," Working Papers 2003, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
  12. Derek J. Clark & Tore Nilssen, 2021. "Competitive balance when winning breeds winners," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(2), pages 363-384, February.
  13. Cohen, Chen & Darioshi, Roy & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2022. "Optimal favoritism and maximal revenue: A generalized result," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
  14. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve‐González & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2023. "Heterogeneity, leveling the playing field, and affirmative action in contests," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 89(3), pages 924-974, January.
  15. Malin Arve & Olga Chiappinelli, 2021. "The Role of Budget Constraints in Sequential Elimination Tournaments," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(4), pages 1059-1087, October.
  16. Zhu, Feng, 2021. "On optimal favoritism in all-pay contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
  17. Tomohiko Kawamori, 2020. "Extractive contest design," Papers 2006.01808, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2022.
  18. Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias, 2024. "On the trade-off between supplier diversity and cost-effective procurement," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 217(C), pages 63-90.
  19. Kawamori, Tomohiko, 2023. "Complete-rent-dissipation contest design," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 232(C).
  20. Li, Bo & Wu, Zenan & Xing, Zeyu, 2023. "Optimally biased contests with draws," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
  21. Derek J. Clark & Tore Nilssen, 2022. "Fatter or fitter? On rewarding and training in a contest," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 60(1), pages 101-120, January.
  22. Goel, Sumit & Goyal, Amit, 2023. "Optimal tie-breaking rules," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
  23. Clark, Derek J. & Nilssen, Tore, 2020. "Creating balance in dynamic competitions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
  24. Wasser, Cédric & Zhang, Mengxi, 2023. "Differential treatment and the winner's effort in contests with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 90-111.
  25. Fu, Qiang & Wu, Zenan, 2020. "On the optimal design of biased contests," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(4), November.
  26. Derek J. Clark & Tore Nilssen & Jan Yngve Sand, 2020. "Gaining advantage by winning contests," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 24(1), pages 23-38, June.
  27. Shelegia, Sandro & Wilson, Chris M., 2022. "Costly participation and default allocations in all-pay contests," MPRA Paper 115027, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  28. Clark, Derek J. & Nilssen, Tore, 2018. "Keep on fighting: The dynamics of head starts in all-pay auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 258-272.
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