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How sensitive is executive compensation to organizational size?

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Nicola Meccheri & Luciano Fanti, 2012. "Managerial Delegation Schemes in a Duopoly with Endogenous Production Costs: A Comparison of Sales and Relative Profit Delegation under Centralised Unionisation," Working Paper series 44_12, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.
  2. Monique Calvi-Reveyron, 1999. "Risque de surinvestissement, signalisation et annonce du dividende : le cas français," Post-Print hal-04688933, HAL.
  3. Angel, Pedro Ortin & Fumas, Vicente Salas, 1997. "The compensation of Spanish executives: A test of a managerial talent allocation model," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 511-531, July.
  4. van Witteloostuijn, A. & Boone, C.A.J.J., 1997. "A game theory of organizational ecology : a model of managerial inertia and market selection," Research Memorandum 005, Maastricht University, Netherlands Institute of Business Organization and Strategy Research (NIBOR).
  5. Katja Rost & Margit Osterloh, 2008. "Determinants of Directors? Pay in Switzerland: ?Optimal-Contract? versus ?Fat Cat? Explanation," CREMA Working Paper Series 2008-26, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
  6. Jung, Jay Heon & Lim, Sonya S. & Park, Jongwon, 2023. "Is your surname remunerative? Surname favorability and CEO compensation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
  7. Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2014. "Organizational structure, strategic delegation and innovation in oligopolistic industries," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(1), pages 1-24, January.
  8. Constantine Manasakis & Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2010. "Endogenous managerial incentive contracts in a differentiated duopoly, with and without commitment," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 31(8), pages 531-543, December.
  9. Short, Jeremy C. & Palmer, Timothy B., 2003. "Organizational performance referents: An empirical examination of their content and influences," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 209-224, March.
  10. Carr, Michael D., 2011. "Work hours and wage inequality: Evidence from the 2004 WERS," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 417-427, August.
  11. Monique Calvi-Reveyron, 2000. "Le capitalisme familial, dans un contexte français, induit-il moins de dividendes que les autres formes d'actionnariat ?," Post-Print hal-04688940, HAL.
  12. Arjen van Witteloostuijn, 1998. "Bridging Behavioral and Economic Theories of Decline: Organizational Inertia, Strategic Competition, and Chronic Failure," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(4), pages 501-519, April.
  13. Hill, Mary S. & Lopez, Thomas J. & Reitenga, Austin L., 2016. "CEO excess compensation: The impact of firm size and managerial power," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 35-46.
  14. Iván Barreda-Tarrazona & Nikolaos Georgantzís & Constantine Manasakis & Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2012. "Managerial compensation contracts in quantity-setting duopoly," Working Papers 2012/17, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
  15. Constantine Manasakis & Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2007. "Endogenous Strategic Managerial Incentive Contracts," Working Papers 0706, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
  16. Toyne, Michael F. & Millar, James A. & Dixon, Bruce L., 2000. "The relation between CEO control and the risk of CEO compensation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 291-306, September.
  17. Galal Elhagrasey & J. Harrison & Rogene Buchholz, 1998. "Power and Pay: The Politics of CEO Compensation," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 2(4), pages 311-334, December.
  18. Ravi Dharwadkar & Maria Goranova & Pamela Brandes & Raihan Khan, 2008. "Institutional Ownership and Monitoring Effectiveness: It's Not Just How Much but What Else You Own," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 19(3), pages 419-440, June.
  19. Muhammad Zeeshan Younas, 2022. "A Spatial Agglomeration Analysis of Firm Productivity: A Case of the Textile Sector of Pakistan," Lahore Journal of Economics, Department of Economics, The Lahore School of Economics, vol. 27(1), pages 20-67, Jan-June.
  20. Pamela Brandes & Ravi Dharwadkar & Jonathan F. Ross & Linna Shi, 2022. "Time is of the Essence!: Retired Independent Directors’ Contributions to Board Effectiveness," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 179(3), pages 767-793, September.
  21. Aurélien Eminet & Zied Guedri & Stefan Asseman, 2009. "Le dirigeant est-il l’architecte de sa rémunération? Structure de contrôle du conseil d’administration et mobilisation du capital social," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 12(3), pages 5-36, September.
  22. Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván & Georgantzís, Nikolaos & Manasakis, Constantine & Mitrokostas, Evangelos & Petrakis, Emmanuel, 2016. "Endogenous managerial compensation contracts in experimental quantity-setting duopolies," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 205-217.
  23. P. Herings & Kirsten Rohde, 2008. "On the completeness of complete markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(2), pages 171-201, November.
  24. Chenli Yin & Dan Li & Maria Paz Salmador, 2022. "Institutional change of compensation policy and its impact on CEO turnover and firm performance," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 16(8), pages 2527-2552, November.
  25. Benoît Pigé, 1994. "La politique de rémunération en tant qu'incitation à la performance des dirigeants," Post-Print hal-02175846, HAL.
  26. William G. Hardin, III, 1998. "Executive Compensation in EREITs: EREIT Size is But One Determinant," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 16(3), pages 401-410.
  27. Khan, Raihan & Dharwadkar, Ravi & Brandes, Pamela, 2005. "Institutional ownership and CEO compensation: a longitudinal examination," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 58(8), pages 1078-1088, August.
  28. Monique Calvi-Reveyron, 1999. "Risque de surinvestissement, signalisation et annonce du dividende:le cas français," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 2(3), pages 115-145, September.
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