IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/bla/joares/v23y1985i1p296-325.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

Measuring Executive-Compensation - Methods And An Application

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Jean-Pierre Florens & Nathalie Naffrichoux, 1992. "Estimation du taux de partage des risques dans les contrats État-industries spatiales," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 43(5), pages 851-870.
  2. George-Levi Gayle & Limor Golan & Robert A. Miller, "undated". "Promotion, Turover and Compensation in the Executive Market," GSIA Working Papers 2008-E32, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  3. Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas Cooley, 2009. "Executive Compensation: Facts," Working Papers 09-16, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  4. Yves Mard & Sylvain Marsat, 2008. "Accounting Policies preceding CEO Changes in France [Les stratégies comptables précédant un changement de dirigeant en France]," Post-Print hal-02156579, HAL.
  5. George-Levi Gayle & Limor Golan & Robert Miller, "undated". "Are There Glass Ceilings for Female Executives?," GSIA Working Papers -1969975920, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  6. Nazim Belhocine, 2008. "The Embodiment Of Intangible Investment Goods: A Q-theory Approach," Working Paper 1217, Economics Department, Queen's University.
  7. P Abell & M Cranna & J Samuels, 1994. "Mergers," CEP Discussion Papers dp0199, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  8. Steven Balsam, 1998. "Discretionary Accounting Choices and CEO Compensation," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(3), pages 229-252, September.
  9. George-Levi Gayle & Robert A. Miller, 2009. "Has Moral Hazard Become a More Important Factor in Managerial Compensation?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1740-1769, December.
  10. George-Levi Gayle & Chen Li & Robert A. Miller, 2018. "How Well Does Agency Theory Explain Executive Compensation?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 100(3), pages 201-236.
  11. MARK L. DeFOND & JAMES JIAMBALVO, 1993. "Factors Related to Auditor†Client Disagreements over Income†Increasing Accounting Methods," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 9(2), pages 415-431, March.
  12. Christiane Pott & Tobias Tebben & Christoph Watrin, 2014. "The effect of outside directors’ and auditors’ incentives on managers’ ability to manage cash bonuses," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 18(2), pages 505-540, May.
  13. George-Levi Gayle & Limor Golan & Robert A. Miller, 2015. "Interlocked Executives and Insider Board Members: An Empirical Analysis," Working Papers 2015-40, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  14. Yves Mard & Sylvain Marsat, 2009. "Earnings management surrounding CEO changes in France [La gestion du résultat comptable autour d'un changement de dirigeant en France]," Post-Print hal-02156582, HAL.
  15. White, Lourdes Ferreira, 1996. "Executive compensation and dividend policy," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 335-358, July.
  16. Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas Cooley, 2023. "CEO Compensation: Facts," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 50, pages 6-27, October.
  17. Pierre Jinghong Liang, 2000. "Accounting Recognition, Moral Hazard, and Communication," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(3), pages 458-490, September.
  18. George-Levi Gayle & Limor Golan & Robert A. Miller, 2012. "Gender Differences in Executive Compensation and Job Mobility," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(4), pages 829-872.
  19. An, Suwei, 2023. "Essays on incentive contracts, M&As, and firm risk," Other publications TiSEM dd97d2f5-1c9d-47c5-ba62-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  20. James Jiambalvo, 1996. "Discussion of “Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC†," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(1), pages 37-47, March.
  21. A. Rashad Abdel†Khalik & Charles Chi & Dimitrios Ghicas, 1987. "Rationality of executive compensation schemes and real accounting changes," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 4(1), pages 32-60, September.
  22. Brenner, Steffen, 2011. "On the irrelevance of insider trading for managerial compensation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 293-303, February.
  23. Abell, Peter & Samuels, J. & Cranna, M., 1994. "Mergers, motivation and directors' remuneration," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 20827, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  24. Lim, Terence & Lo, Andrew W. & Merton, Robert C. & Scholes, Myron S., 2006. "The Derivatives Sourcebook," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 1(5–6), pages 365-572, April.
  25. George‐Levi Gayle & Chen Li & Robert A. Miller, 2022. "Was Sarbanes–Oxley Costly? Evidence from Optimal Contracting on CEO Compensation," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(4), pages 1189-1234, September.
  26. Emeka T. Nwaeze & Simon S. M. Yang & Q. Jennifer Yin, 2006. "Accounting Information and CEO Compensation: The Role of Cash Flow from Operations in the Presence of Earnings," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 23(1), pages 227-265, March.
  27. George-Levi Gayle & Chen Li & Robert A. Miller, 2015. "Was Sarbanes-Oxley Costly? Evidence from Optimal Contracting on CEO Compensation," Working Papers 2015-17, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  28. Noam Wasserman, 2003. "Founder-CEO Succession and the Paradox of Entrepreneurial Success," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(2), pages 149-172, April.
  29. Stanimir Morfov & Manuel Santos, 2017. "A Model of Managerial Talent: Addressing Some Puzzles in CEO Compensation," Working Papers 2017-03, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
  30. Toyne, Michael F. & Millar, James A. & Dixon, Bruce L., 2000. "The relation between CEO control and the risk of CEO compensation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 291-306, September.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.